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ABSTRACT 
 
For a more complete understanding of the significance of fascism in inter-war Britain, 
it is important to consider the extent to which fascist views were an expression or 
extension of existing mainstream views. This thesis uses original research to examine 
how far the promotion of fascist views converged with mainstream opinion and 
identifies the issues on which British fascists went beyond the acceptable boundaries 
of mainstream society.   
 Examining attitudes to antisemitism, refugees, the left, continental dictatorship 
and appeasement, culture, and, finally, the response of the mainstream press to the 
British Union of Fascists (BUF) and their reaction to what they perceived as a 
conspiracy against them, the thesis explores the possibility that there is a sufficient 
area of discursive overlap to locate British fascists within the mainstream. 
 Significantly, comparison of the British fascist press and mainstream 
newspapers reveals that, while there were considerable areas of overlapping 
discourse, nonetheless, the underlying motivations of the fascists and the mainstream 
clearly differed.  With one notable yet brief exception, the majority of the mainstream 
press regarded British fascists as belonging to the political margins and, increasingly, 
British fascism and the BUF in particular, defined itself in counter-cultural opposition 
to the mainstream. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It did not take the disgruntled right of British politics long to seek to emulate 
Mussolini’s example of fascist national renewal.  Alarmed by what they perceived as 
public apathy and the failure of post-war governments to respond to the dual threat of 
increasing national decline and imminent socialist revolution, they were attracted to 
the Fascist’s creed of action.  The first stirrings of fascism in Britain displayed little to 
distinguish it from the pre-existing radical right, but later developments saw the 
adoption of fascist policies and the evolution of an ideology that drew on British 
traditions as well as fascist principles.  Despite some limited success, fascism in 
Britain failed and much of the historiographical debate has concentrated on 
identifying the reasons for that failure.1  Richard Thurlow identified three strands 
within the historiography: comparisons between British fascist movements and 
Nazism, studies of fascism as a utopian movement and the analysis of British fascism 
in terms of fascist/anti-fascist confrontation.2   Until recently, existing research on 
British fascism has focussed on the 'major players', electoral performance, and on the 
membership and organisation of fascist groups.  This reflects a belief held by 
historians of British fascism that fresh understandings will emerge from more and 
more detail about the fascists themselves. However, whilst this detail is important, it 
is symptomatic of what Kenneth Lunn called a ‘failure of imagination’ and a 
preoccupation with it limits our understanding of the impact of British fascism on 
mainstream political and social life as well as on the lives of individuals.3   
More recently, historians have begun to adopt a more imaginative approach 
and attention has focussed on the cultural issues bound up with fascism.  This has 
provided some valuable insight; in particular the work of Martin Durham, Julie 
Gottlieb, Thomas Linehan and Dan Stone has provided both interest and 
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illumination.4  Yet, despite this recent widening of scope, there has been little 
attention paid to the ideology and attitudes of British fascists in relation to those of the 
mainstream.  Tony Kushner has pointed to the ambiguity in British responses to 
fascism: ‘a mixture of fascination, repulsion, admiration and disgust’ in which 
fascism is identified as ‘other’ and, therefore, distanced from the mainstream, yet its 
image and symbols retain an aura of magnetism.5 
 Recently, Martin Pugh has suggested that there was common ground between 
British fascists and the Conservative right.  Other historians have expressed similar 
opinions; Lunn highlighted the links between fascism and the Conservative party at a 
local level.6  Local studies by Todd Gray, Thomas Linehan, Nigel Todd, and David 
Turner support Lunn’s findings.7  Pugh also claims that far from being new or alien, 
the political ideas promoted by inter-war fascists were developments of previous 
British political thought.8  Likewise, both Neil Nugent and G. C. Webber have shown 
that other, earlier, right-wing groups had advocated similar economic and imperial 
policies to those of the BUF.9   
To provide an effective analysis of the dynamics of the relationship of British 
fascism to the mainstream this thesis adopts a thematically driven approach.  Its 
understanding of what constitutes the mainstream is not absolute, offering a more 
nuanced conception of the mainstream.  The position of the mainstream is fluid, 
relative to the issue under consideration, and variable over time.  On occasion the 
attitudes of the mainstream and the British fascists converge, but because the 
mainstream is mutable and fascist ideology lacks flexibility and abhors diversity, time 
and events see them once more at variance. 
What we perceive as the mainstream can also be described in political terms as 
the centre.  Uwe Backes’ conceptual analysis of political extremism considers the 
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relationship between the extremes of ‘left’ and ‘right’ and their relationship to the 
centre, and notes that the Aristotelian tradition regards the centre as embodying the 
principles of moderation.  In political terms the centre provides a solid and balanced 
foundation for an effective political system that incorporates elements from a variety 
of forms of government and facilitates the interaction of a host of social forces and 
differing interests.10   
More recent definitions of extremism recognise a core formed by political 
absolutism and monopolist refusal to tolerate the existence of opposing ideologies. 
Backes relates this to an understanding of extremism as ‘rejecting the minimum 
conditions of democratic constitutional states.’11 This interpretation would place 
British fascism outside of the mainstream.  However, Backes gives some theoretical 
underpinning to claims that there were areas of common ground between the 
mainstream and the fascists when he concedes that ‘the centre contains something of 
the extremes.’12 
This thesis extends our understanding of the significance of fascism in Britain 
and of its relations with mainstream perceptions.  Firstly, it differentiates the 
mainstream and extreme positions for a variety of significant issues.  Secondly, it 
considers the extent to which fascist views were an expression or extension of 
existing mainstream views.  Thirdly, it identifies the issues on which British fascists 
went beyond the acceptable boundaries of mainstream society.  Finally, where fascist 
discourse converges with that of the mainstream the significance of that convergence 
is examined to establish if the underlying motivation is the same, or whether the 
similarity of language masks different agendas.  Using the mainstream and fascist 
press in a way that has not been attempted before, this thesis explores the nature of 
British fascism and locates its place in British political and cultural thought.   
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METHODOLOGY 
The methodology supporting this thesis relies largely on qualitative research based on 
thematic identification of articles relating to the issues that are central to the thesis: 
antisemitism, refugees, the left, foreign affairs, culture, and mainstream responses to 
the BUF.  These issues were selected as they had been identified as significant within 
the historiography of British fascism.   
Other qualitative approaches, most notably Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA), were rejected as being most suited to a detailed study of a small quantity of 
textual extracts. CDA generally involves the selection of a few ‘typical texts’; the 
rationale behind the selection process is notoriously difficult to justify and frequently 
remains vague.13  While Robert de Beaugrande considers that an analysis of discourse 
is key to understanding a culture, he acknowledges that it is not realistic to expect 
CDA to provide a complete analysis.14 CDA is more usually used to explore the 
relations of power and dominance, and to analyse how social inequality is represented 
and legitimised by the use of language.15  Additionally, CDA relies strongly on the 
use of linguistic categories, and topics and content are less significant than is usual in 
historical analysis.16  Nonetheless, some of the tools of CDA are useful and, where 
relevant, this thesis considers the use of techniques such as framing, tone, modality 
and agency in the articles being analysed. 
Similarly, the use of quantative content analysis was considered and rejected.  
The advantages of quantative analysis include the use of statistical procedures to show 
patterns in texts, reducing textural material to more manageable bits of data, making 
comparisons easier.  If coding is sufficiently rigorous, the method offers a high level 
of reproducibility and reliability.17  However, in order to ensure reliability it is 
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necessary for different individuals to repeat the coding of the texts.  It can be difficult 
to achieve reliability when coding texts that are longer or more complex than a simple 
sentence, and semantic validity can be lost if words in the text have more than one 
meaning.18  The process of quantative analysis is labour intensive and, given the 
number of newspapers studied for this thesis, it would have been impossible to justify 
the use of the necessary resources as the level of coding necessary to analyse the 
issues discussed in this thesis would be very complex and the end result, divorced 
from the content and context of the text, may have lost much of its meaning.  
  
Sources I: The Fascist Press  
Any attempt to examine the ideological concerns of British fascism is predicated on 
the understanding that fascism has an ideology, an argument made convincingly by 
George Mosse, Zeev Sternhell, Stanley Payne, Roger Eatwell, and Roger Griffin, who 
all consider fascism as having an ideology with a strong revolutionary thrust.19  
Traditionally, Marxist analysis has rejected this argument and Dave Renton has 
combined a restatement of the Trotskyist perspective of fascism with an attack on 
'liberal historians', particularly Griffin.20  Despite Renton's misgivings there is 
sufficient unanimity to justify Griffin's claim that a consensus has been reached 
around a definition of fascism as:  
a genus of modern, revolutionary, mass politics which, while extremely 
heterogeneous in its social support and in the specific ideology promoted by 
its many permutations, draws its internal cohesion and driving force from a 
core myth that a period of perceived national decline and decadence is 
giving way to one of rebirth and renewal in a post-liberal new order.21 
 
Having accepted that fascist movements are capable of developing an ideology, 
it is possible to consider the ideological evolution of British fascism in connection 
with the policies and political programmes of individual movements.  The 
 11
restrictions of space allow for only the three most significant of the British fascist 
movements to be considered here.  These movements began their ideological 
development in different ways, but, by the mid-1930s their policy and propaganda 
statements had much in common.  The British Fascists (BF) was the first of the 
British movements, closely followed by the Imperial Fascist League (IFL) which 
was founded to provide a more overtly fascist programme than that of the BF, and 
finally the British Union of Fascists (BUF) which generated the most public 
support and produced the most detailed political programme.  Although there 
were other fascist movements, such as the National Fascisti, they tended to be 
short-lived and insignificant in terms of both numbers and impact.22  
The majority of contributors to the historiography of British fascism have 
located the BF, founded in May 1923 by Rotha Lintorn-Orman, as part of the 
reactionary right-wing and Roger Eatwell, David Lewis, Richard Thurlow, and G. 
C. Webber, are notable among those who find little that is fascist in the policy and 
propaganda of the BF.  This was a view shared by many of the BF’s members, 
who left to join other more robustly fascist organisations.  One former member, 
Arnold Leese, who was one of two elected fascist councillors in Stamford, left the 
BF in 1926 and later become one of the founders of the IFL.  He regarded the BF 
as dedicated to preserving the status quo rather than the founding of a fascist state 
and described it as ‘merely Conservatism with Knobs On.’23  Brigadier General 
Robert B. D. Blakeney, who had been president of the BF, also left during 1926 as 
did Rear Admiral A. E. Armstrong and the Earl of Glasgow.  Together they set up 
the British Loyalists, a body that had no overtly fascist characteristic and did not 
challenge parliamentary democracy.  Blakeney later joined Leese in the IFL 
before moving on to the BUF.24 
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Although Kenneth Lunn has argued that the historiography underrates the 
significance of the BF, it appears that, particularly in its early years, it was closer 
to Seymour Lipset’s assessment of fascism as a reaction of the middle classes 
intent on holding back the process of modernisation, in which socialism was a 
strong force, rather than to a revolutionary movement as defined by Griffin’s ‘new 
consensus.’25  Pugh suggests that during the 1920s BF policy closely matched that 
of many right-wing Conservatives, but argues against dismissing the BF as 
marginal and eccentric.26  As the 1920s drew to a close the BF adopted policies 
more in line with fascist thinking.   Thomas Linehan, notes that from 1927 the 
ideology of the BF became ‘more distinctly fascist’, a process that continued into 
the early 1930s until its dissolution in September 1935.  Yet, he also points out 
that the BF lacked certain aspects of an authentic fascist ideology, including a 
rebirth mythology, an irrationalist anti-positivist culture, and an interest in 
spiritual transcendence and the philosophy of fascism.27  So, while it would be 
difficult to claim that the BF was indisputably fascist it is clear that its policy, and 
its press, contained manifestly fascistic elements.  For this reason it is important to 
include the BF press in any analysis of the ideological development of British 
fascism.  
The BF published three newspapers between June 1925 and June 1934, though 
during the final eighteen months production was intermittent, due to the 
successful intimidation of the BF’s printers by members of the BUF, financial 
difficulties and the internal difficulties experienced following a series of 
defections to the BUF.28  The Fascist Bulletin, edited by Blakeney, appeared 
weekly between 13 June 1925 and 12 June 1926.  It was superseded by British 
Lion, a monthly paper edited by E. G. Manderville Roe, from June 1926 to June 
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1930.  The first issue of British Fascism appeared in June 1930 and was also 
edited by Manderville Roe, until his defection to the BUF in May 1932.  Mrs D. 
G. Harnett, member of the Grand Council and Commander of the BF’s Ulster 
Command, edited the next two issues, which appeared in October 1932 and 
February 1933.  There was then a hiatus caused by an attack on the BF 
headquarters by around 60 uniformed BUF members and the threatening of the 
movement’s printers.29 Publication resumed with the ‘Special Summer 
Propaganda Issue’, which announced that from August 1933 the paper would be 
under the joint editorship of Harnett and G. E. Eyre.30  Nothing further was 
published until the ‘Extra Autumn’ edition, edited by Eyre, following which 
publication was again suspended, this time due to financial difficulties, until 
March 1934 when Colonel H. C. Bruce Wilson, who had guaranteed the BF’s 
overdraft, became editor for the remaining four months of the paper’s existence.31  
The premature death of its founder in March 1935 was a further blow to the BF 
and by September 1935 the movement was disbanded. 
A large part of the historiography regards Leese and the IFL as marginal, 
overshadowed by Mosley and the BUF with whom they struggled to compete for 
recruits and resources.32  Both the IFL and BF were dismissed by Thurlow:  
No-one wastes any time in explaining why such quixotic and 
eccentric movements as the British Fascisti in the 1920s and the 
Imperial Fascist League in the 1930s were minute elements on the 
political fringes.33 
 
However, others such as Michael Billig, John Morell and Nugent, while noting the 
minor role played by Leese and the IFL in inter-war politics, consider that, in the 
longer term, their ideology has influenced the post-war extreme right.34  Leese feared 
that allowing other ‘less developed’ races to live on terms of equality with Britons 
would lead to the disappearance of the British race and its culture.35  This seems very 
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similar to recent claims by British National Party (BNP) leader, Nick Griffin, that 
London is no longer a British city and the English and British people have ‘been 
ethnically cleansed from their own country.’36 
Although the IFL was a small organisation with a membership in the low 
hundreds, Linehan notes it attracted several prominent figures associated with British 
fascism and had a more coherent ideology and was more markedly fascist than many 
other groups during the inter-war period.  The belief in Nordic supremacy and the 
development of theories of racial antisemitism provided a mythic core around which 
Leese arranged his policies of anti-democracy, anti-liberalism, anti-socialism, 
preservation of the Empire, the revitalisation of agriculture, and commitment to the 
corporate state.37  While both organisations expressed loyalty to the king, the IFL, 
unlike the BF, was not seeking merely to maintain the old order against modernism 
and socialism, but to create a new social order.38 
The IFL produced only one newspaper, the Fascist.  Published monthly, the 
first edition appeared in March 1929 and the last in September 1939.  Throughout this 
time the paper was edited by Leese, except for the period October 1936 to March 
1937 when C. F. Trueman acted as editor while Leese was in Wormwood Scrubs 
serving six months following his conviction for conspiring to create a public 
mischief.  Leese was released in February 1937, his sentence being reduced for good 
behaviour, and returned to the paper to edit the April edition.  The Fascist had a print-
run of 3,000 but, according to Thurlow, 1,000 of these were bought by a Mr Pope, 
living in Porthcawl.  What he did with them is unknown.  A large number were also 
sent to South Africa.39 
The most notable of the British fascist movements was the BUF, founded by 
Oswald Mosley in October 1932.  While the BUF failed to achieve any electoral 
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success, historians have come to regard it as ‘intellectually the most coherent and 
rational’ fascist party in Europe.40  Initially, Mosley attempted to negotiate mergers 
with both the BF and IFL, but, although he was successful in poaching much of the 
active membership of the BF, both Lintorn Orman and Leese distrusted him and 
argued vigorously against joining the BUF.  Relations deteriorated to such an extent 
that in 1933 BUF members attacked the headquarters of the BF and later that year 
disrupted a meeting of the IFL at which Leese and Blakeney were beaten up and de-
bagged.41  The popular image of the BUF is closely associated with political violence 
and antisemitism, but its policies were detailed and pragmatic.  Linehan has described 
the BUF as the child of the 1929-31 economic crisis, which defined most of its 
economic and political policies, but also acknowledges the philosophical and 
irrational elements in its ideology that were derived from continental influences.42  
The conflict between practical politics and the spiritual and philosophical elements of 
the BUF’s ideology was never satisfactorily reconciled, organisation was hampered 
by factional struggles, and the cost of maintaining the BUF’s staff and headquarters 
became more than Mosley could resource.  Improving economic conditions and 
increasing public distaste for the BUF’s reputation for violence and antisemitism led 
to a decline in members that was not reversed until the threat of war revived interest 
in the BUF’s peace campaign.  Nonetheless, the BUF attracted the largest 
membership of all the inter-war fascist groups in Britain, and it impinged most 
noticeably on the public consciousness as well as attracting the most determined 
opposition.43   The BUF changed its name to the British Union of Fascists and 
National Socialists in April 1936, but generally called itself British Union (BU).44  
For convenience the movement will be referred to as the BUF throughout this thesis. 
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The BUF newspapers were more ambitious in scope and had much larger 
circulation than the BF and IFL.  The Blackshirt was first published in February 1933 
as a monthly paper; in April 1933 it became a weekly publication up until January 
1938 when it ceased weekly publication.  From March 1938 the Blackshirt resumed 
production as a monthly paper and continued until August 1938 when publication as a 
national newspaper ceased and three regional editions were introduced.  For the 
period September 1938 to March 1939 the sources used here are taken from the 
Southern Blackshirt, and for April and May 1939 from the East London Blackshirt.  
The Blackshirt was aimed at a working class readership.45  Much of its content was 
directed at existing members.  Circulation fluctuated.  By 1934 the paper was selling 
25,000 copies a month; sales fell in 1935 to around 23,000.46  Internal struggles 
within the BUF led to several changes of editor.  Captain Charles Lewis and W. J. 
Leaper, previously a member of the Labour party, were early occupants of the editor’s 
chair.  They were succeeded by Rex Tremlett, who resigned in 1936 and was replaced 
by John Beckett, a former Labour MP who had followed Mosley in to the New Party 
and then the BUF.47  Beckett was dismissed in March 1937 and Geoffrey Dorman 
edited the paper from April to July 1937 when A. K. Chesterton became editor until 
January 1938, after which he gave up the editorship to concentrate on Action.48  There 
were no issues of Blackshirt published in February 1938.  Geoffrey Dorman became 
editor of the monthly paper again from March to April 1938, between May and July 
Blackshirt again had no editor and Michael Goulding took over in August 1938.49  In 
September the paper was re-organised into three regional editions, though Goulding 
remained as national editor.  The regional editors were William Luckin for the 
Southern Blackshirt, T. C. Waters for the East London Blackshirt, and Michael 
Tracey for the Northern Blackshirt.50 
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The BUF was also anxious to capture a wider public and introduced the short-
lived Fascist Week, which had slightly more intellectual pretensions and, between 
November 1933 and May 1934, achieved a circulation of up to 30,000 copies a 
week.51  During the late 1930s there were increasing concerns within the BUF 
leadership that the Blackshirt was mediocre and unattractive to uncommitted 
readers.52  In January 1936 Action, edited by Beckett, was launched.  With a format 
modelled on that of the mainstream newspapers, it targeted a more educated audience 
and sold around 26,000 copies a week.53  Following Beckett’s dismissal, Dorman, the 
paper’s aviation expert ‘Bluebird’, acted as editor until February 1938 when 
Chesterton became editor until he resigned from the BUF in March 1938.54 During 
Chesterton’s brief reign Dorman was the assistant editor and Alexander Raven 
Thomson, the BUF’s political Director, wrote the leader column.55  From April 1938 
to April 1939 Dorman edited the paper once more.56  During April 1939 Raven 
Thomson took over the editorship until Action ceased production in June 1940.57 
The analysis of the fascist press in this thesis is based on 180 hours of study of 
microfilm copies of fascist papers held at Teesside University, augmented by 
materials held by the British Library.  I have also relied on research into the IFL 
undertaken as an undergraduate using resources at the Special Collections and 
Archives Department of Sheffield University.  Where relevant, my research has 
drawn on the works of influential individual fascists, such as Oswald Mosley and 
William Joyce.   
 
Sources II: The Mainstream Press  
During the inter-war period there were three major sources of mainstream news and 
opinion: the press, BBC radio broadcasts, and cinema newsreels.  The press was by 
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far the most prolific and pervasive, and presented the most diverse range of opinion.  
By the end of the decade two-thirds of the population had regular access to a 
newspaper.58 The analysis of British mainstream opinion, therefore, is based on the 
press.   Due to the emphasis in the historiography on the overlap between the 
Conservative party and British fascism, particular attention has been paid to the Tory 
press. 
The newspapers consulted during the course of this study can be classified in a 
variety of ways, for convenience they will be grouped here in terms either of their 
political leanings or their readership.  During the 1930s the Times, the Daily 
Telegraph, the Daily Express, the Daily Mail, and, at the beginning of the decade, the 
Daily Mirror were allied to the Conservative party, though they often took issue with 
it on matters of policy.  Although the Observer has a long history as a liberal paper, 
during the inter-war period it was edited by the maverick Tory, J. L. Garvin.59  Under 
Garvin, the paper developed a distinctive voice that combined Tory values with an 
occasional cross-bench outlook.60  Throughout the period, the Manchester Guardian 
and the News Chronicle espoused liberal principles, while the Daily Herald was 
financed by the Labour party and the Trades Union Congress.  
The popular press, including the Daily Express, the Daily Herald, the Daily 
Mail, and the Daily Mirror, were mass circulation papers. By the early 1930s the 
Daily Express and the Daily Herald each had more than 2,000,000 readers, while the 
Daily Mail, which had been selling a similar number of papers in the 1920s, was 
losing readers and had a circulation of around 1,600,000.  The Daily Mirror was also 
struggling; its circulation had fallen to below 800,000. However, after Lord 
Rothermere relinquished control, the paper implemented a successful long-term 
strategy to attract working-class readers and during the mid-1930s sales improved, 
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reaching 1,500,000 by 1939.  The liberal News Chronicle had a circulation of 
1,400,000.61 
The quality press, papers such as the Times (circulation 187,000), the Daily 
Telegraph (200,000), the Observer (201,000), and the Manchester Guardian (45,000), 
had a smaller circulation but carried more political weight than the popular press.  
Their editors were more independent and suffered less interference from their 
proprietors than tended to be the case among the popular press. Although Lord 
Camrose was a working proprietor and Editor-in-Chief of the Daily Telegraph, he had 
a good working relationship with his editor, Arthur Watson.  Many of the editors of 
the quality papers had close ties with members of the establishment and the 
Government. Geoffrey Dawson, the editor of the Times, was a close friend of Lord 
Halifax, a confidante of Neville Chamberlain and, along with H. A. Gwyne, of the 
Morning Post and J. L. Garvin of the Observer, encouraged and supported 
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement.62   
Although around 2,120 hours has been spent researching the mainstream press 
it has not been possible to read every issue of every mainstream paper published 
between 1925 and 1939, and research has been concentrated on a selection from the 
‘popular’, ‘quality’ and ‘liberal’ press, in particular the Daily Express, Daily Mail, 
Daily Mirror, Daily Telegraph, and the Times.  The Manchester Guardian, Observer, 
News Chronicle, Daily Herald, Evening Standard and Punch have also been referred 
to in relation to specific topics.   
The selection of articles for analysis was thematically driven.  Editions of the 
selected papers have been read for the month or months in which significant events 
occurred, for example November 1938 was selected for coverage of and responses to 
Kristallnacht.  Additionally, for every year of the 1930s, at least three months’ 
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editions of one of the papers has been read, and if anything significant related to the 
themes of antisemitism, refugees, the left, foreign affairs, culture, and mainstream 
responses to the BUF was noted the other papers have also been checked for their 
coverage of the same issue or event. Most of the mainstream newspapers consulted 
were on microfilm held at the British Library Newspaper Collection, Colindale, and at 
Manchester Central Library.  The following digital archives have also been employed: 
Times Digital Archive, 1785-1985, the Daily Mirror Digital Archive, and the 
Historical Guardian Digital Archive.63 
In many cases the reports and editorials referred to in this study do not have a 
by-line, and due to the constraints of time and space the individual chapters will 
generally concentrate on giving a reflection of the voice of the paper concerned rather 
than that of its individual contributors.  However, there are some significant instances, 
where the views being expressed are clearly stated as being those of an individual, 
rather than the paper, or where they depart noticeably from the paper’s usual stance, 
that warrant a little more attention.  
  
CONTEXT AND THEMES 
This thesis explores the extent to which the discourse of the British fascist press 
during the inter-war period promoted attitudes and opinions that were shared by the 
mainstream press. The historiography relating to inter-war Britain is extensive and has 
been hotly debated, but a brief summary will provide the necessary context for the 
following chapters. 
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Mainstream politics  
The 1920s and 1930s in Britain have been described in terms of disappointed hope 
and the failure to grasp opportunities, and also as a time of improvement that saw the 
establishment of an infrastructure that would underpin later prosperity.64  The 
principal themes of British politics at this time reflect both failure and limited success.  
There were no radical developments in the political mainstream, and, despite the 
election of two Labour governments, the underlying consistency of the various inter-
war governments is of particular significance.  Charles Loch Mowat, describing the 
result of the December 1918 election, refers to the beginning of 'twenty years of 
undistinguished Tory rule.'65    
A review of the historiography of British inter-war politics reveals a consensus 
of historical opinion that supports Mowat's view that Conservative thinking 
dominated inter-war governments.  Robert Skidelsky describes the real divide in 
British politics in the 1920s and 1930s as being between economic radicals and 
economic conservatives, a divide that cut across party.66  Martin Pugh also sees the 
period as characterised by Conservative primacy.67  That nine of the eleven inter-war 
governments were either Conservative governments or had a majority of Conservative 
members supports Mowat's case, but that still leaves the two Labour governments of 
January to November 1924 and June 1929 to August 1931.  Skidelsky argues that the 
1924 government was committed to the ‘Conservative case’, particularly in respect of 
unemployment.68  Indeed, the Labour Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, described 
the Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, with approval, claiming that: 'In all 
essentials, his outlook is very similar to ours.’69   A. J. P. Taylor described 
MacDonald's government as being ‘in office, but not in power.’  Its object was to 
show that Labour was capable of governing, an aim that it was only able to meet, 
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given the lack of previous experience of most of its ministers, by relying on the advice 
and expertise of civil servants.70  MacDonald was committed to ‘the inevitability of 
gradualness.’71  Certainly there is no evidence that the first British Labour 
government planned to adopt any radical socialist policies, though there were 
moderate achievements in housing and education.72 Martin Pugh agrees that the 
overriding concern of the Labour leadership was to demonstrate that Labour was fit 
for office.  He suggests that a short period of government, sufficient to demonstrate to 
voters and the mainstream press that Labour could be trusted without having to 
grapple with the country's economic and social problems, was all that MacDonald 
wanted at that time.73  MacDonald was particularly keen to convince the press, which, 
especially during election campaigns, often portrayed Labour politicians as akin to 
Bolshevists, that the country had nothing to fear from a Labour government. The lack 
of an overall majority could be considered another restraining factor; without Liberal 
support the government could not outvote the Conservatives. 
Similarly, in the 1929-1931 Labour government, Treasury views on public 
investment were decisive in determining policy.  Taylor suggests that as this was 
again a minority government there was little opportunity for implementing a socialist 
programme.  He also casts doubt on the party leadership's interest in such a 
programme.74  Skidelsky takes this point further, arguing that the Government's 
minority status made little difference as the Labour party had developed no policies 
prior to the election, unlike the Liberals who had a detailed programme for public 
investment and consistently pressed for a bolder approach to the country's economic 
and social problems.75  Pugh also rejects the lack of a parliamentary majority as 
significant in policy terms, describing it as an excuse for lack of action used by both 
Labour governments when the party leadership had no intention of moving towards 
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socialism.  For MacDonald socialism was a long-term project unlikely to be realised 
in his lifetime.76  The Labour leaders were confined by their belief that the public was 
not ready for socialism, and by their inability to comprehend the need to develop 
policies for its gradual introduction.  Faced by the seemingly insurmountable 
economic challenges of a worldwide recession they retreated into coalition and the 
National Government. 
Throughout this thesis economic issues are referred to, where relevant, in the 
individual chapters, but there is no single chapter devoted to economics.  Although 
economic policy was central to the BUF’s thinking and integral to the implementation 
of the proposed corporate state, the BF and IFL did not develop detailed economic 
policies.  Leese had little understanding of economics and relied on the economic 
theories of his friend, the inventor, Arthur Kitson.77  During the 1930s, despite the 
economic slump and high unemployment in the ‘depressed areas’, there was little 
debate in the mainstream press in relation to economics.  The big economic issues of 
the previous two decades: tariff reform, free trade, and the gold standard were largely 
resolved by then, except for a period of nineteen months between 1929-31 when the 
Express and Mail challenged Baldwin’s leadership over the issue of Empire Free 
Trade (EFT).  Although both papers still continued to bang the drum for EFT and the 
imposition of tariffs between 1931-9 they were no longer arguing the case; just 
repeating the slogans.   
Economic policy does not appear to have been an issue that captured public 
attention.  There was some common ground between the fascists and the Empire Free 
Traders of the previous decade, but the majority of the mainstream expressed little 
interest in the issue and the exact political mix of interwar governments had minimal 
effect on economic policy; the Treasury kept firm control of the direction of policy.78   
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During the slump of the 1930s the National Government pursued a similar 
economic line to that of its predecessors, rejecting the arguments of Keynes and 
others, for example Lloyd George and Oswald Mosley, who advocated government 
intervention and a more managed economy.79  Taylor described Mosley's proposals as 
providing the basis for most of the constructive advances of the following thirty 
years.80  The Labour leadership’s rejection of the Mosley Memorandum prompted 
Mosley to leave the party and led to his founding of the short-lived New Party. 
Nonetheless, due to the slump unemployment was a high profile issue and the 
BUF was keen to exploit public concern.  The official unemployment figures show 
that more than 2,000,000 people were unemployed throughout 1931-1935; during the 
winter of 1932-1933 the figure rose to 3,000,000.  During the 1920s there had been 
severe unemployment, but this was generally short term and restricted to industries 
with declining exports, those that had lost their markets during the First World War or 
were affected by the general decline in world trade.  During the 1930s unemployment 
was more widespread and for many became a long-term prospect.81  The National 
Government reduced spending on public works during 1931-1932 on the grounds that 
relief works depleted resources needed for industrial investment. Spending on 
unemployment benefit was also reduced, and the long-term unemployed were subject 
to the means test.  The Government achieved savings of £24,000,000, but the vagaries 
of the system caused a great deal of hardship and resentment.82  John Stevenson and 
Chris Cook argue that unemployment has been blamed for a range of social problems, 
for example poverty, ill health and bad housing that would have existed even if there 
had been high levels of employment.83  They suggest that living conditions were 
generally improving, a view supported by Aldcroft.84  However, Charles Webster is 
critical of what he describes as 'revisionism', which underplays the suffering of the 
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distressed areas. He emphasises the unequal provision of welfare services and points 
out that they were often 'least developed where most needed.’85  The Government, 
influenced by the Treasury and in the absence of any effective challenge to the 
dominant economic orthodoxy, was convinced that little could be done to tackle 
unemployment and related social problems until the worldwide economic situation 
improved.  
 In the meantime most of its attention was directed towards international rather 
than domestic affairs. Throughout the period Britain's foreign policy was of 
considerable importance and during the 1930s became the dominant issue, in 
particular the British Government’s support for the League of Nations and its attitude 
to Italy, the Spanish Civil War, and Germany generated much public interest.   
Each of the subsequent chapters explores one or more issues related to the 
following themes. 
 
Antisemitism 
Antisemitism has commonly been seen as one of the most significant characteristics 
of British fascism and also as one of the key reasons that it remained outside of the 
mainstream.  Yet there has been no detailed comparison of the level of antisemitic 
content published in the British fascist and mainstream press.  Chapter one uses a 
three stage model based on the work of Colin Holmes and Michael Marrus to chart 
the extent and development of antisemitism in British fascist publications, explores 
the different ways in which the fascist and mainstream press portrayed Jews, and 
considers the relevance of developments in theoretical approaches to antisemitism. 
The research presented in this chapter clearly demonstrates that the antisemitic 
opinions of the fascist press departed substantially from the mainstream, and in the 
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case of those who expressed a genocidal desire for the elimination of all Jews, crossed 
the boundary between civilised behaviour and barbarism. 
 
Refugees 
Chapter two considers the similarities between some of the popular mainstream 
papers and the fascist press in writing about issues relating to refugees and discusses 
the more measured response of the quality press.  The chapter is informed by a more 
detailed and extensive study of the mainstream sources than has previously been 
undertaken.  Despite the enthusiasm of the popular press and the more cautious 
support of the quality press for aspects of the Nazi regime, their condemnation of the 
persecution of the Jews plainly separates them from the viewpoint of the fascist press 
on this issue.  However, the attitude of the mainstream press to refugees was more 
complex; many of the editorial comments of the popular press could be transferred to 
the fascist press without appearing out of place, suggesting that British fascism was 
not estranged from mainstream opinion in respect of its attitudes to refugees. The 
reluctance of the Government and a sizeable proportion of the mainstream press to 
provide a refuge for those fleeing Nazi persecution is explored with reference to Tony 
Kushner’s theories on liberal and conservative (exclusionist) antisemitism.  
 
The Left 
The attitudes of the inter-war governments to British fascism are outside the scope of 
this thesis and warrant a study of their own.  Suffice it to say that despite the rise of 
fascism in Europe, the British Government and the Conservative element of the 
mainstream press were more concerned with the perceived threat of the radical left.86  
This was a concern that the British fascists capitalised on and one that the fascist press 
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constantly reinforced. Articles in the fascist press also attempted to heighten fear of 
the more moderate left by conflating lawful participants in the democratic process 
with revolutionary communism. Yet there is no evidence in the historiography to-date 
that shows they were successful in contributing significantly to the creation of a 
national climate hostile to the left.  Indeed, Matthew Worley argues that the Labour 
party was widely perceived as occupying legitimate political space.87  Chapter three 
addresses this issue and considers the extent to which the demonisation of the left was 
common to both the fascist and mainstream press.  The analysis of the coverage of 
British general and municipal elections illustrates that, while the majority of the press 
were not generally overtly hostile to the Labour party, there were occasions when the 
Tory papers shared the rhetoric of the fascist press in their pillorying of the left.   
Comparison of coverage of the Spanish Civil War in the fascist and Tory press 
manifestly reinforces this point. 
 
International relations 
Chapter four will compare the response of British fascist press and the mainstream 
press to British foreign policy and to international events during the inter-war period.  
The analysis of the fascist groups will be focussed on the BUF as it offered a coherent 
foreign policy. There has been some detailed analysis of the BUF’s foreign policy; 
including D. S. Lewis’ claim that the foreign policy of the BUF provided a clearly 
defined alternative to that of the Government, but these have concentrated on the BUF 
in isolation and there has been no detailed comparison with the policies advocated by 
the mainstream press.88  Although Webber has described the BUF’s foreign policy as 
changeable, and in some aspects it was, in others it displayed a certain rigidity and its 
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fundamental principles were fixed.89  Unlike mainstream attitudes, the BUF’s policy 
on European affairs did not develop in response to increasing international tensions. 
 
Culture and decadence 
Much of fascist ideology is predicated on the conviction that society is decadent and 
moral standards are declining to such an extent that the well-being of the nation is 
threatened. Chapter five builds on the work of Gottlieb and Linehan et al in its 
analysis of fascist and mainstream representations of British society.  The chapter is 
divided into three major parts.  The first identifies the major cultural concerns of 
British fascists, the second establishes how the perceived ills were to be remedied, 
and the third compares the preoccupations of the fascist press with those of the 
national newspapers.  Although cultural developments during the inter-war years did 
not meet with universal approval and modernism, in particular, was viewed with 
suspicion, fascist demands for the sweeping away of perceived expressions of 
decadence and degeneracy did not strike a chord with the general public.  It seems 
that the British attitude to modernity lacked the element of destructive energy from 
which the Nazis were able to draw strength and popular support, and the public were 
receptive to a wider set of cultural mores then the fascists allowed. 
 
Mainstream responses to the BUF 
The BUF frequently claimed that they were ignored and misrepresented in the 
mainstream press.  Chapter six tests that claim and considers the implications of the 
level of coverage received by the BUF in more depth than previous studies.90  The 
extent to which the mainstream press situated the BUF outside the boundaries of 
mainstream opinion will be assessed and the response of the BBC and cinema 
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newsreels will be briefly considered to illustrate more fully the extent to which the 
BUF became estranged from the mainstream. Additionally, the chapter discusses the 
nature of the mainstream response in terms of anti-fascism and analyses the reaction 
of the BUF to what it perceived as the conspiracy against it.  That reaction will be 
considered in the light of previous assessments, including that of Michael Spurr, that 
categorise the BUF as a subculture.91 
 
Conclusion 
Overall this thesis demonstrates that there were significant areas of discursive overlap 
between the fascist and mainstream press.  Important elements of fascist thinking had 
mainstream roots, yet, even in areas that appear to show a convergence of views, the 
ideological imperative of the British fascists was not shared by the mainstream.  The 
British fascists’ vehement expressions of overt antisemitism and their refusal to 
tolerate any opposition or alternative viewpoint kept them on the outer margins of 
democratic society. 
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Chapter 1 
 
BEYOND THE PALE? – Attitudes towards 
domestic antisemitism1 
 
While fascism ineluctably tends towards racism in its attempts to generate a sense of 
unique national identity and destiny, it is not necessarily antisemitic.  Roger Griffin 
argues that the myth of a pure race is not essential to fascism, nor is it necessary for 
the nation to be conceptualised in biological terms.2  Yet, antisemitism offers fascists 
a convenient scapegoat to blame for all the nation’s perceived ills, and allows them to 
tap into pre-existing antipathy to Jews, providing a focus for their drive to cleanse and 
renew the nation.   
Inter-war fascism in Britain is indelibly associated with antisemitism, but not 
uniquely so.  Certainly, there is a long history of hostility to Jews in England.  There 
were anti-Jewish riots in York in 1190, and in 1290 Edward I exploited anti-Jewish 
sentiment when he expelled all Jews from England to avoid repaying the money he 
had borrowed to finance wars with Wales and Scotland.3  Although this order was 
never formally rescinded Cromwell allowed professing Jews to establish communities 
in England from 1656 onwards.4  As discussed below, the term ‘antisemitism’ was 
coined in the nineteenth century and distinguishes a more secular hatred of Jews 
rather than the traditional religious antipathy.5  Since Disraeli's premiership this type 
of ‘modern’ antisemitism had been a feature of British society, though, patently, not 
to the same extent as in mainland Europe.6  British antisemitism tended to be 
economic and social rather than political and this has been posited as one reason for 
fascism’s failure in this country.7  Indeed, Britain is often portrayed as a country that 
has been relatively free of prejudice towards Jews, for example William D. Rubinstein 
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described inter-war Britain as almost entirely free from racial-national antisemitism.8  
Nonetheless, the historiography of the last few decades has demonstrated that 
antisemitism, in various forms, has been a menacing and persistent presence in 
Britain, and Tony Kushner argues that non-organised forms of antisemitism did have 
a strong negative effect on British Jews.9  
The virulence of antisemitism in Britain was not a constant factor and Colin 
Holmes has shown that, although there was no evidence of government sanctioned 
antisemitism, the period immediately after the First World War was one in which 
prejudice against Jews was increasing.  Holmes links the increase to the British 
publication of The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Bolshevik Revolution in 
Russia, and the appointment of several Jews to prominent government positions.10  
His analysis of antisemitism in British society shows that antisemitism was prevalent 
among individuals and certain groups during the inter-war period, but he 
acknowledges that without a reliable means of surveying public opinion it is 
impossible to be precise about the extent.11  Significantly, however, Holmes does not 
examine the role of the mainstream press, which, then as now, attempted to fulfil a 
dual role endeavouring to both shape public opinion and to reflect it.  Moreover, more 
recent work by William I. Brustein on articles relating to Jews sampled from the 
Daily Mail does not analyse the articles in any depth, classifying them simply as 
favourable, unfavourable, and neutral. His conclusion suggests that the paper was not 
overtly antisemitic, but does not greatly advance our understanding.12  
By comparing the antisemitic content of the mainstream and fascist press and 
concentrating on the period 1925-1936, before the increasing refugee crisis altered the 
dynamics of the debate between liberal and fascist viewpoints, this chapter seeks to 
determine whether the antisemitism of the British fascist press represented a reflection 
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or an extension of mainstream views or whether it goes far beyond mainstream 
concerns and was, in fact, beyond the pale. 
 
DEFINING ANTISEMITISM   
There is no universally accepted definition of antisemitism and while there is much 
common ground each attempt at definition adds a new twist, stressing the relative 
importance of different characteristics.  There is agreement among academics that 
antisemitism is a relatively modern term, first used in Germany in 1879.13  Gisela 
Lebzelter distinguishes between antisemitism and the hostility that host communities 
throughout the ages have felt towards unassimilated groups whose social and religious 
practices were distinct from their own.14  Both Lebzelter and Richard S. Levy have 
ascribed the development of antisemitism, as distinct from the traditional hostility to 
Jews, to the emancipation of Jews across Europe that began in the late 1860s.15  
However, they disagree on the nature of the change.  For Lebzelter the definition of 
antisemitism is based on ideas and perceptions, the distinguishing feature of 
antisemitism being that it does not allow for assimilation or conversion to 
Christianity, as any form of integration would be seen as corrupting the host 
community.  In this definition antisemitism denies that Jews are part of the nation, 
considers them inferior and evil, and seeks to exclude them from the community.16 
Conversely, Levy sees the difference between antisemitism and anti-Jewish feeling as 
being located not merely in ideas and emotions but in continuing action.  Those who 
continually act against Jews are antisemites even if they believe conversion is a 
possibility.17  There are problems with both of these definitions as they lack the 
flexibility to distinguish and measure the levels of antisemitism being expressed in the 
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fascist and mainstream press, and, therefore, are of little use in evaluating any 
differences between the two.  
More recently Brustein, has identified thirteen categories of action, ranging 
from false accusations against Jews to murderous riots that can be classified as 
antisemitic. However, he accepts that his typology does not acknowledge the variable 
significance of different acts within a category.  For example his category on the 
formation of antisemitic groups would not distinguish between the British fascist 
groups in relation to the extent of their antisemitism.18 
Of more practical use in assessing antisemitism in Britain are the definitions 
deployed by Colin Holmes and Michael Marrus. Both categorise antisemitism in 
terms of degree, and include less virulent forms than is possible under Lebzelter's 
definition, which would exclude antisemites such as G. K. Chesterton who believed, 
in principle, that Jews could be assimilated if they became Christians.19  Holmes 
offers a clear definition that also has the advantage of being easy to apply.  Having 
stipulated that antisemitism exists only insofar as it is directed at Jews as Jews, rather 
than at individuals or groups who happen to be or include Jews, he identifies three 
types of antisemitism. The first is directed at prominent individuals or groups, for 
example a Jewish member of the government or Jewish financiers who are criticised 
or abused because they are assumed to have characteristics stereotypically ascribed to 
Jews.  The second is directed at all Jews, who are perceived in a stereotypical fashion.  
These views can be described as racist, but not in biological terms.  Finally, the third 
sees all Jews as biologically undesirable aliens whose blood corrupts the nation.20 
Similarly, Marrus' model distinguishes three categories of antisemitism, which 
he pictures as three concentric circles.21   The concept of concentric circles is also 
endorsed by Albert S. Lindemann, who, while acknowledging its limitations, in 
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particular the difficulty in fixing boundaries as some antisemites appear to belong in 
different categories at different times, argues that it offers a systematic and coherent 
way of dealing with different degrees of antisemitism.22  Marrus’ outer circle 
encompasses a wide body of anti-Jewish feeling ranging from vague antipathy to 
conscious decisions not to associate socially with Jews.  Lindemann describes the 
antisemitism of this outer circle as mild and unreflective expressions of repugnance 
for Jews that usually reflect the antisemites’ cultural background.  If ‘first-circle’ 
antisemites move away from that culture, either physically or intellectually, they are 
capable of forming normal relationships with Jews.  The feelings and responses of 
antisemites in the second band of Marrus’ model are more intense and volatile.  They 
have a hostile and defensive attitude towards Jews, becoming more active and more 
numerous at times of perceived national crisis.  Lindemann suggests that the second 
circle is comprised of those who find some intellectual and psychological satisfaction 
in antisemitism and are, therefore, more consistently committed to its expression.  
They are more likely to join antisemitic organisations and, while not supporting 
radical solutions to what they see as the 'Jewish problem,’ they promote exclusionist 
policies in the belief that Jews should be subject to restrictions and controls, some 
going so far as to advocate separate existence, a view not restricted to gentiles.  
Fanatical antisemites, who have an irrational reaction to Jews that is not influenced by 
events or actual Jewish actions, make up the inner core of the model.  They see Jews 
as a powerful and all-pervading force that threatens the survival of civilisation as they 
know it.  These fears tend to be expressed in racial terms; Jewishness is portrayed as 
an indelible taint, a disease that corrupts and destroys the nation.   The final or inner 
circle, then, is the preserve of those who would deny Jews their humanity and any 
right to fair and equal treatment.  These eliminationist antisemites advocate the 
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removal of Jews from the community and the most extreme contemplate the 
destruction of the Jews with equanimity, as they can tolerate no compromise with 
what they perceive as evil incarnate. 
For our purposes the concept of measuring antisemitism by degrees provides a 
useful tool for comparing the publications of the various fascist organisations with 
each other and with the mainstream press.  It also provides a means of noting the 
progression of some fascist publications from vague cultural antisemitism to racist 
and biological antisemitism. 
 
ANTISEMITISM AND THE BRITISH FASCISTS 
A definition that recognises different forms of antisemitism is particularly useful in 
considering the position of the British Fascists (BF) as their attitude to Jews has been 
subject to considerable debate.  Richard Thurlow claims that the BF did not become 
hostile to Jews until 1932, while Thomas Linehan notes that antisemitism did not 
become official policy until 1933, although 'a vague form of "anti-alienism" featured 
in BF pronouncements' which Linehan considers might have been used as a code by 
some members.23   Kenneth Lunn, however, argues that that this assessment of the 
BF's antisemitism underestimates the extent to which antisemitism was part of the 
BF's political message.24  While there were ‘coded’ references to Jews, particularly in 
relation to their alleged control of the press, with references to ‘The Hidden Hand in 
Fleet Street’25, ‘Financiers’ and ‘lords of usury’26, there were also more explicit 
allusions to Jews, including references to the ‘Jewish Question’ and the alleged aim of 
‘crushing Christian civilisation,’ which would support Lunn’s interpretation,27 as 
would the ‘Principles of Fascism’ set out in British Lion, which listed restrictions on 
the civil rights of, and extra taxes to be levied on, ‘aliens’ who were ‘not of British 
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parentage and descent.’  A note makes it clear that ‘Jews are in all cases mentioned, 
regarded as aliens.’28  Certainly, there were antisemites in the organisation and their 
views were reflected in the articles and letters printed in the BF press.   The 
antisemitic tendency of the BF was reinforced by the use of material previously 
published in the Patriot, a journal funded by the eighth Duke of Northumberland to 
promote antisemitic and ‘Die-hard’ Conservative views. 29 
In the mid 1920s the BF's primary concern was the threat of communist 
revolution, and the Fascist Bulletin was largely comprised of articles and reports of 
meetings exposing the communist menace and the need for the BF to organise a force 
to overcome it.  Nonetheless, within these articles and reports there were frequent 
references to the undesirable influence of Jews.  The first issue of the weekly edition 
of the Fascist Bulletin reported meetings at which speakers had explained that the 
Bolshevik Revolution was the work of German Jews or international Jews bent on 
world domination.  Brigadier General Blakeney in his front-page editorial also 
referred to unrest in Russia due to 'the tyranny of alien Communists.’30  Similar items 
appeared weekly, including allegations of atrocities committed in Russia by troops 
'almost entirely composed of alien races, led by Jewish Commissars,’ and repeated 
claims that the Russian government was led by German Jews or by a 'Junta of Jews.’31 
The BF also turned their attention to British Jews in the 1920s.   
Examples of antisemitism employing the application of racial stereotypes to all 
Jews were also common, although sometimes the message appeared confused as to 
the nature of the threat they represented.  An article in the Fascist Bulletin claimed 
Jewish immigrants were  'largely from the lowest grades of their nations of origin, and 
have been largely responsible for the contamination of our British stocks, the 
multiplication of the unfit, and the slums of our industrial cities.’  However, a couple 
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of paragraphs later the threat presented by Jewish immigrants was perceived in a very 
different manner: 
many of them, of course, as everyone recognises, men of high intelligence 
and capacity - their influence now permeates every sphere of national and 
international life, including Bolshevism and Communism. It is quite obvious 
that the Jews will continue their control in England's affairs until present 
Englishmen show sufficient virility and will to sweep them out of their 
country, or until their investments in the cinema trade or other undertakings 
for the advancement and comfort of our great democracy have ceased to be 
sufficiently lucrative to accord with Jewish ideals, when they will decamp to 
invest under other flags and climes.32 
 
There is no indication in the article that the author was aware of any contradiction in 
his use of such very different stereotypes.  His perception of Jews as an inferior and 
corrupting influence is resolutely fixed and so the recognition that Jews may be ‘men 
of high intelligence’ is tempered by the belief that they do not produce anything - all 
their endeavours are perceived as parasitic and exploitative.  The intertwined themes 
of international chicanery and parasitic exploitation were a frequent refrain throughout 
the British fascist press, though this was not unique among antisemites and the 
perception of Aryans as being a ‘creative’ race, with Jews cast as exploitative 
despoilers, was integral to Nazi antisemitism, in particular. 
In addition, there were regular references linking Jews to ‘International 
Finance,’ an amorphous group depicted as intent on furthering their own interests to 
the detriment of the British nation.33  Significantly, the BF did not hesitate to promote 
Jewish conspiracy theories.  In 1925 an article in the Fascist Bulletin referred readers 
to The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, long after the Times had proved it to be a 
forgery.  In the same issue there was also a letter arguing that the Protocols had not 
been forged.34  A slight change of tactics was adopted in 1926, the provenance of the 
protocols was brushed aside and it was asserted that ‘Whatever the origin of the Book 
of Protocols, there is much that is undeniably true in its pages ...’35  However, no 
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doubts about their authenticity were expressed in British Lion when Colonel A. H. 
Lane referred to the Protocols as part of a protest against the employment of 
naturalised British subjects as teachers in London schools.36  Henry Ford’s ‘Jewish 
Conspiracy’ theories were also promoted, and in 1931 it was alleged that Ford had 
retracted these views only after an attempt was made on his life and the application of 
intense psychological pressure, both allegedly orchestrated by Jews.37 
The contamination of the ‘race’ and the need for Britons to be 'pure-bred' was 
another issue concerning the BF in the 1920s and Blakeney issued instructions that 
'Only young and able-bodied men of pure British race are to be accepted for "Q" 
Divisions.’38  During 1925, in response to increasing concern among the BF 
leadership that revolution or civil war was imminent, all of the BF’s county-based 
commands were ordered to set up small infantry units which, when the anticipated 
emergency arose, would be merged into “Q” Divisions intended to support the 
‘Authorities’, act as a loyalist rallying point and engage the communist insurgents on 
the streets.39  How effective the “Q” Divisions would have been is a matter of 
speculation, but it seems unlikely that the BF had sufficient young and active 
members to mount an effectual defence of the nation against the envisaged 
revolutionaries.  Blakeney himself appeared to acknowledge that the “Q” Divisions 
were not at full strength when he wrote: ‘[w]hen the rush of recruits comes it will be 
necessary to show great discrimination in their selection.’40 Those existing members 
who did not meet Blakeney's standards or who caused 'mutual distrust and friction' 
were to be identified by regional Commanders and 'got rid of or put into such 
positions that they cannot do harm.'41 
The BF’s fears regarding the dangers posed by immigration were expressed in 
more detail in an article by ‘Pro Patria,’ in which Englishmen were alleged to be 
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surrounded by ‘foreign and hybrid elements’ described as ‘paper Britishers.’  It was 
alleged that allowing immigrants to become ‘naturalised’ weakened the nation 
because the naturalisation certificate ‘cannot change the race (with its implications) of 
the recipient.’  The article claimed that immigrants from the East, near East, Balkans 
and Southern Europe ‘come provided with their own race memories which are not 
ours, with race instincts which are not ours, and with mental and moral points of view, 
the result of their racial heritage, which are not “assimilable” to our British standards 
of life and character.’42  The future of the race was said to depend on preventing 
aliens from stealing the birthright of Englishmen.   
The foregrounding of race in this article and the rejection of the possibility of 
assimilation suggest that the author has come close to the boundary between the 
second and third categories of antisemitism.  However, the examples of the threat 
presented by alien immigration are not expressed in the terms used by the most 
extreme racial and biological antisemites; there is no mention of purity of the blood, 
and aliens are not depicted as a disease contaminating the national body.  Instead the 
author relies on the more typical antisemitic complaints of the BF leadership and 
members, issues that were frequently raised in the Fascist Bulletin, the alleged alien 
control of the banking system and alien responsibility for the Gold Standard.  No 
measures are suggested to restrict alleged alien influence and protect the nation, 
reflecting the BF’s lack of a clear policy on this issue prior to the publishing of the 
1928 principles. 
Following the adoption of a more overtly fascist ideology in 1932, the BF 
continued to embrace antisemitism, giving it a higher public profile in 1933 in an 
attempt to show that there were sound reasons for their antisemitism and to refute 
suggestions that they hated Jews unreasonably or wanted to ‘ape Germany’s lead.’43  
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The defence of their antisemitic policy was that as ‘Nationalists and Imperialists’ they 
put their own people first and had to 'deal with any non-racial element which has been 
allowed to assume a controlling power in our midst.’44  Britain had to be run by 
Britons, who must have preference above aliens.  Jews had no right to British 
citizenship because they retained 'their racial allegiances and customs.’45  It was also 
alleged that the Jewish community had a higher proportion of criminals than the 
general population.46  A frequent complaint in the BF press was that Jews attempted 
to gain political and economic supremacy wherever they settled, and that in Britain 
they controlled the National Government and were attempting to destroy the 
Conservative party.47   
However, the BF explicitly rejected more radical solutions for removing 
Jewish influence stating that they had no plan to 'quietly assassinate all Jews resident 
in this land.’  They intended to 'merely label him as an alien, and thus have a right to 
control his actions while he is resident in our midst.’  If Jews conducted themselves as 
'honest and law-abiding citizen[s],’ even though the BF refused to recognise them as 
citizens, they would 'have no need to squeal at the treatment meted out' by the BF.48   
For some members the BF's policy was not sufficiently antisemitic or fascistic 
and they left to join more militant organisations.  This had been a fairly regular 
occurrence throughout the BF’s existence. The first significant loss was in 1925 when 
around a hundred members set up the National Fascisti, a more extreme group that 
collapsed three years later due to factional struggles and a lack of funds.  Following 
internal disputes over the role of the BF during the 1926 General Strike several 
prominent members, including Blakeney, A. E. Armstrong, and the Earl of Glasgow, 
left to form a rival organisation known as the British Loyalists.  Shortly after this 
Arnold Leese, who had been one of two BF candidates elected as local councillors in 
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Stamford in Lincolnshire, also resigned.  In 1928 Leese was one of the founder 
members of the Imperial Fascist League. Blakeney also joined the IFL, becoming one 
of its most prominent members.  Towards the end of 1931 and the beginning of 1932 
Neil Francis Hawkins and E. G. Mandeville Roe led the defection to the BUF of those 
members of the BF who supported a merger with Mosley’s New Party hoping to find 
the policies and leadership the BF lacked.49 
The BF had not developed a consistent racial policy and though the 1930s saw 
them move more deeply in to the second category of antisemitism they did not 
progress beyond it into the third, although some former members, including Arnold 
Leese and William Joyce, would go on to do so.  Apart from the example by ‘Pro 
Patria’ mentioned above the BF did not specifically rule out assimilation, but articles 
in British Fascism appear to envisage a society where Jews would live on the margins 
and would be deported if they transgressed.  Where they would be deported to was not 
specified and the question of inter-marriage was not addressed.  The BF’s 
antisemitism was not radicalised by the success of the NSDAP in Germany. 
 
THE IMPERIAL FASCIST LEAGUE  
In sharp contrast to the BF, the IFL did develop a detailed racial policy.  As editor of 
the Fascist Arnold Leese used the paper to express his increasingly obsessive 
antisemitism.  J. E. Morell has suggested that the IFL's primary concern was 
antisemitism, fascism being merely a convenient cloak.50  Richard Griffiths appears to 
share this view claiming the IFL 'took a violently antisemitic line' from the 
beginning.51  Colin Cross also asserts that from the first Leese saw himself as a racial 
fascist.52  He suggests that the Fascist was based on Der Stürmer, and maintains that 
Leese frequently quoted from it and made similar use of cartoons.53  However, Der 
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Stürmer is not mentioned in the Fascist prior to 1932, though the Völkischer 
Beobachter is, and cartoons were not a regular feature of the Fascist until the end of 
1933.54  Lebzelter has paid closer attention to the primary sources and notes that there 
is no evidence of racial antisemitism at the time the IFL was founded.  She identifies a 
change of attitude in 1930, related to the Protocols of the Elders of Zion; which later 
developed into racial antisemitism.55  Holmes' interpretation broadly supports this 
view.  He argues that 'after 1930 racial ideas and philosophies were central and 
paramount.’56  It is not surprising that interpretations vary as the views expressed in 
the Fascist during its first year are not clear-cut, reflecting the lack of a fully 
developed antisemitic policy and also representing the differing views of individual 
contributors.  Significantly, when Arnold Leese became the leader of the IFL and 
editor of the Fascist his views dominated IFL policy and propaganda, and a more 
consistent antisemitic tone developed.  This was largely due to the lack of members 
willing or able to contribute to the paper and very soon most of the Fascist was 
written by Leese.  As his obsession with Jewish conspiracy theories grew so did the 
degree and extent of the Fascist’s antisemitic content. 
The first edition of the Fascist, published in March 1929, made no mention of 
Jews at all, nor did the Fascist Principles of the IFL published in May 1931, although 
that issue did state that Britain could not absorb the alien Jewish population without 
deteriorating.57  Lebzelter notes that initially Jews were not explicitly denied 
membership of the IFL.58  However, during 1929 to the end of 1930 there were an 
increasing number of articles critical of Jews.  There were three main reasons for 
these articles: firstly Zionism, Leese was incensed by those Jews who put Zionist 
interests before the interests of Britain.59  Secondly, he was suspicious of Jewish 
financiers and believed that 'Jewish Money Power' was linked to the League of 
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Nations and was responsible for the Gold Standard, both of which he fiercely 
opposed.60  Thirdly, influenced by his experience as a veterinary surgeon, he 
strenuously disapproved of shechita, the Jewish method of ritual slaughter for cattle, 
which he believed caused the animals unnecessary suffering.  This was an issue he 
continued to publicise for the rest of his life.61 
Fears of a Jewish conspiracy were added to the mix from the beginning of 
1930, with the appearance of frequent items on Jewish domination of British and 
international affairs.62   The Fascist alleged that Jewish finance was influencing the 
British government, Bolshevism was a Jewish plot, and none of this was made public 
because Jews controlled the press.63  The existence of the supposed Jewish conspiracy 
was demonstrated by quoting from the Protocols.64 
However, although there is evidence of increasing antisemitism, there was little 
that was expressly racially antisemitic.  'Racial security' was mentioned in July 1929, 
but Jews were not specifically mentioned as a threat.  A process of assimilation was 
proposed whereby alien British subjects could become citizens over the course of three 
generations; Jews were not explicitly excluded from this.65  Indeed, in October 1929 
Leese stated that 'the Jewishness of the Jew begins to fade when he mixes with 
Gentiles!'  He claimed that the Jewish authorities had invented Zionism to circumvent 
assimilation.66  But, by September 1931, the Fascist’s line had hardened to '"No Jews" 
is better than "Good Jews".’67 
The beginnings of racial antisemitism can be traced back to September 1930 
when Leese recommends Hans F. K. Günther's The Racial Elements of European 
History to his readers.68  Leese described Günther as 'a well known Nazi' and his book 
as 'a sure guide to the principles of Nordic politics.’69  Günther's racial theories 
appealed to Leese's existing prejudices, and he relied heavily on them in the 
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development of his racial antisemitism.  The following month, in an article praising 
the NSDAP's electoral success, Leese asserts that the Nordic races:  
Are facing a common enemy in the Jew Money Power and so their Fascism 
will be always anti-Jewish from racial reasons quite unconnected with 
religion.70 
 
Around this time Leese also began to consider how the nation could be protected from 
the perceived threat of Jewish control and in December 1930 the Fascist proposed 
that aliens 'be displaced from key positions in any essential industry … our definition 
of aliens includes all Jews.’71  At this stage, however, expressions of racial 
antisemitism were rare. 
In March 1931, Leese's antisemitic writings took on a more noxious tone.  In 
considering what he regarded as the 'only three possible ways in which the Jew 
menace can end' he stated that ‘the first is in their extermination,’ an option he did not 
expressly reject, as he did that of assimilation, 'which no decent Nordic man or 
woman could consider seriously.’72  If compulsory segregation was to be the agreed 
solution, Leese favoured the Madagascar scheme advocated by Henry Beamish 
challenging doubters to ‘show us  “a better ‘ole” in which to dump this Nation which 
invariably abuses the hospitality of every other people among which it is given 
shelter.’73   
This month also saw the first appearance of 'News from the Jewish Front,’ a 
regular column featuring a selection of items relating to Jews, alleged Jews, or those 
associated with Jews.  Some of these items were merely snide pieces of gossip, others 
were loosely connected to current affairs, but the majority merely report the 
appointment of Jews to responsible positions, or question the ancestry of public 
figures to whom Leese had taken a dislike.74  Although the content of this column is 
little more than antisemitic tittle-tattle it is not insignificant, as it constantly reinforced 
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negative images of Jews in the minds of its readers and helped to create the perception 
of a relentless encroachment of Jewish influence. 
In June, July and August of 1931 Leese quoted extensively from the 
Protocols, and outlined the alleged plan for Jewish world domination, but said little 
about race, except that 'Race is the Basis of all Statesmanship.’75  Yet, it is a 
significant sign of the increasingly explicit and overt nature of the IFL's antisemitism 
that, by November 1931, the summary of IFL policy had been altered to mention Jews 
specifically.  Instead of being opposed to 'Alien Domination, through the Gold 
Standard' the IFL now favoured the 'Elimination of evil alien influences, especially 
that of the Jews.’76  The significance of race was also highlighted in an article by a 
German ‘National Socialist’ in January 1932, but there is no comment on the subject 
from Leese.77  However, it is from this point that the IFL moves inexorably towards 
the third category of antisemitism and the advocation of biological-eliminationist, 
antisemitism. 
The increasing significance of racial fascism within the IFL was marked in 
January 1933 when the swastika replaced the fasces on the masthead of the Fascist. 
From March 1934 the Fascist described itself as the 'organ of racial fascism.’  
Although Lebzelter is correct to point out the 'increasing rabidness' of Leese's 
antisemitic propaganda during this period, she is mistaken when she claims that the 
IFL's aim was ‘the same as of whole-sale massacre.’78  It appears that she has misread 
the source.  When taken in context that phrase refers to the fate of the Nordic race if 
no action was taken against the Jews.79   
The Fascist continued to demand that Jews be eliminated from Britain; asserting 
that there was only one final and permanent solution that could prevent total ruin 'so 
far as the British empire is concerned; and that is ALL JEWS OUT.’80  Leese and the 
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IFL advocated the complete removal of all Jews from British territory because, like 
the NSDAP, they had come to believe that:  
Race underlies the whole organised life of mankind, and that only on the 
basis of sound racial ideals can the structure of a national civilisation be 
built.81   
 
Articles in The Fascist frequently included phrase such as 'Race is the basis of 
politics.’82  For the IFL race was not synonymous with nationality, rather each 
country was characterised by the different proportions of racial types within its 
boundaries.  According to Leese, again relying on Günther, the Jews were not a race, 
as such, but a combination of inferior races alien to Europe.  He believed it was the 
predominance of the Hither Asiatic blood in this racial mix that explained the Jews' 
alleged cruelty, sadism, and lust for revenge.  He included stereotypical descriptions 
of the appearance and character traits of Hither Asiatics: 
In temperament the Hither Asiatic is mean and sensual… Deliberate cruelty 
comes very easily to him; revenge is one of his strong passions, (The Jewish 
Purim is a festival of revenge), and homosexuality is another… for all his 
cunning, the Jew has never been able to form a lasting State.83   
 
Such stereotypical representations of Jews featured regularly in the front-page 
cartoons of the Fascist.  There were also frequent comments to the effect that Jews 
were incapable of original thought or creativity.84  
Additionally, Leese used allegations of ritual murder as an anti-Jewish 
propaganda tool, linking it to the kidnapping of the Lindberg baby.85  In 1934 he also 
expressed his approval of Julius Streicher's allegations of ritual murder in Der 
Stürmer.  Referring to the nature of the illustrations used by Streicher, Leese excused 
them on the grounds that:  
it is often necessary to be startling and crude before one can wake up the 
gentle-minded Gentile to a realisation of the abominations of Jewry.86 
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The influence of Der Stürmer can be seen in an article in which Leese claimed that 
the cruel nature of the Jews was demonstrated by the ritual murders alleged to take 
place at Passover and Purim, and the ritual slaughter of animals for food.  'The love of 
torture, or sadism, seems an instinct with all these people, an instinct which, it seems, 
must be satisfied.’87  He maintained that:  
It is well established, in spite of many shameless denials, that Jews practise 
ritual murder of Christians in order to obtain fresh blood to mix in their 
ceremonial Passover bread.88 
 
In July 1936 Leese repeated allegations of ritual murder and it was this article 
that led to his trial for seditious libel.89  These alleged practices of the Jews are typical 
of accusations made against 'out-groups' throughout history.  Similar charges of 
murder, cannibalism, and sexual deviance were made, for example, during the 
persecution of the Christians by the Roman Empire, the persecution of heretics by the 
Christian church, and the persecution of witches in early modern Europe.90  
Leese was convinced that a significant part of the 'Jewish conspiracy' was a 
strategy of weakening the Nordic race by marrying into Nordic families, or by 
seducing its women, married or single.  He believed that the greatest crime any 
Nordic could commit was to fail their race by inter-marriage. The Fascist adopted a 
‘name and shame’ policy, publicising the names of those believed to have married 
Jews; particularly the aristocracy who were thought to have a special duty to protect 
the Empire and the race.91  Leese relied on the research of Gregor Mendel (1822-
1884), an Austrian priest and botanist who developed the theory of heredity based on 
his experiments with pea plants:  'Mendel has shown that a Race is never lost through 
mixture, provided there is a desire to regain it.’92  The Nordic blood could be 
recovered if Mendelian principles were observed.93  Leese, taking a similar approach 
to Günther, believed that when two races interbred the original prototypes were not 
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lost, one would predominate and if those with predominantly Nordic characteristics 
bred only with other Nordics then any inferior blood would be, eventually, bred out. 
However, further contamination had to be prevented and The Fascist continued 
to advocate segregation as the most appropriate policy.  In 1935, Leese considered 
that the use of the lethal chamber to solve the 'Jewish Menace' was:  
quite practicable but (some would say unfortunately) in our time it is 
unlikely that the world will demand the adoption of that drastic procedure.94  
  
Therefore, Madagascar remained the IFL's preferred solution. Leese argued that all 
the world's Jews should be deported to Madagascar, at their own expense.  The island 
would be partitioned and the Jews would have to pay compensation to the French 
government and to the indigenous population, who would have a portion of the island 
for their own exclusive use. The area around Madagascar would be policed by air and 
naval patrols provided by the Nordic nations, but paid for by the Jews.  Once the 
deportations were complete any Jew discovered anywhere in the world except 
Madagascar would be liable to the death penalty.95 
The only difficulty with the Madagascar scheme that Leese acknowledged was 
in deciding exactly who was a Jew, and therefore to be exiled, when there had been so 
much mixing of blood.  The problem of definition was also of concern to the Nazi 
government and on 14 November 1935 the First Supplementary Decree of the Reich 
Citizenship Law was issued.  A Jew was defined as someone with more than two non-
Aryan grandparents.  People with one or two Jewish grandparents were classified as 
of mixed blood, that is Mischlinge.  A Mischling of the first degree had two Jewish 
grandparents and a Mischling of the second degree had only one.  Mischlinge retained 
their citizenship rights.  The decision as to the Jewishness of a grandparent depended 
on whether or not they had been a member of the Jewish religious community.96   
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Leese welcomed the developments in Germany, though he saw them as only a 
beginning.  Leese did not dispute the German definition of a pure Aryan as one who 
was 'wholly, or seven-eighths non-Jewish,’ but his own approach to the classification 
of Jews was harsher than that of the First Supplementary Decree.  Before the 
proclamation of the Nuremberg Laws he had already made his position clear:  
There can be no exception in this expulsion of the Jews.  …  Half-caste 
Jews and quarter Jews constitute a difficult problem, as do half-castes all 
over the world; we do not think there is any solution to that problem other 
than sending them away with their Jewish blood-brothers, although they 
should receive special assistance.  Milder dilutions of Jewish blood can 
probably be absorbed into our population, but cannot receive full citizenship 
nor can such be allowed to hold titles or official posts.97  
 
Leese regarded someone with only an eighth of Jewish blood, who the Nazi 
regime would class as pure Aryan, as unfit for citizenship or public service.  Half and 
quarter Jews, who retained their citizenship in Nazi Germany, were to be exiled to 
Madagascar.  Though he did not explicitly forbid marriages between Nordics and 
other European races it seems implicit in his references to Mendel's principles and the 
need to recover Nordic blood by breeding true to type. 
The output of the Fascist included every type of antisemitism from attacks on 
individual Jews, through stereotypical portrayals of Jews as a group, to consideration 
of genocide on biological grounds.  Leese presented his readers with a racial 
philosophy that conformed to his Manichean view of the world. By the late 1930s 
there was hardly an item in the Fascist that was not linked in some way to Jews. 
Using the three categories of antisemitism it is clear how quickly Leese and the IFL 
moved from the outer edges of the model to its inner core. The transition from the 
first category to the second was a matter of months.  Within eighteen months 
biological racial antisemitism had been adopted and by the second anniversary of the 
Fascist genocide was suggested as a potential solution to the 'Jewish problem.’ 
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THE BRITISH UNION OF FASCISTS 
This was all in sharp contrast to the stance adopted by Mosley in the early years of the 
BUF.  Mosley’s association with antisemitism pre-dates the BUF and Dorril points to 
his calculated use of antisemitic campaigns in the New Party.98  Referring to the New 
Party, Mosley had declared that ‘a new movement must find somebody or something 
to hate’ and it seems the Jews fitted the bill.99  However, initially, the BUF did not 
officially sanction antisemitism. Holmes notes that the BUF did not run a major 
antisemitic campaign until 1936, though there were antisemitic elements in the BUF 
from the beginning.  He identifies an increasing level of antisemitism from 1934 
onwards, though this is of the more traditional cultural type rather than the biological, 
racial antisemitism of the IFL.100  Richard Thurlow and Thomas Linehan both agree 
that antisemitism increased from 1934 onwards when the leadership officially adopted 
a policy of antisemitism.101  Prior to this the leadership of the BUF had insisted that 
antisemitism was not permitted, despite the activities of many members and the 
frequent antisemitic references in the BUF press.  Articles and letters in Blackshirt, 
which was aimed at activists within the movement, displayed a much greater degree 
of antisemitism than those in Action, which targeted a more general readership and 
adopted a format closer to that of the mainstream popular press. 
Analysis of the BUF press supports this interpretation: a Blackshirt editorial in 
May 1933 states that Mosley had 'issued strict instructions that there was to be no 
form of Jew-baiting and has emphasised frequently that the movement is in no way 
anti-Semitic'; the editorial goes on to claim that large numbers of Jews are anti-fascist, 
but despite this the BUF 'have not sought any struggle with them, but we do not 
shrink from struggles which are forced upon us.’102  However, although no major 
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antisemitic campaign was launched until 1936, within the pages of the Blackshirt 
there was a continuing series of attacks on Jews.  In November 1933 the Blackshirt 
claimed again that the BUF was not antisemitic; a couple of sentences later it alleged 
that Jews were attempting to involve Britain in a war with Germany.  Two weeks later 
the claim that the BUF was not antisemitic was reiterated, but this was followed by a 
list of those it would 'ruthlessly exterminate' - all those listed were stereotypically 
associated by antisemites with Jews.103  The article also claimed that 'Jews repeatedly 
make cowardly attacks on our members.’104  The BUF appeared to have adopted the 
tactic of prefacing antisemitic attacks with a claim that the BUF was not antisemitic. 
Throughout 1934 there were articles in the Blackshirt attacking 'international 
finance' and 'alien money,’ which the readership would understand meant Jews.105  
Following the violence at the Olympia meeting on 7 June 1934 and Lord 
Rothermere’s consequent withdrawal of support, which Mosley attributed to pressure 
from Jewish advertisers, there was a noticeable increase in the level of antisemitic 
content in the Blackshirt’s articles and in the speeches it reported, culminating in 
Mosley’s speech at the Albert Hall on 28 October 1934.  The report of the Albert Hall 
rally included Mosley’s claim that he had taken up the challenge presented by  'the 
power of organised Jewry, which is today mobilised against Fascism.’106  By the end 
of November 1934 the headlines were becoming more explicit.107  For the next two 
years reports of Mosley's speeches show an increased focus on Jews, and attacks on 
'Jewish international finance' and  'Jewish influence in politics and industry' became 
prominent elements when BUF speakers addressed rallies and meetings.108  During 
this period the Blackshirt no longer relied on its readers making the link between 
‘international finance’ and Jews, instead it made it clear that they were indivisible.  
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In 1935, while still trying to distance the BUF from ‘extremists’ such as 
Leese, the Blackshirt praised the 'natural and healthy antisemitism which is always to 
be found in areas thickly populated by Jews.’109  Around this time the letters column 
included many letters attacking Jews for being involved in finance and crime and for a 
variety of other, bizarre, reasons including 'putting three stones in the coffins to be 
thrown by the dead at the Virgin Mary, her husband, and their Son,’ for being a 
'unscrupulous, wicked people,’ the 'implacable enemy of Jesus Christ and all 
Christendom' and 'working for the supremacy of the Jewish race.’110   
The rising tide of antisemitism in the Blackshirt, which had been building 
steadily during 1935, came to a peak in 1936. March saw the introduction of the 
regular column 'Jolly Judah' by Angus McNab.  Dedicated to showing Jews as alien 
and parasitic, it featured a collection of 'news' items and reports from other papers 
designed to discredit them.  While the tone of the column was not quite as obsessive 
as the Fascist’s ‘News from the Jewish Front,’ its methods and purpose were 
remarkably similar.  The World Jewish Congress was referred to as 'these elders of 
Zion,’ the daubing of Epstein's statue 'Rima' with paint was welcomed, Jews were 
criticised for owning chain-stores, and the conviction of two men for selling obscene 
postcards was reported, apparently because one of them had a Jewish name.111  A 
series of articles by John Beckett exposing the alleged extent of Jewish control of the 
British press also began in March.  Beckett concluded the series by questioning the 
role of 'an alien minority' with 'such a great voice in deciding what we shall know.  
We have certainly found the reason why much important news never reaches the ears 
of our people at all.’ 112  
No opportunity to denigrate Jews was missed.  In August 1936 Alexander 
Raven Thomson dismissed suggestions that Jews had made a significant contribution 
  
 
60
to Britain’s cause in the First World War, supporting his argument with a dubious use 
of statistics.113  In similar vein a correspondent wrote sneeringly of the Jewish ex-
servicemen’s march, describing the former soldiers as a ‘mob of conscripts’ with few 
medals.114  September saw the first of a series designed to counter the publication of 
pro-Jewish leaflets.  The article claimed that the BUF did not attack individual Jews, 
but then went on to supply selective details of five Jews involved in vice and fraud 
cases; at least one of the five, Samuel Insull, was found not guilty when eventually 
tried.  However, he was still included, ‘as an outstanding example of the power of 
Jewish finance.115  Another regular column, ‘Through Fascist Eyes,’ claimed that 
twenty five per cent of the world’s drug dealers were Jewish, and that Jews were over-
represented in German crime statistics.116 
Articles and reports in Action, first published in February 1936 generally 
adopted a low-key approach to antisemitism.  In February the theatre critic 
complained that ‘the Press’ had praised a Jewish actress leading him to expect that she 
‘will be radiant - one of those women of whom there is perhaps one in a generation - 
gracious, loyal, witty and charming.  But no.  She is Jewry’s jewel – thick at the waist 
and a little eastern in movement,’ a competent performer ‘with nothing to indicate the 
quality of genius.’ The critic goes on to say that better performances have been given 
by British actresses. He was also disconcerted by members of the audience, in 
particular ‘… a negligent inelegant hand whose movements ostentatiously beating the 
rhythm of the orchestra, display to the best advantage a huge emerald ring.  On my 
left is a sulky Jewess.  On my right an American Jew.’ The justification for describing 
these theatre-goers lies in the whispered comment of the attendant selling chocolate  
“‘ang together don’t they, the Jews?”117  This type of comment, while unpleasant, 
belongs to the first, stereotypical, category of antisemitism.   
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More significant were the regular articles by William Joyce that claimed to 
reveal ‘the intensified Jewish conspiracy for war,’ criticised the government for 
favouring Jews at the expense of ‘British people,’ and made allegations of Jewish 
violence against fascists.118   Other sections of the paper reiterated the charges of 
Jewish violence.119  Articles in Action included suggestions that Jews took jobs 
needed by British workers, and that communism was spread by Jews.120  In an article 
in February 1936, criticising the imposition of sanctions on Italy, Mosley referred to 
the Soviet delegate to the League of Nations as ‘the Jew Litvinoff.’121  Action also 
made references to the alleged Jewish control of the national press and the cinema.122  
Despite these examples, the level of antisemitic content in Action was much less than 
in the Blackshirt, reflecting the difference between their target audiences: Action was 
designed for a wider, less committed readership than the Blackshirt. 
In the Blackshirt antisemitism continued unabated and reports show an 
increase in the number of meetings held in areas with high concentrations of Jews in 
the local population, particularly in the East End of London, but also in Manchester 
and other cities, as the BUF's antisemitic campaign gathered pace.123  In November 
1936 Mosley held two meetings in the East End on the same evening and at both he 
spoke about ‘corrupt Jewish interests’ and the attempts of Jewry to break the BUF.124  
Around this time in the Blackshirt and at BUF meetings regular attacks on the Public 
Order Act, which would come into effect in January 1937 and restricted the wearing 
of uniforms, the formation of quasi-military organisations, and gave the police powers 
to prohibit political marches, were common. Reginald Gibbs claimed that it was the 
Jews who caused trouble, but it was the BUF who were punished.125  Allegations of 
dubious business practices that were alleged to harm British businesses and workers 
were also raised on a regular basis.126 
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The reports of BUF meetings published in the Blackshirt delight in describing 
the firm handling of those who attempted to heckle or prevent the meetings taking 
place. Invariably these opponents were described in unflattering and offensive terms 
and left the reader in no doubt that they were Jewish.  Mosley was alleged to have 
been attacked by a ‘horde of Jew-led hooligans.’127 Headlines such as ‘Jew 
Brutalities’ list alleged attacks on young BUF members or women by groups of men 
who were ‘unmistakably Jewish.’128  It was claimed that a BUF speaker was beaten 
and kicked unconscious when he went to the aid of a female being attacked by Jews. 
The Blackshirt complained that the national press did not report attacks on BUF 
members, but would report the eviction of communists from BUF meetings.129   The 
Telegraph did report an attack on Mosley in June 1937, but reports of activities 
involving the BUF were rare in the mainstream press except for the Mail during the 
period January to July 1934, when Lord Rothermere gave the BUF, or the Blackshirts 
as he preferred to call them, the support of his paper. 
From 1937 the pace of the BUF’s antisemitic campaign abated somewhat. The 
‘Jolly Judah’ column continued, Jews were accused of warmongering and using the 
national press to campaign against Germany, the behaviour of Jews during air raids in 
the First World War was criticised, and there was a campaign to highlight alleged 
Jewish sharp practice in relation to hire-purchase agreements.130  In November 1937 
the American poet Ezra Pound began to write articles for Action; he was already a 
regular contributor to British Union Quarterly.131  From March 1938 Pound’s column 
became a fairly regular feature and it was frequently laced with antisemitic references 
and snide comments about Jews.132  However, he did not restrict his comments about 
usurers to one faith, Protestants were also lambasted and Quakers were described as 
more dangerous than Jews.133  Another addition was the occasional appearance of the 
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‘Kronicles of Klemenz Brunovitch,’ the reflections of a fictitious East End tailor who 
reported the actions of a range of stereotypical Jewish characters emphasising their 
allegedly cowardly and venal nature.134  The ‘Kronicles’ were unpleasant, but lacked 
the vicious force of Joyce’s contributions. More significantly, in December 1937 
Blackshirt carried an advert for the Protocols of Zion.135    
Generally, however, the BUF’s antisemitic campaign lacked the force and 
energy it had shown between 1935 and 1936, reflecting both the impact of the Public 
Order Act and also the departure, in March 1937, of two of the BUF’s most virulent 
antisemites, Joyce and Beckett, due to the financial problems the BUF were 
experiencing following the loss of Mussolini’s subsidy.136  The BUF’s financial crisis 
continued and membership, which had been in decline since the loss of the publicity 
provided by the Mail shrank to an estimated figure of less than 6,000.  In February 
1938 the number of BUF staff was reduced further, and from March Blackshirt was 
published monthly instead of weekly.   
Despite the continual denials of antisemitism it is clear from the evidence 
presented that the BUF press published antisemitic material from its earliest issues.  
The level of antisemitic content fluctuated depending on the degree of official 
sanction it received from the BUF leadership and on the intended readership, but it 
was never entirely absent.   However, regardless of the presence of racial antisemites 
such as Joyce and Beckett, the antisemitic output of the BUF papers remained 
consistent with the two outer circles of the model and there was no evidence of the 
biological antisemitism that is typical of the fanatical antisemite associated with the 
model’s inner core. 
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ANTISEMITISM IN THE MAINSTREAM PRESS 
Expressions of antisemitic sentiments were far less frequent in the mainstream press.  
This is not to say that antisemitism did not exist outside of the pages of the fascist 
press.  There were several journals and papers, including the Patriot and the Morning 
Post, that regularly expounded antisemitic views, but they were confined to the 
margins and had relatively small circulations.137   Other papers also occasionally 
published stereotypical comments relating to Jews and, more regularly, blatantly 
antisemitic letters.  These occurred more frequently in the local and provincial press, 
but there were also examples in the national papers.138  Yet, as Andrew Sharf has 
noted, it is impossible to judge the extent of popular support for these sentiments from 
the available evidence.  Sharf suggests that, while there is evidence that Jews were 
seen as ‘different’ and disliked accordingly by some, including a vocal antisemitic 
minority, antisemitic views were not widely held.139   Tony Kushner disputes this and 
argues that, while exclusionist antisemites were in the minority, British Jews also 
experienced a ‘liberal’ form of antisemitism that was related to the concept of an 
‘emancipation contract.’ This is based on the supposition that antisemitism would end 
when society began to tolerate Jews and, in response to the host community’s 
toleration, Jews became a less distinctive group within the community.  Kushner 
argues that liberal antisemitism, therefore, attributes continued antisemitism in a 
tolerant society to the failure or refusal of Jews to assimilate sufficiently, that is, if 
antisemitism continued it was the fault of the Jews.140 
Additionally, Kushner also identifies a second, ‘conservative’ or exclusionist 
variation of British antisemitism that rejects the concept of assimilation and regards 
all Jews as inherently alien. These exclusionist antisemites responded to the perceived 
threat represented by the presence of Jews in Britain by demanding their expulsion, 
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and by refusing to countenance the admittance of any more.141 Kushner’s theory 
offers a different perspective for considering the degree and extent of antisemitism in 
the mainstream press, one which is potentially useful in differentiating the stance of 
the various strands of the mainstream press and will be especially relevant when 
considering attitudes to refugees in the following chapter. 
While journalists with antisemitic views were employed by the mainstream 
press, for example Douglas Reed by the Times and G. Ward Price by the Mail, there is 
no evidence of a consistently antisemitic line being adopted by the mainstream press 
and examples of stereotyping and alarmist commentary tended to relate to those Jews 
who had recently arrived in Britain, a theme that will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter.142  Generally ‘British’ Jews were specifically excepted from 
stereotypical descriptions of ‘aliens’ and were praised for their efforts in aiding more 
recent arrivals from Eastern Europe.143   This approval of Jews who, though they 
might experience low levels of social antisemitism, were considered to have 
integrated well goes some way to supporting Tony Kushner’s argument that there is a 
liberal form of antisemitism that is related to the concept of the ‘emancipation 
contract.’   
Significantly, examination of the national papers shows that individual Jews 
were not singled out or attacked by the mainstream press because they were Jews, and 
their involvement in newsworthy incidents was reported in the same way as that of 
other people; the court and society columns reported the activities of prominent Jews 
in exactly the same fashion as other society or political figures.144  This reflected the 
extent to which Anglo-Jewry had integrated into British society. 
Events that antisemites might be expected to exploit to illustrate unfavourable 
Jewish stereotypes were handled objectively, and sometimes even sympathetically, as 
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can be seen between 1932-34 in the reporting of the Insull case.  Insull was a Jewish 
financier facing extradition from France, and later Greece, to America where he was 
to be indicted on charges of embezzlement and larceny. The Mail described him as 
'once a poor Jewish boy in Whitechapel, [who] rose to be one of the most spectacular 
figures in American finance.’145  Later coverage was also sympathetic, giving a 
positive appreciation of his business career and explaining that his companies might 
still be solvent as the collapse was a result of his attempt to resist a hostile take-over 
bid.  The reporting of the case by the Express was similar but less extensive.  Insull 
was described as ‘coming home’ to Reading.146  The initial reports of the case in the 
Times are more objective, mentioning only the indictments and omitting the human 
interest detail of his origins; there are, however, references to his charitable donations 
in several items relating to a London hospital.147  Following Insull’s death in July 
1938 the Times published a lengthy obituary, giving details of his birth in 
Westminster, his association with Thomas Edison and his subsequent business career, 
the legal action that ensued and Insull’s eventual acquittal.148  Revealingly, in the 
Fascist Arnold Leese complained that in the Times’ obituary notice ‘of that shady 
gentleman Samuel Insull, not a sign was given that he was a Jew.’149 
Jews, as a ‘race,’ did not receive much press interest, although during 1932 the 
Express drew attention, more than once, to the reluctance or outright refusal of some 
insurance companies to issue policies to Jewish clients.  This sparked a vigorous 
correspondence from which the Express printed a selection representing a variety of 
opinions.150  Editorial opinion was critical of the insurers, claiming that they were 
‘discriminating in a wholesale way against the Jews,’ including those ‘whose honesty 
has never been questioned.’151  This implied that there were Jews whose honesty was 
questionable.  Additionally, the front page of the same issue carried extensive quotes 
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from insurance companies alleging that ‘Jews are notoriously bad and careless 
drivers’ and that ‘there are certain classes of business - gowns, millinery, furs, and 
wireless - which, if conducted by Jews, can not get cover for fire and burglary.’152  
The statements go on to imply that the majority of claims from Jews were fraudulent 
or inflated.  In fairness it should be said that the Express often printed controversial 
views, which it did not necessarily share, in an attempt to stimulate debate and 
generate interest in the paper. 
The Express prided itself on a reputation for balanced coverage and claimed to 
be offering readers the opportunity to make up their own minds on topical issues.   So 
it is not surprising that, a little later the paper featured articles that attempted to show 
Jews and their activities in a more positive light, including a rebuttal of allegations of 
dishonesty against Jews as a race, photographs of the Chief Rabbi at the Beth Din, 
accompanied by an explanation of the function and methods of the court, and an 
article on the Jewish New Year which, while recognising that Jews were often 
regarded as 'the worshippers of Mammon and materialism,’ gave a positive image of 
the Jewish faith, concentrating on repentance, prayer and charity.153  An editorial in 
July 1932 argued that “Perish Judea!” the ‘slogan of the Hitlerites’ would be ‘the 
epitaph of Germany’ if Hitlerism prevailed.154  Persecution was firmly rejected and 
the contribution of the Jewish community recognised. 
In contrast, reports in the Mirror relating to Jews were generally neutral in 
tone and tended to be restricted to occasions that quirked public interest, such as the 
visits of royalty to various Jewish organisations, the award of honours to Jewish 
notables, and unusual occurrences such as the publication of a Jewish cook book or 
the installation of a kosher kitchen in a cruise liner.155  However, the Mirror did print 
an article by Andrew Souter, ‘Here’s to the Jews,’ which, while Souter claimed to be 
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neither for nor against Jews, employed a patronising tone and used stereotypical 
figures to categorise the race as a whole.156 
Notably, even when espousing the fascist cause the Mail did not overtly adopt 
its antisemitic precepts, concentrating instead on BUF policies that matched Lord 
Rothermere’s concerns.  The January 1934 article by Lord Rothermere headlined 
'Hurrah for the Blackshirts,’ accompanied by a sympathetic editorial, made no 
mention of 'alien influences,’ 'international finance,’ or Jews in any form.157 Coverage 
of a meeting addressed by Joyce in Chiswick on 18 January 1934 reports no 
antisemitic topics, although Joyce did make antisemitic remarks in response to 
questions.158  
Subsequent reports are similarly reticent on the subject of Jews.  Opponents of 
the BUF, particularly those involved in violent altercations, are described by the Mail 
as ‘Red bullies,’ ‘Red hooligans,’ and the ‘Red terror.’159   However, there were coded 
antisemitic references to the ‘entanglements of cosmopolitan finance,’ and ‘people 
from the ghetto.’160  Links were also made between ‘aliens’ and Bolshevism, which 
was described as ‘the work of crafty and ruthless men.  They operate secretly, with 
the aid of foreign money’ to achieve ‘Red revolution in Great Britain.’161  Following 
the violence of the BUF’s Olympia meeting in June 1934 the Mail complained that ‘a 
disorderly Red crowd was allowed to proceed from the east of London … It was 
largely composed of aliens.’162  Shortly before abandoning the BUF the Mail began to 
adopt the BUF tactic of denying antisemitic tendencies while criticising Jews, for 
example it decried the ‘utterly baseless fiction that the Blackshirt Movement is anti-
Jewish,’ and argued that ‘Severely though the Blackshirts have suffered from the 
violent assaults of mobs of Bolshevist-subsidised Jewish Communists in the East End 
of London and many industrial areas, they have no desire or intention to persecute the 
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Jews.  Had they any such purpose they would not be receiving the support of The 
Daily Mail.’163  By mid-July, however, Rothermere had ended the Mail’s support for 
the BUF on the grounds that he ‘never could support any movement with an 
antisemitic bias, any movement which had dictatorship as one of its objectives, or any 
movement which would substitute a “corporate state” for the Parliamentary 
institutions of this country.’164  This seems a little disingenuous on Rothermere’s part, 
as the BUF’s policy regarding the latter issues had not changed between January and 
July 1934 and antisemitic attacks had frequently appeared in the pages of the BUF 
press. 
The London based papers were clearly not antisemitic, but neither could they 
be said to be overtly philo-semitic.  The nationally renowned Manchester Guardian, 
however, clearly celebrated and encouraged the activities of the local Jewish 
community with regular reports of a wide variety of Jewish clubs and societies.165 The 
educational, cultural, and charitable work of these groups was praised and co-
operation between Jewish and non-Jewish organisations was welcomed.166 
 
CONCLUSION 
The expression of antisemitism across the British fascist press was not consistent.  
Only the IFL developed a racially based antisemitism, and this can be largely ascribed 
to Leese being the sole arbiter of policy during most of the IFL’s existence.  The 
influence of Beamish and Günther was fundamental to Leese’s antisemitic evolution, 
however, his racial policies were developed independently of the Nazi regime.  The 
antisemitism of the BF and the BUF fluctuated depending on the prevailing attitude of 
their leadership, but remained within the range of traditional British far-right 
exclusionist antisemites.  The antisemitism of the BF was rooted in the pre-existing 
  
 
70
antipathy of its leading members and was linked to fear of the alleged conspiracies of 
‘International Finance’ and the spread of communism, both of which the BF believed 
to be advanced by Jews.  The foregrounding of antisemitism in 1933 was part of an 
attempt to introduce a more radical programme in a futile effort to revitalise the 
movement.  Variations in the level of antisemitism expressed by the BUF were related 
to power struggles within its hierarchy.  The increased level of antisemitism following 
the withdrawal of Rothermere’s support was largely a response to dwindling 
membership, and to what was perceived as Jewish aggression.  Repeated references to 
Jewish control of industry, finance, political parties and the press reinforced the 
BUF’s sense of isolation from the mainstream and encouraged members’ reliance on 
the movement. 
Analysis of the mainstream press has not shown conclusive evidence to 
support Tony Kushner’s argument that the ‘emancipation contract’ had led to British 
Jews being blamed for antisemitism. There is no criticism of their distinct religious 
practices or failure to assimilate.  During the 1930s the mainstream press appeared 
content with the existence of discrete Jewish communities within the wider society.  
However, there was some evidence of pressure on recent arrivals to conform, and, as 
will be seen in the next chapter, the activities of Jews in continental Europe were 
more likely to be thought to have contributed to antisemitism, which would support 
Kushner’s concept of ‘liberal’ antisemitism.  Overall the evidence indicates that 
examples of antisemitism were rare and that antisemitism was not a feature of the 
mainstream press in Britain between the wars.  Overt antisemitism appeared to be 
socially unacceptable and the continual denigration of the Jews in the fascist press 
does not reflect the attitudes of the mainstream, even in a distorted way.  Expressions 
of the milder forms of antisemitism, as typified in the first category of the model, may 
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reflect the extent of antisemitism present among the general public, but as Holmes 
pointed out we cannot be sure of this as there is no way to measure public opinion 
retrospectively.  Even the publication of readers’ letters with an antisemitic content 
does not imply that the mainstream press supported those views.  Letters were 
published from a wide variety of viewpoints and it remains common practice for 
controversial letters to be published in order to stimulate debate.  As Sharf noted the 
extent of antisemitism in Britain cannot be estimated from the number of antisemitic 
letters printed in the mainstream press as many of those who write to the papers might 
be cranks or represent minority views.167  The only reliable indicator is that the 
mainstream press were not regularly expressing antisemitic views and massively 
outsold publications that did.  It is apparent that the antisemitic opinions of the fascist 
press were not an extension of mainstream opinion, but, particularly those calling for 
restrictions on Jewish civil liberties or their expulsion from Britain, were a 
considerable departure from them.  In the case of those such as Leese and Joyce who 
expressed a genocidal desire for the elimination of all Jews the boundary between 
civilised behaviour and barbarism had clearly been crossed. 
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Chapter 2 
 
CAUTIOUSLY DOES IT – Attitudes to 
German Antisemitism and Jewish 
Refugees1 
 
 
While the mainstream press in Britain did not share the extreme antisemitic views 
of the fascist press, and at times displayed a positive appreciation of ‘British’ 
Jews, their attitude to ‘foreign’ Jews was more equivocal.  In particular the Tory 
popular press demonstrated an irrational fear of the effects of allowing even small 
numbers of refugees into the country and was very keen to distance Britain from 
any involvement in the relief of Jews suffering persecution in continental Europe.  
However, responses towards Germany and the overt expression of racial 
antisemitism were complex, as unambiguously critical reports could lead to 
correspondents being expelled from Germany, and editorial comment, although 
generally critical of German antisemitism in action, was tempered by the possible 
national and international repercussions of interfering in what was seen as another 
nation’s domestic affairs.  This chapter seeks to explore these issues in detail and 
to establish if the attitudes of the British fascists and the mainstream converged, 
firstly in relation to the Nazis’ rise to power, secondly over the treatment of Jews 
by the Nazi regime and thirdly over responses to the refugees fleeing Germany 
and the occupied territories.  In particular the chapter considers more closely the 
concept of liberal antisemitism and addresses the question of whether Jews were 
only acceptable in mainstream society if they were few in number and fully 
assimilated. 
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British responses to Jewish refugees have been hotly debated.  Although 
they argue that more could have been done, Bernard Wasserstein and A. J. 
Sherman maintain that the British government’s approach to Jewish refugees was 
comparatively generous, about 50,000 refugees were allowed entry into Britain, 
and Wasserstein claims that, despite some underlying antagonism, there was 
considerable public sympathy for the refugees.2  Rubinstein, meanwhile, is 
adamant that Britain and the other democracies could not have saved any more 
Jews from the Holocaust.  For Louise London, such arguments are not fully 
substantiated and, while she acknowledges that Britain did more to shelter the 
Jews than any other country, apart from the Soviet Union and the United States, 
she argues that Britain’s generosity was limited by self-interest.3  The weight of 
the historiography supports the argument that the British Government, and others, 
could have saved more refugees than they did, but how many more could have 
been rescued is debateable. 
While donations to the various relief funds goes some way to endorse 
claims of public support for the refugees, sufficient account has not been taken of 
the attitude of the popular press, let alone the vicious diatribes of the fascist press.   
Holmes argues that the British Government was always conscious of public 
antagonism to Jews and this reinforced its existing inclination to be cautious in 
admitting refugees.4   
According to Sharf’s analysis of the attitudes of the British press to Jews 
in Nazi Germany, the press distorted or omitted little in its coverage of the 
persecution of the Jews in Germany.5  Yet, closer examination shows that the 
extent of the coverage and its presentation varied considerably between the 
mainstream papers.  The popular press reported intermittently on the violence and 
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repression taking place in Germany.  These reports tended to be sensationalised, in 
comparison with those of the quality press.  Papers such as the Times and the 
Telegraph were more objective, providing more frequent and more detailed 
reports of events.  The Times provided extensive coverage, and the tone of the 
reports from the Times’ Berlin Correspondents was disapproving.6   The quantity 
and tone of each paper’s reports and editorials varied, and these were often 
influenced by the ‘line’ of the proprietor or editor of the paper concerned.  The 
editor of the Times, Geoffrey Dawson, who was a confidante of Neville 
Chamberlain, generally kept the paper’s editorial stance in line with government 
policy.7  In the case of the Mail and the Express, due to the bitter circulation war 
in which they were engaged, their primary focus was always selecting and 
presenting the news in a manner that would maximise their chances of outselling 
each other.  While the tenor of its leader columns was consistent, the tone of 
reports and articles in the Express varied notably, depending on the author of a 
particular item, for instance, D. Sefton Delmer was less enthusiastically pro-Hitler 
than Pembroke Stephens.   Possibly Lord Beaverbrook allowed his columnists 
slightly more latitude than did Lord Rothermere, who according to Dorril, used 
George Ward Price as his ‘journalistic mouthpiece.’8  Close reading of Ward 
Price’s autobiographical writing confirms Dorril’s assessment of his association 
with Rothermere.9 
 
THE QUALITY PRESS AND NAZI GERMANY: INITIAL RESPONSES 
The reactions of the Times and the Telegraph to Hitler’s Chancellorship and the 
early days of Nazi policymaking were not enthusiastic.  The Times adopted a 
cautious approach and was measured in its editorial response to Hitler’s first 
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government, noting that, given the level of popular support for Hitler, it was 
‘desirable’ that he be offered the opportunity to show that ‘he is something more 
than an orator and an agitator.’  While the Times implied that there was the 
potential for concern, it advocated a ‘wait and see’ policy in the hope that Hitler 
would demonstrate his ‘constructive powers, and his ability for the first time to 
exercise power with responsibility.’10  The Telegraph was more sanguine than the 
Times, seeing no potential threat in Hitler’s leadership of the German 
Government.  In the Telegraph’s perception of Germany the Jewish community 
‘shows not the slightest apprehension at the Nazi leader’s entry into office.’11  For 
the Telegraph, it was very much business as usual in Germany. 
Maintaining stable international relations was the most significant factor 
driving the quality press’ response to the Nazi regime.  Despite the Nazis’ ruthless 
suppression of political opponents, a Times editorial, in February 1933, noted that 
the world was waiting sympathetically to see if Hitler’s undoubted talents were 
sufficient to enable him to lead an effective government.12  This was despite the 
almost daily reports detailing the suppression of political opponents.13  Eventually, 
editorials began to reflect the alarming reports filed by the Times’ German 
correspondents, and by March 1933 criticism of the conduct of the elections, the 
use of violence and persecution, and, significantly, fear of the potential threat to 
international peace were voiced.14  However, the degree of editorial concern 
quickly diminished and, before the month was out, readers were told that Hitler’s 
foreign policy was not immoderate and internal excesses should not prevent an 
international accord, manifestly demonstrating that the Nazi regime’s persecution 
of its citizens was seen as being of little relevance outside Germany.15  The 
paper’s correspondents continued to file reports that described events in Germany 
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accurately and, while phrased in neutral tones, they conveyed a clear sense of 
distaste and disgust at the actions of the Nazi regime.  As well as particular 
incidents involving specific individuals, the Times also reported on ongoing issues 
such as the suppression of dissent in the churches, the Reichstag fire and 
subsequent trial, the use of concentration camps, and the increasing levels of 
hardship and persecution faced by German Jews.16   
The Telegraph also began to demonstrate concern over the treatment of Jews 
in Germany.  In April 1933 an ‘opinion’ piece by one of the paper’s 
correspondents was published in the news columns instead of the usual factual 
report.  The correspondent argued that the Jews had been a great asset to 
Germany: ‘Not only in business, but in medicine, literature, the Press, art, music 
and the drama, they are everywhere prominent and in the front rank.’17  In an 
editorial on the same day the Telegraph refuted claims by German journalists that 
reports of ‘alleged atrocities’ were ‘false rumours’ that created a ‘distorted view of 
the great events in Germany.’18  The editorial insisted that ‘the reports of brutal 
attacks by “Nazi” troopers on their political enemies have been too well 
authenticated by experienced newspaper correspondents and confirmed from 
private sources to be ignored.’  The persecution of the Jews in Germany was 
judged ‘quite inexcusable in a civilised country.’19  A couple of days later the 
Telegraph’s reaction to the anti-Jewish boycott is equally straightforward,  
… it certainly was not a victory of Reason or 
Judgement…Saturday’s proceedings were not at all grand or heroic 
in character–and the Nazis really seem to aim at the heroic–but 
were, in fact, contemptibly sordid and mean.20   
 
The response of the Times to the boycott was in a more restrained and less 
censorious tone.  Its editorial pointed out some potential risks to Germany of the 
strategy its new leaders had adopted, and supported Lord Halifax’s statement in 
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the House of Lords that there could be no intervention in internal German affairs.  
Although convinced that British intervention could only be counter-productive, 
the Times stressed the widespread concern felt in Britain at recent developments in 
Germany.’21  
At this time the Times and the Telegraph did not consider the persecution of 
German citizens as anything other than a domestic issue, which would not impede 
Anglo-German relations.  Yet, both papers expressed clearly that the actions of the 
Nazis were morally repugnant and politically inadvisable. 
 
THE RESPONSE OF THE POPULAR PRESS TO HITLER’S RISE TO 
POWER 
The approval of the Tory popular papers for Hitler and the Nazi regime was 
largely due to the perception that Hitler shared their concerns regarding the 
dangers of communism. The Mail had expressed its approval of Hitler and the 
National Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) as early as September 1930, 
when, following significant electoral gains by the NSDAP, an article lauding their 
success and calling for a similar youth-centric party to be established in Britain 
was published under Rothermere’s byline, although the article was actually 
written by Ward Price.22  The article also accepted Nazi propaganda that Jews had 
been over-represented in public office.   
Unlike the Mail, the Express had always claimed to be even-handed. While 
stating that it ‘unequivocally condemned persecution of the Jews’ it boasted that it 
offered a greater freedom than other newspapers for the discussion of both sides 
of any political issue.  While disassociating itself from the views expressed, in 
1932 the Express had published a ‘startling attack on the Jews by Dr. Joseph 
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Goebbels.’23  A couple of days later A. L. Easterman, an Express correspondent, 
was given an equivalent amount of space and prominence in order to answer 
Goebbels’ allegations.24  It is probable that when it published Goebbels’ article the 
Express was more concerned with a potential rise in circulation than with any 
interest in furthering debate. 
After 21 days of Hitler’s Chancellorship, Express columnist D. Sefton 
Delmer assessed the changes in Germany.  He noted the increase in militarism and 
the talk of war, commented on Hitler’s shrewdness in outmanoeuvring von Papen, 
Dr. Hugenberg and Hindenburg, observed that few people were now willing to 
talk candidly over the telephone, yet made no mention of any overt persecution.25  
This was quickly followed by an account of Delmer’s flight to Frankfurt 
accompanying Hitler who was to give a speech as part of his election campaign. 
Hitler is referred to as ‘the saviour of Germany’, but later described as looking 
‘like … a provincial commercial traveller.’26   
Despite the lack of editorial comment, the Mail and the Express did include 
reports from Germany in their foreign news, and both initially concentrated on 
anti-communist activity, an issue they took very seriously.  The Express appeared 
to approve Hitler’s ‘Plans To Save Germany’, which included ‘DRASTIC 
ACTION AGAINST REDS.’27  This was, apparently, justified due to the ‘RED 
WAVE OF TERROR’, which had been unleashed in Germany on Moscow’s 
orders.  The ‘wave of terror’ was the shooting, allegedly by communists, of a 
police constable and a Hitlerite after the Nazis’ triumphal march on 30 January 
1933.28  The Express gave this event more coverage than other papers, reflecting 
its deep anxiety over communism.  
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The persecution of the Jews was occasionally reported; instances included 
the expulsion of Jewish doctors from hospitals, the banning of concerts with 
Jewish conductors, and the prohibition of Jewish lawyers and Judges from 
entering the law courts.29   The Express had suggested that if Hitler were to end 
‘Jew Baiting’ then the German boycott would also end, but it adopted a more 
forceful tone in its support for Hitler’s anti-communist stance.30  This, coupled 
with its willingness to downplay the persecution of the Jews, is exemplified in an 
editorial of April 1933: 
The most popular cry of the moment is “Down with Hitler!”  The Jews 
quite rightly cry it louder than any one else.  But they are supported 
back in France and Britain by influential, sober-minded people who 
would declare Germany a plague spot until she changed her 
Government.  Do they know what they are talking about?  The “Daily 
Express” abhors the persecution of the Jews as it detests all forms of 
government that are based on violence – but what is Hitler doing?  He 
is carrying into actual realisation Bismarck’s dream of a unified 
Germany.  He is crushing a Communistic movement that was not only 
threatening to disrupt Germany, but was threatening to form a colossal 
Bolshevik combination with Russia.    Hitler and his Nazis may prove 
to be the enemies of Germany and civilisation.  There is much about 
their movement that is revolting to British susceptibilities.  But if 
German Communism had seized control of the Reich, many of the 
people in this country who are shouting for his downfall would have 
been shouting far louder “Send for Hitler!”31 
 
So as long as the persecution included communists, the Express considered that 
much could be forgiven.    
More often than not the Express presented Hitler in a favourable light.  Their 
Special Women’s Correspondent, musing on the question ‘will Hitler ever 
marry?’ reflected on his ‘passionate speeches’ and his ability to ‘move an 
audience and make them vibrate to his voice and gesture.’32  On Hitler’s forty-
fourth birthday an article appeared reporting the celebrations, which included 
money and food for the poor and holidays for children.  In his ‘Talk of London’ 
column ‘the Dragoman’ referred to Hitler as ‘Handsome.’33   
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While not endorsing the persecution of Jews, the Express appeared keen to 
justify Hitler’s actions.  In May 1933 the paper ran an article by Gilbert Frankau 
headed ‘As a Jew I am not against Hitler.’  Frankau was a poet and novelist who 
had been discouraged by his parents from identifying with anything Jewish.34   
Frankau claimed that the protest against Hitler was ‘being somewhat overdone.’  
While he predicted that the persecution would eventually prove to be against 
Germany’s interests, Frankau claimed that it was understandable because: ‘The 
Communist movement in Germany has been largely fomented by Jews.’  He 
explained that German Jews were not as integrated as those in Britain, and, while 
many were good Jews, there were those, presumably ‘bad’ Jews, who ‘would 
rather see Germany fall than Jewry.’  Frankau went on to say that if only ‘Hitler’s 
jack-boot was a little less broad in the toe it might kick out the latter without 
injuring the former.’35  
If the Express was usually clear in its approval or disapproval of the various 
developments in Nazi Germany, occasionally the tone could be more ambiguous.  
In an article by Pembroke Stephens celebrating Hitler’s first year in office his 
achievements were listed: the reduction of unemployment, the stabilisation of 
farming, the smashing of communism, trade unions and political clericalism, and, 
finally, the restoration of order. Conversely, Stephens also described some of the 
less attractive aspects of Hitler’s Germany, for example a shop girl sent to a 
concentration camp for refusing to contribute sixpence to the winter help fund. 
The destruction of Berlin’s cultural and intellectual brilliance was mourned, 
despite the concurrent improvement in public morality.  Overall, Stephens 
concluded that the majority of people were less happy, had less money and fewer 
rights than previously, but Stephens expressed no sense of outrage or anger at 
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what was so obviously wrong in German perceptions of Volksgemeinschaft.  
Instead the tone of the article is more that of a bemused outsider observing a 
failing experiment; an experiment that the reader is encouraged to think worth 
trying, one that really should have worked: 
Make full allowance for the Nazis.  Admit that the Jews abused 
their position in democratic Germany and deserved their fate.  
Admit that the Socialists were corrupt and weak. Admit that the 
Treaty of Versailles imposed the tortuous sufferings and terrible 
confusion on Germany, and that a scourge to lash the demoralised 
country into unity was the logical outcome of too much pressure 
from abroad.  
Yet the picture that National Socialism presents to the world on its 
first birthday lacks charm.  The failure of the Nazis to impress the 
western world with their record is not the fault of Hitler, for whom 
I personally have the greatest admiration and respect.  The fault 
lies in the defects in the German character…The average German 
is docile and cool, obedient and haughty, sentimental and crude, 
with a genius for organisation, militarism and self-praise.  The 
complex of these emotions is responsible for the cruelty and lack 
of humour in the Nazi movement which, with less rigid 
application, might have set a pattern of great beauty to a grey 
world.36 
 
The Tory popular press, exploiting the novelty value of Hitler and the Nazi 
regime, treated the Nazi elite as celebrities and Stephens appeared enchanted by 
the social activities of some young and dashing Nazi leaders who were enjoying 
Berlin ‘society’, particularly the company of wealthy and beautiful women.  
Stephens fancifully described the ‘youthful and rather exotic looking’ President of 
Cologne, Dr Diels, and the ‘Darling of the Diplomats,’ Herr Schultz, who was 
attached to Roehm’s staff and was the ‘best-looking Nazi diplomat.’  Stephens 
assured readers that the ‘good type of Nazi is a jolly fellow who believes 
wholeheartedly in enjoyment.’37 
Surprisingly, despite Rothermere’s evident enthusiasm for Hitler and his 
belief that the youth of Germany had set an example in revitalising their nation 
that government that Britain should emulate, the Mail generally exhibited less 
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enthusiasm for Hitler than the Express.38  In August 1934 a review of ‘Hitler’s 
Amazing Career’, by Douglas West, listed the facts without any sycophantic 
gloss.39  However, when the Mail did articulate its admiration for Hitler it did it 
unequivocally and the accompanying editorial described Hitler as a clear-sighted 
leader, comparing him favourably to Napoleon.40  Headlines on the following 
page proclaimed Hitler the most powerful figure in world history.41  A matter of 
days later the Mail published an exclusive interview between Hitler and G. Ward 
Price.  As well as giving readers Hitler’s views on Germany’s peaceful intentions, 
world economic conditions, and the  League of Nations, Ward Price also informed 
them of the clearness of Hitler’s skin, his well-groomed appearance and 
immaculate dress. Having, briefly, raised the spectre of division in the Nazis’ 
ranks he retreated into the realms of the romantic novelist when he told readers 
that ‘The Leader’s eyes flashed as he replied.’42  In a more restrained tone the 
following day’s editorial described Hitler as ‘the most prominent and most 
discussed man of our time …’43  
The results of the plebiscite in August 1934, in which 84.6 per cent of 
German voters endorsed Hitler’s combination of the roles of Chancellor and Reich 
President following Hindenburg’s death, were also hailed by the Mail as ‘an 
astonishing tribute to the personal prestige of Herr Hitler.’  Although 
acknowledging that: 
moral suasion was undoubtedly applied to the “critics and doubters” 
no pressure could force a whole nation, against its will, to give such 
impressive proof of its confidence. 44   
 
If the majority was content for the minorities to be suppressed and coerced there 
was nothing for the Mail’s readers to be concerned about.  The Express took a 
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slightly different line in its editorial, declaring that ‘Hitler’s vote slumps, though 
he is still master of the hearts and fears of the majority of his countrymen.45   
 It is significant that the Mail had published positive appreciations of Hitler 
in August 1934 as in September Otto von Bismarck, grandson of the Iron 
Chancellor and Counsellor at the German embassy in London, reported to Berlin 
that due to the BUF’s increasing popularity the British Government had decided 
to fight fascism and the press had agreed to support this, hence, according to 
Bismarck, the press attacks on Germany during the previous few months.46  The 
Mail was definitely out of step with the alleged pact with the Government, and the 
Express was hardly in fighting mood.   
In contrast to the Tory popular press, the Mirror’s approach was much less 
flattering, for example an editorial published a couple of weeks before the 
plebiscite read:  
After the old Junker … comes the hysterical Austrian, with his 
megalomania, based on an acute inferiority complex, his neurasthenia, 
his oratorical brilliance, his inexperience in the government of a great 
people.’47   
 
Readers were advised to observe over the next few months how much substance 
there was behind the ‘passionate gestures’ and the ‘flaming words.’  Three days 
later, referring to the interview in the Mail, readers were also warned not to rely 
on Hitler’s words when he spoke of his peaceful intentions towards Britain.  They 
were reminded that the Kaiser once spoke in similar terms.48  
 
MAINSTREAM RESPONSES TO THE PURGE OF THE  SA 
The reaction of the British press to Hitler’s ‘Night of the Long Knives’ showed 
little sign of the antagonism reported by Bismarck.  The Telegraph referred to 
Hitler as showing ‘the daring of a born leader of men.’49  Other Tory papers were 
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equally congratulatory.  However, the Times’ editorial was, once again, less 
fulsome relating the progression of events and commenting that:  
HERR HITLER, whatever one may think of his methods, is genuinely 
trying to transform revolutionary fervour into moderate and 
constructive effort and to impose a high standard of public service on 
National-Socialist officials.50 
 
This, while less enthusiastic than the Telegraph and the Tory popular press, could 
not be construed as an attack on Germany.   
 It may well have been the liberal or left-wing press that Bismarck had in 
mind when he made his report to Berlin.  The Manchester Guardian did print 
items that repeated allegations of brutality or were critical of press freedom in 
Germany, and also reported the speeches of British public figures who were 
critical of the Nazi regime.51  The paper’s editorial response to the ‘Night of the 
Long Knives’ cast doubt on aspects of the official version of events but accepted 
there was a counter-revolution and that Hitler had acted with ruthless speed to 
secure his position.52 On the same page, however, a correspondent questioned the 
existence of a counter-revolution and suggested that Hitler’s government might 
soon be replaced by a Junker regime that included Göring.53  Similarly, the 
Mirror’s editorial, while acknowledging the success of Hitler’s ‘iron hand’, also 
thought the Junker class represented a potential threat that might force Hitler to 
compromise.54  The following day’s editorial accepted that Hindenburg’s support 
had made Hitler’s position secure, but reflected on the probability that in order to 
conceal internal dissension Germany might well turn her attention ‘upon the 
“enemies of Germany” across her frontiers.’55  
The coverage in the mainstream press hardly constituted a concerted attack 
on Germany, but Bismarck’s perception of widespread and unfounded criticism of 
the Nazi regime highlights the Nazis’ sensitivity to any criticism.   This feeling of 
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ill-usage did not diminish and, as we shall see in a later chapter, Hitler continued 
to complain of unjust criticism and anti-Nazi bias throughout the decade.  This 
was a reading of mainstream reporting of events in Germany that was shared by 
British fascists. 
 
THE FASCIST PRESS AND NAZI GERMANY 
Unsurprisingly, the fascist press did not report examples of persecution in 
Germany, but did, occasionally, refer to such reports in the mainstream press, 
claiming that they were lies or exaggerations disseminated by a Jewish-controlled 
press and designed to discredit Germany.  For example, in April 1933 the 
Blackshirt claimed that the German government did not discriminate against 
Jews, that the Jewish issue was not relevant to fascism, and that stories in the 
national press were ‘lying propaganda.’  It was also explained that, in Germany, 
Jews were allied with the two main enemies of fascism.  At one extreme they 
were associated with Communism and at the other with ‘International Finance.’56 
The Blackshirt was contemptuous of the mainstream press’ reporting of events in 
Germany and the papers’ analysis of events.57  In a similar vein Arthur Kitson 
argued that the British press was anti-German because Hitler had acted to save 
Germany from the political hatred of the Jews.58 According to Action the 
coverage of events in Germany by the mainstream press was ‘distinguished by its 
venom and mendacity.’59   
A letter, published in the Blackshirt, from a ‘Jewish Correspondent in 
Prague’ explained that ‘good’, patriotic Jews had nothing to fear from the Nazis, 
despite some beatings, deaths and so forth.  It was admitted that two Jews had 
been kidnapped and had not been seen since, ‘but they were Communists and that 
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was the reason for their disappearance.’60 As in the Tory popular press, it 
appeared that the persecution of communists was viewed as legitimate. 
The fascist press made every effort to depict the Nazi regime in a positive 
light.  Mosley described Hitler as the ‘New Man of Germany’, and claimed that 
the Nazi movement had shown what could be done by the will to action and to 
power.61  The BUF applauded the Nazis’ use of a strong hand in maintaining 
power, but expected the Nazi government to repress revenge attacks and other 
outrages.62  During May 1933, the Blackshirt introduced a regular column called 
‘The New Germany’; in each issue it portrayed a different aspect of the Nazi 
regime in a positive manner.63  In July an article by Alexander Raven introduced 
readers to the ‘Human Side of Hitlerism.’  This included a visit to a concentration 
camp for political prisoners, where even ‘one of the heftiest and most violent’ of 
communists was allowed parole because he had a large family, and featured a 
parade of former Boy Scouts who had been absorbed into the Hitler Youth.64   
Action continued to deny that the Jews were suffering persecution because of 
their race and claimed there was a conspiracy to prevent England and Germany 
establishing friendly relations.  The article went on to insist that Jews had not been 
subject to a ‘savage and unjustifiable persecution.’  Instead ‘the Jew’ had been 
given the  
freedom to enjoy his own culture and to indulge in his own cultural 
activities, in place of superimposing them on the German people, 
whether they wanted them or not.’65 
 
Comments like these accentuated the perception that the Jews in Germany were 
significantly different to the majority of the population and were, therefore, 
manifestly not German. 
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The IFL also approved of Hitler’s show of strength, and in the Fascist 
Hitler’s Chancellorship was celebrated with a short, front-page article by H. R. 
Hoffman, a German National Socialist.  Hoffman welcomed ‘Hitler’s strong 
government’ which he claimed was protecting Germany from Bolshevism and 
Marxism, and enabling the ‘rebirth of the Nordic ideal.’66  The following month 
the Fascist advised new readers that  
owing to Hitler’s determination to destroy for ever the evil influence 
of the Jew on the people of Germany, all the Jewish world power is 
concentrated against him; consequently the “Britis(c)h” [sic] 
newspapers, with their Jewish correspondents and Jewish news-
agencies, are full of lies and misrepresentations not only about Hitler 
but about what is going on in Germany.’67 
   
 Another article by Hoffman explained, without admitting the nature of 
events, that ‘the present happenings in Germany’ were due to the increasing 
influence of Jews in German society, their links with communism, and the 
German people’s eventual realisation that 
a national rebirth and a racial renewal could only become possible when 
the Jews were assigned a position in the New Germany which was in 
proportion to their percentage of the population.68  
 
 Again without specifying any details, the Fascist claimed in June 1934 that 
‘…Germany has won a victory against the Jew, and consequently we British are to 
be used by the Jew Money Power to smash her if it can be done.’69  A later issue 
of the Fascist accused the Jews of calumny, hatred and falsehood, claiming that 
they had manipulated international responses to the ‘efforts of the German Nation 
to emancipate itself completely from the Jews.’70  Its views on Jewish control of 
the press were also reiterated when, in December 1934, the Fascist claimed that:  
the anti-German attitude of the so called “British” daily newspapers, 
together with their hints about Britain being drawn into the trouble, is 
Jewish in its origin.71   
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The Fascist did not state which papers were hinting that Britain might become 
embroiled in conflict with Germany, but no such hints are to be found in the pages 
of the Tory press.  Indeed the Mail and Express were strident in their demands that 
Britain should not become involved in any continental conflict. 
The responses of the fascist press to Hitler’s Government are similar in 
their welcome and enthusiasm for the changes being introduced in Germany.  
There is also a superficial similarity in their avoidance of any description of the 
persecutions in Germany and their insistence that reports in the mainstream press 
of those persecutions were misleading and malicious.  Yet, there were significant 
differences in the tone and style of the articles relating to the treatment of Jews in 
Germany, reflecting the target readership of the various publications.  Action, as 
we have seen, portrayed the persecution as an opportunity for Jews to enjoy 
cultural freedom and independence without impinging on the ‘German people’, 
thus reinforcing the supposed alien nature of the Jews while downplaying their 
persecution. The Blackshirt gamely persisted with the contradictory line that the 
‘Jewish issue’ was irrelevant while maintaining that the Nazi Government needed 
to take robust action against ‘Jewish’ socialism and finance to consolidate its own 
position and protect Germany’s interests.  The Fascist, while insisting that the 
reports of persecution were fabricated as part of a Jewish conspiracy, celebrated 
Hitler’s intention to excise the Jews from German public life.  The popular press 
shared some of the enthusiasm for Hitler demonstrated by the fascist press, 
celebrating in particular his image as a strong leader bringing order and stability to 
Germany, however, they also treated him as a celebrity as well as a serious 
political leader.  All of the mainstream papers were critical of the persecutions of 
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the Jews, although the popular press shared the fascists’ approval of the repression 
of communism. 
 
THE MAINSTREAM PRESS AND JEWISH REFUGEES 
London argues that in the face of the suffering of the Jewish refugees Britain 
opted for caution, pragmatism, and the national interest.72  This was certainly the 
position advocated by the majority of the Tory press, but the manner in which the 
various papers articulated their concerns regarding admittance of refugees to 
Britain varied considerably.  Stridency was the overwhelming characteristic of the 
editorials addressing the subject of refugees in both the Daily Express and the 
Daily Mail.  Both viewed the refugees as a threat to Britain’s interests and 
expressed their views forcibly.  The Times and the Daily Telegraph were more 
moderate in tone and appeared more sincere in their expressions of concern for the 
plight of the refugees, though they too were adamant that Britain alone could do 
little to alleviate the suffering.  Britain was no longer a country of immigration 
and the Aliens Act of 1905 had been introduced to halt the flow of Jewish 
refugees from Eastern Europe.  Further legislation in 1914 and 1919 added extra 
restrictions.73  Most of the refugees fleeing Nazi persecution were granted only 
temporary leave to remain and were en route to other countries that offered a 
permanent home.  The Jewish Community in Britain raised funds to underwrite 
the cost of maintaining Jewish refugees during their stay in Britain and the leaders 
of Anglo-Jewry had promised the Government that the cost of providing for the 
refugees would not fall on the British tax-payer. Both the Government and the 
Anglo-Jewish hierarchy were concerned that admitting large numbers of refugees 
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might stimulate antisemitism and this was a significant factor in limiting the 
numbers allowed entry.74 
Fears regarding an alien ‘invasion’ pre-dated the growth of fascism; specific 
concerns regarding Jewish refugees had been circulating ‘since the beginning of 
the influx in 1881.’75   In 1924 the Times ran a series of articles under the heading 
‘Alien London’, which reported the effects of the ‘alien invasion.’76  These appear 
to fit well with Kushner’s definition of ‘liberal antisemitism.’  An editorial 
commenting on the ‘Alien London’ series declared that  
No nation welcomes the settlement within its borders of an alien 
population, living its own separate life and preserving its own 
characteristics from generation to generation. No nation can desire that 
such a population should share in the political system of the country.77 
 
Established Jews were not seen as a problem, but there was concern that more 
recent, first generation immigrants should assimilate, though they were not 
expected to give up their religious practices.  The descendents of these immigrants 
would be an asset to the nation, but the process of amalgamation would take 
patience and time and it must not be made more difficult by ‘throwing open the 
gates to a flood of fresh immigrants ...’78 
The issues discussed in this series of articles would be raised again in the 
late 1930s as the refugee crisis deepened.  The use of terms such as ‘Swarms’, 
‘Foreign invasion’, ‘invaders’ and ‘The invaded British’ to refer to the arrival of 
refugees would resurface in the fascist press, as would the allegations relating to 
hygiene, disease, internationalism, fraudulent behaviour and the stealing of British 
jobs.  Gradually the use of terms that implied disease or militant occupancy 
decreased in the mainstream press.  They were replaced by others which, while 
still emotive, were marginally less threatening.79   
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 During the early 1930s the mainstream press was not greatly concerned 
with refugees, and in 1932 the Express reassured its readers that there were only a 
small number of Jews in Britain.80   The arrival, in 1933, of refugees from 
Germany attracted the interest of the Express, however, and its description of two 
Jewish refugees as ‘the first of 60,000’ clearly suggested the imminent arrival of 
all 60,000 in Britain.81  The following month it was alleged that there were aliens 
on the dole, competing with Britons for jobs.82  The accusation that refugees 
represented economic competition to unemployed British workers was particularly 
potent given the context of the depression and high levels of unemployment.  
Despite the fears of the Express, by December of that year only 3,000 refugees 
had arrived according to the Permanent Commission for Refugees, and by April 
1934 there were only 2,000 remaining in England, as many had moved on to other 
destinations.  The Commission reported that far from being a burden to the 
countries that had given them refuge, the new arrivals were contributing to the 
economy and in some cases providing employment in new businesses and 
industries.83   
The Times was quick to assert the benefits that refugees brought with 
them, particularly in the advancement of learning, as an editorial in 1933 made 
clear.84  The paper continued to stress that refugees did not represent a threat to 
Britain’s interests.  Indeed an article by Lord Rutherford on the work of the 
Academic Assistance Committee praised the achievements of the academic 
refugees based in Britain, and stressed that the money spent in aiding the refugees 
to establish themselves outside of Germany was raised for that specific purpose 
and did not disadvantage British academics, but this had meant that the council 
had not been able to help all those in need.85  The Telegraph also emphasised that 
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the support given to academic refugees did not injure British lecturers and 
students.86  
In 1938 and 1939 events in Europe propelled the issue of the alleged 
danger to Britain represented by refugees up the mainstream agenda.  The 
mainstream press expressed increased editorial concern for the fate of those 
fleeing Nazi persecution, but their primary concern was the implications of the 
refugee crisis for Britain. The mainstream papers no longer referred to the arrival 
of refugees as an invasion, instead they used terms such as influx or flood.  This 
made the arrival of refugees seem less like an act of aggression and more like a 
natural disaster.  The change of tone was subtle, and, while it suggests that the 
mainstream press viewed the refugees as victims who were not responsible for 
their plight, it did not mean that they were any more welcome. 
 
The quality press and refugees in the late 1930s 
Following the Anschluss the Telegraph stressed the importance of not opening the 
door to all immigrants.87  The Times expressed sympathy for those Austrians who 
were victims of Nazi persecution, but it too supported the policy of restricting 
entry to Britain.  Still, it had qualms regarding the reduction of traditional British 
hospitality to those seeking asylum.  Refugees, the Times claimed, had enriched 
English life and the regulations should be ‘interpreted with wide liberality.’88  
Following Government policy with regard to the refugees the Times urged 
international cooperation to solve the refugee crisis.89   
The events of Kristallnacht in November 1938, and the increased 
persecution that followed, were reported in detail by the British press.  The most 
complete reports were published by the Times, which described Kristallnacht as a 
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‘Black Day for Germany’ and concluded that international opinion would have no 
influence in Germany.90  A few days later this point was repeated and developed 
in a Times editorial that argued that words of condemnation were insufficient, and 
demanded ‘deeds not words.’  The intensification of the persecution led to 
expectations of an increase in the number of refugees. The intention of the 
Government to encourage the settlement of refugees in the colonies and 
dominions was welcomed by both the Telegraph and the Times, which 
recommended speedy and large scale action.91  It had been suggested by Sir John 
Hope Simpson, who had been vice-president of the Refugee Settlement 
Commission from 1926-30, that vast areas of the Dominions and Colonies could 
be developed and populated by refugees.92 There was significant support in 
Parliament and the press for this course of action, although there were difficulties 
to overcome as settlement in the Dominions would require the agreement of their 
governments and care would need to be taken in selecting suitable areas within the 
Colonies.93 
Despite the public expressions of revulsion evoked by Kristallnacht Tony 
Kushner notes that surveys carried out by Mass Observation in early 1939 show 
that the event soon faded from people’s minds.94  Certainly it is in the nature of 
newspapers that they constantly move on to the next story, and as the intensity of 
the persecutions in Germany waxed and waned so the newspapers’ interest, and 
consequently the extent of the coverage the public were exposed to, rose and fell. 
The Times continued to urge the need for international cooperation to 
alleviate the distress of the refugees, and in an editorial in January 1939 lists some 
of the options that were being considered following the 1938 Evian Conference.95  
Perhaps realising how little that was helpful to the refugees would actually be 
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produced by the Conference, the Times urged the Government to proceed quickly 
with its plans for the resettlement of large numbers of refugees in the colonies and 
stressed that ‘these possibilities elsewhere cannot excuse any failure in prompt 
action of the British Government.’96   
In marked contrast to the fascist press, the Times was unstinting in its 
praise for the work of the relief funds, regularly urging support for Lord 
Baldwin’s Refugee Fund and occasionally for smaller appeals, for example the 
Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, which was aiding scholars and 
scientists.97  A letter, from Wilfred Greene, A. F. Pollard et al, appealing for help 
for a ‘small but particularly sad group’ of academics was also published in 
February.98  The Times does not record the level of response to this appeal on 
behalf of historians. The Telegraph also gave editorial support to Lord Baldwin’s 
appeal, and argued that refugees ‘are apt … to be of substantial benefit to the 
country which harbours them.  But there is no one land which can absorb this new 
migration …’99 
Among the Tory press, the Times was the most active in calling for action 
to resolve the refugees’ plight. There were frequent editorials supporting 
Government policy on refugees, but all contained pressing reminders of the need 
to act more swiftly.100  The Times particularly approved the increasing rate at 
which refugees were being admitted to Britain.  Noting that there were currently 
40,000 refugees in Britain which ‘certainly lessens, though it hardly erases, the 
reproach that we have done less than other countries.’101  Despite the progress 
made, more needed to be done and it was suggested that, given Keynes’ prediction 
that lack of labour not unemployment was likely to be the major problem for 
Britain in the near future, more refugees should be allowed to remain 
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permanently.  Making the need for urgency even clearer, an editorial in August 
quoted Sir John Hope Simpson’s survey of the refugee crisis, agreeing that 
‘continued adherence to the principle of dealing with refugees case by case means 
that a “victim” may be in a concentration camp or in “his grave” before his turn 
comes.’  The solution advocated was an extension of the block visa system and 
more camps such as the one in Richborough, or those in Holland and Belgium.102 
The Telegraph did not pay as much attention to the refugee crisis as did 
the Times.  There were, however, reports of persecution from its German 
correspondents, and the stories of refugees who had been smuggled into Britain.103 
Editorial comment on Sir John Hope Simpson’s report dismissed the possibilities 
of keeping more refugees in Britain and urged international cooperation and 
‘larger schemes of settlement.’104 The Telegraph supported the Government’s 
caution in handling the refugee crisis, and its refusal to allow indiscriminate 
admission.  The need for something to be done was acknowledged, but there was 
no sense of urgency and the inability of Britain to accommodate significant 
numbers of refugees was stressed.  Readers were reminded that ‘charity begins at 
home.’105  Unfortunately for many that is where it stayed.  
  
Attitudes of the popular press to refugees in the late 1930s 
The leader columns of the popular press could be distinctly unsympathetic 
towards the refugees, though on occasion they also offered perfunctory words of 
sympathy.  A Mail editorial in March 1938, while expressing ‘compassion’ at the 
‘sad plight’ of the Austrian refugees, insisted that Britain’s first duty was to 
herself:  ‘Such an influx of aliens would compete seriously with our own people in 
the labour market.’  Readers were encouraged to suppress any generous instincts 
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as ‘the floodgates would be opened and we should be inundated by thousands 
seeking a home.’106  An Express editorial, after paying lip-service to ‘some sad 
stories of the persecuted Jews’ moved swiftly on to raise the possibility that 
Britain might ‘admit all Jewish refugees without question or discrimination’, 
which was judged to be undesirable as it might stir up antisemitic feeling.107  This 
was a crude attempt to manipulate public opinion, as there had been no suggestion 
that Britain alone should provide shelter for all refugees.  A couple of weeks later 
the Express, referring to the plight of refugees from Austria and Germany allowed 
that the ‘problem excites the pity of all humane folk …’ but people in the 
distressed areas of Britain were also suffering, and the ‘dole queues are still longer 
than those formed up at Europe’s frontiers.’108  Despite publishing reports on the 
persecutions, the Express limited its editorial comment to offering the sympathy 
of the public and a plea for tolerance.109  It continued to regard the persecutions as 
a ‘domestic issue.’110  Unlike the other mainstream papers the Express was critical 
of any Government sympathy towards the refugees, complaining that ‘[t]he Jews 
are always in the news.’  The need for parliament to discuss the issue of refugees 
was questioned, as Britain had ‘already accepted our full quota of foreign Jews. 
We cannot assimilate any more.’111  
 During 1939 the Express’ editorials attempted to appear sympathetic to 
those forced to flee the Nazi regime, but disapproved of any who made it safely to 
the tender mercies of British hospitality.  Reports from correspondents who 
witnessed the persecution and the hardships suffered by the refugees were 
generally more sympathetic than London based columnists and editors.  Alongside 
a sympathetic account of the wedding, in Berlin, of two young German Jews who 
were embarking for Shanghai and an unknown future the next day, the Express 
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published an article, by Horace Thorogood, claiming that St John’s Wood was 
swamped by refugees.  Thorogood seemed annoyed that the refugees were not 
poorly dressed and that they could afford to live in flats in ‘our Wood.’112  It 
appears as if starting to make a successful life in Britain somehow undermined 
their need for asylum.  At first sight, the Express gave the impression that it took a 
similarly resentful tone with a headline of ‘Wandering Jews aboard ship danced, 
dressed for dinner’ but the report of the refugees’ journey is, surprisingly, more 
focused on the human interest of the refugees’ story and does not show any 
hostility to the 275 out of 907 passengers who were to be allowed to leave the 
cruise liner and travel to Britain (the remaining refugees went to France, Belgium 
and Holland).113  Following the arrival of the 275 in Britain the Express printed a 
self-congratulatory and, given the antagonistic attitude of the paper towards 
refugees, hypocritical editorial that proclaimed Britain the ‘last resort of the Jews’ 
and bragged that Jews were treated better in Britain than anywhere else in the 
world.  The claim that ‘prejudice has no dwelling among us’, suggests that the 
leader writer was not as familiar with his paper’s content as he should have been.  
Having established the inherent virtue of the entire British nation, for which no 
praise was required as the British could not alter their nature, the Jews were 
advised, in their own best interests, to encourage, sustain, support and exalt 
Britain ‘in every case and in every circumstance.’114  While the Express did not 
explicitly insist that the refugees assimilate speedily, it was implicit that they 
should conform to British values and culture to avoid encouraging antisemitism. 
The Mirror shared the view that charity to refugees was a virtue Britain 
could not afford: 
The exile from plague stricken lands is an encumbrance – alas!  We 
have to say: “there is no room for you.”115   
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Its editorial comment, while reluctant to encourage settlement in Britain as letting 
even fifty Austrian refugee doctors practise in Britain would be detrimental to 
British doctors, was happy to suggest that a role should be found for them, and 
others, in the Commonwealth.116  News columns carried headlines such as 
BRITAIN BECOMES DUMP FOR THE NAZI EXILES’ and editorial comment 
claimed that the Nazis were dumping the Jews, ‘destitute, on others.’117  There 
was also less focus on the persecution of the Jews and the fate of the refugees than 
in other mainstream papers as during 1938 the Mirror concentrated on Spanish 
and Chinese refugees.118  The Mirror noted the continuation of the Jewish pogrom 
and, metaphorically wringing its hands, asked ‘How estimate [sic] the immense 
suffering that this tragic race is enduring?’ There was no answer, and no comment 
on what should or should not be done was made, for the persecution of the Jews 
‘is but a part of the sum total of unnecessary human misery.  In China and in 
Spain the horror of power politics proceeds unabated.’119  The reader was left with 
the vague hope that right would prevail. ‘Cassandra’, however was more forceful 
and specific in his criticism of the ‘Nazi chiefs’ he held responsible for Germany’s 
shame, though he exonerated the majority of the German people of culpability for 
‘these outbursts of vindictive savagery’ and ‘appalling bestiality.’120   
Uncharacteristically, the Mail was appalled by the crushing penalties 
imposed on the Jews following the murder, in Paris, of Herr vom Rath, a young 
German diplomat.121  Although it had repeatedly and vehemently opposed any 
refugees being admitted to Britain, as the international situation worsened the 
Mail appeared to moderate its stance and there was a more sombre tone to an 
editorial that highlighted the relentless nature of the Nazi persecution of the Jews 
and acknowledged that this would only intensify.  That the fate of the refugees 
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must be addressed was stressed, as was the need for an international solution 
given that it was not a task Britain could undertake alone.  Surprisingly, there was 
no opposition to an expected announcement from the Government introducing 
‘practical measures’ on the refugees’ behalf.’122  The following day’s editorial 
supported the Government’s stance on refugees, including a willingness to ‘give 
homes to “very large numbers” of Jewish children’ and to accommodate many 
more adults if they were later to settle in ‘other parts of the world.’  The need for 
other countries to do their part was also reiterated.123  However, concern at the 
number of refugees in Britain continued to be expressed.124 
An article by Graham Stanford in the Mail addressed questions regarding 
the refugees in Britain, including the cost to the British taxpayer and the threat to 
British jobs.  He reassured readers that most of the 22,000 refugees who had been 
admitted to Britain were there temporarily and 5,000 had already left.  Stanford 
stressed that the Home Office would not allow entry to anyone who might take a 
job that could be done by a British subject, though those that were willing to be 
retrained for jobs available outside Britain were allowed temporary refuge, 
provided the cost of their training and maintenance was met by friends, relatives 
or the relief funds.  He also pointed out that two hundred refugees had set up 
factories employing 15,000 British workpeople.125 
Stanford’s point of view was not shared by the Mail’s sub editors, who, in 
May 1939, were responsible for the rare re-emergence of terminology more 
frequently used in the fascist press when a Mail report of protests by acrobats, 
pianists and comedians at the number of foreign entertainers given permits to 
work in Britain was headlined ‘ALIENS INVADE VARIETY.’126  The same 
week readers were informed that: ‘Undesirable aliens no longer find it easy to 
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smuggle themselves into this country.’127  Yet, in June 1939 the Mail told its 
readers that refugees were ‘pouring into Britain at the rate of 1,000 a week.’  The 
report also mentions that the 30,000 refugees in Britain were not a burden to the 
tax-payer, but pointed out that the ability of private individuals and charitable 
organisations to meet the expense could not continue indefinitely, particularly as 
there were ‘4,000,000 potential refugees in Germany and Czechoslovakia.’128  
Again the implication was that they would all descend on Britain. 
There was, then, a distinct difference between the quality and popular 
presses in their attitudes towards refugees.  The quality press was more 
welcoming to refugees, recognising not only their humanitarian needs but also the 
potential benefits they brought to Britain.  Nevertheless, the quality press did not 
support the large-scale entry of refugees into Britain.  The cautious policies of the 
government were encouraged, and it was not until it was too late for any effective 
action to be taken that the Times appreciated the urgency of the situation and 
urged the Government to introduce more speedy and generous procedures.  The 
Telegraph remained committed to the existing policies and on occasion adopted a 
tone similar to that of the Mail and the Express when dismissing the possibility of 
Britain taking more refugees. The popular press was generally more hypocritical, 
offering perfunctory expressions of sympathy while vehemently insisting that 
Britain had done all that could be expected.  The agitated and repeated insistence 
of their editorial columns that allowing more refugees into Britain would 
jeopardise British interests mirrored the histrionics of the fascist press and comes 
close to Kushner’s theory of exclusionist antisemitism.  That said, the reports filed 
by their foreign correspondents demonstrated more empathy with the refugees’ 
plight.  Having seen firsthand the reality of the persecution, and the difficulties the 
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refugees faced, it is natural that the correspondents’ reports should display more 
understanding than the articles and editorials penned by London-based staff, who, 
divorced from the harsh reality of the refugees’ plight and perhaps genuinely 
believing that things could not be as bad as had been claimed, argued that Britain 
could not afford to admit more refugees. 
 
REFUGEES AND THE FASCIST PRESS 
The fascist press shared the concern of the popular press that refugees were a 
threat to the job prospects of British subjects, although the fascist press often gave 
the impression that the fears of the popular press were already fully realised.  As 
early as 1929 the Fascist complained that aliens congested the labour market to 
the detriment of native Britons who were unemployed.129  In June 1933 the front 
page of the Fascist featured an excerpt from the Daily Herald raising union 
concerns that refugees from Germany were displacing British workers in the 
entertainment industry.130  The link made between the presence of ‘aliens’ and the 
length of British dole queues by the Express in the middle of 1933 was soon 
repeated by the Blackshirt. Headlines such as ‘TOO MANY ALIENS’ were 
followed by claims that there were 2,000,000 unemployed yet ‘thousands of jobs 
are being given to aliens.’131 
There were also similarities in the terms used by the popular press and the 
fascist papers throughout the second half of the 1930s.  For example, an article by 
Henry J. Gibbs claimed that the ‘influx’ of aliens was leading to an increase in 
vice.132  Similarly, under the headline ‘ALIEN PENETRATION’, an article in the 
Fascist in February by Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Lane, author of The Alien 
Menace, asserts that:   
 112
The influx of Aliens has greatly increased during the last four 
years, for the reason that thousands of Jews (mostly 
revolutionaries) from Germany have come over here, many of 
them getting jobs.133   
 
This single sentence incorporates three of the major themes of the fascist press: 
antisemitism, the threat to Britain, especially in regard to jobs, represented by 
refugees, and the perceived link between Jews and communist revolution.  The 
front page of Action sported triumphant headlines claiming ‘JEWISH INVASION 
STEMMED’ due to the activities of the BUF, which had, apparently, mobilised 
the will of the people and prevented the Government from allowing ‘thousands of 
Jews to flood in’ to Britain.134    Southern Blackshirt in November 1938 argued 
that money needed by unemployed British workers was being ‘taken’ by an 
‘influx of alien Jews’ who were the beneficiaries of the powerful influence of 
‘International Finance’ which controlled the press, the political parties and the 
politicians.135  An editorial in March 1939 referred to the ‘protests at the refugee 
influx’, which took place in January.  An article in the same issue claimed that 
British workers were ‘threatened by the hordes of refugees pouring into the 
country.’136 
While the fascist press had frequently expressed concern about the loss of 
‘British’ jobs to aliens, an area of particular concern was the impact of Jewish 
refugees on the medical profession. Action was frequently critical of the number 
of refugees practising medicine or undertaking medical research in Britain.  
Examples include headlines such as ‘JEWS IN HARLEY STREET BRITISH 
DOCTORS DO NOT WANT THEM’ and ‘Austrian “Quacks” Set Up In 
Practice.’137  Although the second headline implies that Austrian doctors were 
practising “irregularly” to the detriment of British doctors, the text merely 
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suggests that it would be possible for them to do so. In the same issue a reader’s 
letter printed across two columns, with a large headline proclaiming ‘ALIEN 
INVASION’, provided a draft for other readers to send to their MPs protesting at 
‘the increasing number of alien Jews who are being provided with an occupational 
sanctuary in my land.’   The draft went on to allege that hundreds of medical and 
dental practitioners were practising ‘irregularly.’  Although no evidence was 
provided to support these allegations the draft demanded to know why no legal 
action was taken against these ‘quacks.’ 138   
The fascist press were also concerned with the threat to the employment 
prospects of other workers.  Manchester factories were said to be ‘over-run with 
aliens yet British workers find it difficult to find employment.’139   The Blackshirt, 
responding to reports of the proposed deportation of an unemployed Irishman on 
remand for fighting, reiterated the constant complaint that Jewish refugees 
received favourable treatment: 
Out of work gentiles are not wanted in Britain, while every crawling 
alien who creeps into this country unchallenged is aided in getting a job, 
and welcomed as some chosen being to receive the utmost 
consideration.140  
 
There were also concerns that ‘Jews were now invading the taxi business to 
the detriment of Britons.’141  Mosley was quick to exploit this issue and meetings 
for London taxi drivers were arranged for 30 May and 27 June 1938. The report of 
a meeting of the Barnes, Mortlake and East Sheen Chamber of Commerce to 
discuss the number of Jewish refugees setting up as small traders was used as a 
platform to rehearse the BUF’s ‘Keep the lot out’ slogan and to repeat its previous 
attack on the alleged ‘influx of Jewish refugees into the medical and dental 
professions.’  Doctors and dentists, however, had the protection of their respective 
professional bodies, though, as these were said to be under pressure from the 
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government to be sympathetic to refugees to the detriment of British citizens, it is 
obvious that the BUF did not consider this protection to be worth much.  
Shopkeepers had no protection and Action argued that only the licensing of shops 
could ensure ‘BRITISH TRADE FOR BRITISH PEOPLE.’  Traders were 
encouraged to ‘band together against any influx of foreign Jewish refugees’ and 
also to ‘protest against the number of naturalised aliens and Jews who are also in 
business over here.’142  References to refugees were usually followed by 
suggestions that they ‘take work away from our own people.’143   Another 
example of this was the ‘special investigation’ undertaken by Patrick Moir, a BUF 
member, into the poor conditions of workers in the hotel trade, which he linked to 
the employment of refugees.  Employers were said to be proposing that ‘more 
foreigners should be brought into the trade to “teach our workers a lesson.”’144  In 
January 1939 Southern Blackshirt attempted once again to ‘nail the lie that there is 
any shortage of employable workers in the hotel trade …’ and, therefore, there 
was no ‘necessity to import labour for hotel work.’  In case there was any doubt, 
the editorial made plain what was required: ‘A lot less yapping about the suffering 
of aliens and a closer interest in [the] working conditions of Britons …’145  In the 
same issue Southern Blackshirt was critical of the National Union of Journalists 
for promoting an appeal by its National Executive Committee for aid to 
Czechoslovakian journalists.146 
Refugees were also accused of taking jobs away from British domestic 
servants, and in the Fascist Jewish women were accused of ‘sweating’ young 
female refugees, as evidenced by letters to the Jewish Chronicle that complained 
of having to pay young, untrained refugees twenty or twenty five shillings a week, 
when ten shillings ‘pocket money should be quite enough.’147   Government 
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claims that some refugees provided jobs for the unemployed were rejected as 
nonsense.148  The fascists also opposed any money, whether from the government 
or from charitable donations, being spent on refugees.  In particular, Lord 
Baldwin’s appeal and the Lord Mayor’s Mansion House Fund were criticised.149  
A Southern Blackshirt editorial went so far as to claim that ‘any Briton who 
subscribes for foreigners while our own people are in need is a traitor to his own 
kind.’150  The same issue also carried two articles criticising the cinema industry 
for giving ten percent of one day’s proceeds to refugee charities while paying low 
wages to its workers and ignoring the distressed areas of Britain.151  Similar views 
were expressed in the Fascist.152 The alleged link between refugees and 
unemployment was reinforced in Southern Blackshirt, with a front page spread 
and the entire leader column devoted to the topic; the gist of the matter for the 
BUF was ‘BRITAIN CANNOT AFFORD TO SUPPORT FOREIGNERS.’153  
The subject was rehashed again in the following issue.154  Even the opening of a 
home for refugee children was opposed, as one day those children would be 
competing for jobs.155 
As international tensions grew the fascist press paid less attention to 
refugees and concentrated their efforts on countering alleged ‘warmongering’ 
engineered by ‘International Finance.’  The first issue of British Union News, 
however, found space to complain: 
No matter where we turn we see Jews everywhere, and now that all 
the old democratic parties are so busy bringing thousands more 
into the country, East London gets the brunt, until our streets are 
full of alien Jews, who cannot even speak our tongue.156  
 
The fascist press was consistent in its rejection of any aid being given to refugees.  
In the image of Britain projected by the fascist press all British resources were 
needed to relieve unemployment and poverty in Britain, nothing could be spared 
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for the relief of foreigners who were portrayed as undeserving, greedy and 
grasping.  Allowing any refugees into Britain was seen as threatening the 
prospects of the unemployed or those working in the trades or professions that the 
refugees were qualified to enter.  That the majority of refugees were in transit to 
other countries was ignored.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter reveals elements of an overlapping discourse between the 
mainstream and fascist press.  Both expressed the hope that a revitalised Germany 
would take its rightful place in international affairs, thus contributing to the 
stability of Europe.  Both also shared an appreciation of the Nazi regime’s 
vigorous suppression of communism.  At times the popular press rivalled the 
fascist press in their expressions of admiration and respect for Hitler and initially 
they also welcomed his stance on improving the German economy and imposing 
order.  Nevertheless, despite the enthusiasm of the popular press and the more 
cautious support of the quality press for aspects of the Nazi regime, their 
condemnation of the persecution of the Jews clearly separates them from the 
viewpoint of the fascist press on this issue.  However, the attitudes of the 
mainstream press to refugees were more complex. 
While Wasserstein clearly recognises the complexity of decision making 
in democratic polities, his suggestion that the British Government was more 
accommodating than other governments is faint praise if considered closely.157    
The British Government, conscious of the potential for public antipathy to Jews to 
develop further, remained cautious in admitting refugees.158  The British press was 
complicit in maintaining both the public’s attitude and the Government’s caution.  
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As international tensions increased the Times did press for more refugees to be 
admitted, but once war was declared the Government was unlikely to respond 
favourably. The public’s attitude to refugees was largely defined by British 
antisemitism, as discussed in the previous chapter.  Kushner cites evidence from 
the Mass Observation Archives to support the argument that the events of 
Kristallnacht had soon faded from people’s minds.  He also uses examples from 
the archives to suggest that the majority of those polled believed that the Jews 
were the authors of their own misfortune.159   However, concentrating on these 
few examples, without making clear the extent to which they are representative of 
the whole, obscures the overall picture and, particularly in the case of the popular 
press, distorts our view of the relationship between the press and the public on this 
issue.160  The Mail and the Express, especially, were not merely reflecting public 
attitudes and fears regarding refugees, the hectoring tone used in editorials 
suggests they were attempting to heighten them.   
Although the mainstream press adopted a very different attitude to that of 
the fascist press regarding the persecution of the Jews in Germany, ensuring that 
the public were fully aware of the nature of the Nazi regime, the popular press 
blurred the boundaries between the fascist and the mainstream press on the issue 
of refugees.  Despite the reports of persecution and the editorials denouncing it, 
the popular press continued its opposition to the presence of refugees in Britain in 
terms that were akin to those of the fascist press.  The similarities of tone and 
language were marked and, although the overall impression of the papers is very 
different, many of the editorial comments of the popular press could be transferred 
to the fascist press without appearing out of place.  While this suggests that, in 
respect of its attitudes to refugees, British fascism was not estranged from 
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mainstream opinion the motivation that underlay those attitudes differed.  The 
British fascists were clearly driven by exclusionist antisemitism, and the 
expression of its opposition to refugees relied heavily on stereotyped images of 
Jews..  
The previous chapter has shown that during the 1930s the mainstream 
press appeared content with the existence of discrete Jewish communities, and 
gave implicit praise to ‘British’ Jews who had integrated.  Yet, there was some 
evidence of pressure on refugees to conform, and the Tory press clearly 
subscribed to the view that the activities of Jews in continental Europe contributed 
to antisemitism, all of which would support Kushner’s concept of a ‘liberal’ 
antisemitism.  However, while the adamant refusal of the Tory popular press to 
tolerate the admittance of any refugees better fits the model of ‘exclusionist’ 
antisemitism, it could be argued that, although the vast majority of refugees were 
Jewish, the papers’ exclusionist attitude extended to any refugees regardless of 
race or creed and did not encompass Jews already settled in Britain. This stood in 
contrast to Britain’s fascist organisations, whose opposition to the refugees was 
ideologically grounded in antisemitism, and which, to varying degrees, proposed 
the exclusion of all Jews from mainstream society, be it through second-class 
citizenship, expulsion, or even extermination. 
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Chapter 3 
DEMONISATION OF THE LEFT AND 
THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
 
 
 
The antipathy of British fascists to the left, in particular towards communism, had a 
strong ideological base and was as vigorously expressed as their antisemitism.   Their 
concerns were echoed by significant sections of the mainstream.  In Britain, upper and 
middle-class anxiety regarding the political left was largely based on fear of a 
Bolshevik style revolution, a fear that was fostered during the 1920s by the growing 
strength of the trade unions and the Labour party, the founding of the Communist 
Party of Great Britain (CPGB) in 1920, the ‘Zinoviev letter’ of 1924 and the 
trepidation surrounding the General Strike in 1926.1  However, by the end of the 
decade apprehension had eased considerably, aided by the lack of revolutionary 
fervour during the short-lived General Strike, the anti-union legislation that followed, 
and the commitment of the unions and the Labour party to the parliamentary system.2  
Matthew Worley has argued that between the wars the Labour party was expanding 
its appeal to voters and was increasingly recognised as a legitimate part of the 
parliamentary process.3  Despite this, elements of the Tory mainstream press were 
prone to revive anti-socialist sentiment on occasion, and British fascists did not relax 
their vituperative opposition to the left. 
This chapter studies the expression of opposition to the left in both the 
mainstream and fascist press. The analysis of articles relating to the Labour party and 
the coverage of municipal and general elections tests the reliability of Worley’s 
assessment.  Additionally, the examination of coverage of the wider spectrum of the 
left and of reports about the Spanish Civil War demonstrates the extent to which each 
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represented another point of convergence between the British fascists and the 
mainstream. 
 
FASCISM AND THE LEFT 
There is a measure of consensus among historians that fascism rejects the central 
tenets of socialism. This is despite the far-left political origins of many of the leading 
fascists and the strong connections between some fascist movements and socialism 
identified by Paul Hayes, which, at an ideological level, Roger Eatwell describes as 
fascism having ‘more points of contact’ with socialism than with other ideologies.4  
Meanwhile, Roger Griffin has argued that fascism, while nationalist, is not necessarily 
anti-internationalist and, though defining fascism as unquestionably anti-Bolshevik, 
he accepts Sternhell’s argument that its expression of anti-socialism is more 
ambiguous.5  Nonetheless, in the British case fascism was rooted in a fear of 
Bolshevik revolution, as Eatwell notes.6   
 
The demonisation of Communism 
Certainly from the earliest incarnations of fascism in Britain there were repeated 
condemnations of communism. Indeed, the BF emerged largely in response to fear of 
a Bolshevik revolution in Britain.  It represented an extension of mainstream fears 
developed into an organisation intended to have the potential to act should those fears 
materialise into real revolt.  The BF’s support for the status quo and its initial focus on 
anti-communism resulted in a reputation for offering ‘Conservatism with Knobs On.’7 
Most condemnations of communism in the fascist press were phrased in ways that 
dehumanised its proponents and portrayed them as an evil, demonic, force intent on 
destroying civilised society.  A recurring theme was the linking of communism with 
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Godless atheism or, in an attempt to demonise it further, with the Devil.  British 
fascists exploited every opportunity to attract Christian support by portraying 
themselves as the only pro-active defence against the communist anti-Christ.  The 
Fascist Bulletin in June 1925 referred to communism as the ‘Devil’s work’, an 
abomination that threatened the sanctity of marriage and used murder and persecution 
to achieve domination.8  The anti-Christian nature of communism was emphasised 
and this was underlined by repeated claims that communism was led or influenced by 
Jews.9  The BF’s actions in response to communism in Britain were more low-key 
than its heated prose; there were occasional attacks on the sellers of left-wing papers 
and Harry Pollitt, the CPGB leader, was briefly abducted.10   
The IFL also attempted to demonise British communists, though in a less 
literal fashion.  In the Fascist it was claimed that in Britain communist teachers, 
mainly women, regularly took part in ‘semi-secret “nudist” gatherings and camps 
where the foulness of the proceedings requires to be seen to be credited.’11  Like the 
BF, the IFL was relentless in linking Communism to Jewish influence, describing it as 
‘the world’s greatest deception of all time.’12 
Employing terminology similar to that of the BF, the BUF activist, Captain 
Gordon-Canning, described the left in France as representing the ‘powers of 
darkness’, and accused the Soviets of working for the aims of Lucifer.13  In the same 
article he, bizarrely, portrayed Hitler as Gabriel, standing for the dominion of God and 
ready to hurl ‘Lucifer and his blood-red cohorts’ back into the abyss.  Although 
overwrought, this type of imagery was consistent with the BUF’s proclaimed 
allegiance to Christianity.  Priests who appeared to express left-wing views could 
expect to be pilloried in the fascist press.14 
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There were also similarities between the BF’s portrayal of communists as 
murdering barbarians, and Action’s accusations of Bolsheviks committing murder, 
torture and rape. Not only did the paper allege that atrocities were being committed 
‘abroad’, it claimed that the same type of men were active in Britain.15 The evils of 
communism were frequently linked to the Jews.  Joyce referred to the ‘Red Front’ in 
Britain as cowardly, Jewish and violent.16  In addition there were repeated references 
to the violent and cowardly nature of communists who were alleged to attack fascists 
only when they heavily outnumbered them, using sticks and razors against unarmed 
fascists, and who did not hesitate to use violence against women.17  Joyce referred to 
communists as ‘sub-men.’18  This type of copy was intended to heighten existing 
concerns regarding communism and persuade readers that the danger was imminent. 
The BUF attempted to drive a wedge between the leadership of the left and 
working-class men and women, using similar techniques across the whole spectrum of 
the left.  Action presented the communist leaders as regarding the proletariat as fools 
needing leadership, while the intelligentsia were portrayed as pink pansies with long, 
flowing hair, exotic and eastern scent and a foreign accent who turned yellow at the 
mention of fascism.19  It was common for the BUF press to raise the spectre of Soviet 
control and the Communist party was accused of representing the interests of Moscow 
rather than those of the working people of Britain.20  
 
Denigration of the Left 
Despite Mosley’s previous form on the left-wing of the Labour party and the New 
Party’s socialist leanings, the BUF press was antagonistic towards the Labour party. 
For Joyce there was no great doctrinal difference between the socialists, the Labour 
party, and communism.21  Raven Thomson claimed that all left-wing political parties 
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offered a mix of corrupt futility and bloodstained reality.22   Links were made between 
the Communists, the Labour party and blasphemy and acts of sacrilege.23  In an 
attempt to undermine Labour support, members of the Labour party were tarred with 
the brush of Communism and its leaders were accused of being uninterested in the 
plight of the workers or the unemployed.  Action alleged that they played at being 
statesmen and pocketed their expenses while foreign socialists demanded the blood of 
the British and German working class.24  The Labour leadership was presented as 
incompetent, yet dangerous.  One front-page headline declared ‘Labour Blunders to 
Revolution.’25  Labour’s alleged financial incompetence and callous attitude to the 
unemployed was highlighted in a report of an unemployed man with a wife and five 
children who had been sent to the workhouse, thereby reducing even further the 
chance of him finding work, and increasing by ten shillings a week the cost to the 
rate-payers of keeping the family.26 
Similarly, the trade unions were also rebuked for their poor performance in 
promoting the interests of their members, for ill-treating their employees, and for less 
than brotherly disputes between unions.27  In Action John Emery regularly criticised 
the TU leadership in his column ‘Industrial Notes’ claiming they were ineffective and 
in the pocket of the employers.28  Specific unions were also singled out for criticism; 
it was alleged that the practices of the National Union of Seamen exposed sailors to 
Jewish exploitation, that the leaders of the Welsh miners’ union were willing to see 
members’ wages reduced to the level paid to Polish miners in order to regain export 
sales, and that leaders of the Transport and General Workers Union had failed to 
improve the intolerable conditions of London busmen.29  In contrast, John Beckett 
claimed that the role of the trade unions under fascism would be strengthened giving 
them a position of equality with the employers in the running of their industries.30  
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The BUF press continually reinforced the message that the working class was being 
betrayed by its leaders, who should have been safeguarding workers’ interests but 
were instead lining their own pockets and attempting to provoke a class war under 
instructions from Moscow.  In all of their coverage of left-wing politics the fascist 
press were careful to present the working class as decent and patriotic folk misled by 
their leaders. 
 
THE MAINSTREAM PRESS AND THE LEFT 
Apart from organs, such as the Herald, that were dedicated to the cause, the 
mainstream British press did not embrace the left.  The Tory popular press were 
particularly staunch in their repudiation of everything left-wing.  This extended to the 
Co-operative societies, which together with the trade unions and socialist groups such 
as the Independent Labour Party, the Fabians and the Social-Democratic Federation 
originally founded the Labour Representation Committee (LRC) that became the 
Labour party.  Despite the dismay of the LRC’s first chairman, Frederick Rogers, at 
the ‘solid unbending Toryism’31 of the Co-operative leaders, the popular press cast 
them as the villains of British retailing.  Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere co-
operated in a long-running campaign against the societies that extended beyond the 
pages of the papers to public meetings and encouraged local trade associations to pass 
motions denouncing the Co-ops’ unfair trading tactics.32  The ‘charges’ against the 
Co-ops included that they drove independent traders out of business, evaded paying 
tax, attempted to cut wages and increased the hours worked by their employees.  It 
was also alleged that it was actually more expensive to shop at a Co-op than an 
independent trader, and that Co-op contracts with local councils disadvantaged rate-
payers as well as local traders.33  The editorials and article headlines were phrased in 
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terms of a battle, with emotive references to the ‘fight’, and the ‘Co-op war front’, the 
‘war cry of 50,000 grocers’, and the ‘battle for fair trade.’  The societies were 
described as a ‘menace’ and a ‘curse.’34    
 The papers were less warlike in their attitudes to the Labour party.  Matthew 
Worley argues that the Labour party’s links with the Liberal party, its successful 
usurpation of the Liberal’s progressive role, and its recruitment of more than thirty 
disgruntled Conservatives had aided the growth of a perception of the party as a 
peaceful alternative to communism and increased its appeal to a wider cross-section 
of voters.  Additionally, Worley suggests, the party had benefited from its inclusion in 
government during the First World War, and from the perceived efficiency of the 
wartime economy, which, with its state control of key industries, had legitimised 
Labour’s policies on national ownership.35   
In the run up to the May 1929 general election, the Express and the Mail had 
both dismissed fears that revolution was at hand.  The Express was succinct: 
revolution was a joke.36  The Mail, while also convinced that class warfare was 
doomed to failure, still felt the need to warn that the Bolsheviks were bent on making 
mischief and committing crime, and would cause damage and disorder.37  The paper 
adopted a comparable technique when discussing the Labour party.  Praise for the 
dignity and restraint of Ramsay MacDonald was undermined by the comment that he 
was striving to ‘keep in order the wild men of his party and to discipline them into an 
appearance of respectability.’38  A Mail editorial also linked the party to communism; 
referring to socialism as ‘the mad doctrine which has caused such frightful misery in 
Russia.’39  In the same piece the paper claimed that if the socialists were elected 
extremists would dictate policy and business would be destroyed.40  In contrast the 
Express was not alarmed at the prospect of a socialist government.41 
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During campaigning for the 1934 municipal elections the Mail and the 
Express employed techniques similar to those of the British fascists.  The papers 
blurred the boundaries between the Labour and Communist parties by referring to 
both as ‘Reds.’  On the day of the 1934 municipal elections the Mail editorial was 
headlined ‘Keep Out the Reds’ and readers were urged to vote for the Municipal 
Reform Party (MRP) to keep ‘the “Big Bad Wolf” of Socialism from the door.’42  It 
was claimed that the socialists would squander ratepayers’ money and ruin the 
business community, leading to an increase in unemployment and a heavier burden on 
the ratepayers.  The Express editorial also urged support for the MRP, but in less 
emotive language, merely pointing out that the socialists had no definite housing plan 
and had conducted a negative campaign.43  However, the front-page headlines had 
accused the socialists of ‘terrorist tactics’ and the report of a MRP meeting was 
interspersed with recommendations that readers should vote to prevent the election of 
‘hooligans.’44  Excerpts from this report were reprinted in Blackshirt in an article that 
dismissed the accusations of ‘fatuous politicians’ that fascists caused political 
disturbance at a time when ‘Red terrorism shows itself openly on our streets.’45   
While the Mirror was less inclined to conflate the socialists and the 
communists, it did advise readers to vote for the ‘sane government’ of the MRP rather 
than the socialist ‘don’t count the cost Party.’46  The voters, however, paid little heed 
to the warnings of the popular press and there was a Labour landslide.  The Mirror 
reported the result in neutral tones and ascribed the Labour victory to voter apathy, as 
did the Mail, and the Express.47 According to the Express the socialists had made a 
‘Red London.’48 
The quality press was generally much more moderate in the tone adopted in 
editorials or news reports relating to the TUC and the Labour party.  Despite the 
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party’s occupation of legitimate political space the prospect of a Labour government 
was greeted with dismay by the Tory quality press and there are clear parallels with 
the fears expressed in the Mail.  The Telegraph alleged that the socialist leaders were 
dominated by ‘ignorant and reckless extremists,’ while the Times insisted that the 
party leadership was incapable of checking the momentum of revolutionary socialism 
which was linked to class war and the expectation of another general strike.49  The 
Times also claimed that the socialists would ruin business.50 
Similarly, the possibility of socialist control of the county councils was not 
met with sanguinity.  The Tory quality press expressed similar concerns to those of 
the popular press, albeit in a more measured tone, in relation to the potential risks of 
socialist control of county councils, particularly London.  The Times, for example, 
gave substantially more coverage to the MRP manifesto than that of the socialists and 
published extracts that alleged that the Labour party was more concerned with the 
implementation of socialism and the destruction of trade than with providing 
municipal services, as it was pledged to ‘carry out dangerous and extravagant socialist 
experiments.’  The Times reinforced these claims by adding that the extravagance of 
the previous socialist administration had nearly proved disastrous.51  On the day of the 
poll the leader writer praised the MRP’s record for sound government and warned that 
the socialists’ policy was ‘dangerously adventurous’ and likely to lead to ‘reckless 
spending.’52  The tone of the Telegraph’s leader writers was even more heightened 
during the 1935 General Election campaign, and culminated in the claim that if the 
socialists won then ‘the panic and chaos devised by Sir Stafford Cripps would 
paralyse the city overnight.’53  None of this, however, was couched in terms that 
suggested that Labour was not a legitimate party within the parliamentary system, and 
between elections reports of Labour activity displayed no overt hostility. 
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The response of the quality papers to the Co-operative movement was also 
more positive.  Although, in the same month that it published a full page devoted to 
the Co-operative movement including a positive appreciation of its history and five 
advertisements for various branches, the Telegraph did publish an article expressing 
concern at developments in the movement, which the paper interpreted as a bid for 
political power.54  The Times, while reporting events related to the societies, 
expressed no qualms about the movement and went so far as to describe the popular 
press attacks on the Co-ops as ‘violent and ill-informed.’55   
Surprisingly, this was a view shared by the IFL which, though ‘H. H. L.’ had 
previously complained that the tax advantages enjoyed by the Co-ops allowed them to 
squeeze out independent small traders, he later claimed that the campaign against the 
Co-ops was a ‘great contributing factor’ to London going ‘Red.’56  The attitude of the 
IFL was sanguine and the result of the election was welcomed ‘as being another big 
step towards the time when Britain, willingly, and with a sense of relief, will turn to 
Fascism as the only way out.’57  The BUF was also largely unconcerned with the Co-
ops’ activities, though they were alarmed by socialist infiltration of the organisation 
and were critical of the importation of large quantities of Argentine beef and of the 
delays in negotiating disputes with unions representing its workers.58  Although the 
Nazis were averse to the German Co-op movement, the BUF press was not hostile to 
Co-operative principles and regarded the press campaign against the Co-ops as a plot 
orchestrated by the ‘alien’ owners of chain-stores, designed to set small traders and 
the Co-ops against each other.  Reflecting practice in Italy, the BUF promised that 
under a fascist regime the Co-ops would play a bigger and more important part in the 
national economy.59  Raven Thomson produced a pamphlet outlining the ‘proud 
place’ of the Co-ops in the Corporate State and the conditions attached to state 
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recognition and protection.60  In practice these conditions would have neutered the 
Co-ops. 
 
RESPONSES TO THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
It was in coverage of the Spanish Civil War that British fascists and some elements of 
the popular mainstream press were able to give full vent to their fear and hatred of the 
left. Despite Randolph Churchill’s caustically expressed opinion that only a few 
‘excitable Catholics and ardent socialists think this war matters, but for the general 
public it’s just a lot of bloody dagoes killing each other’,61 events in Spain were 
interpreted for the readers of both the fascist and mainstream press in the context of 
international political developments and seemed to polarise British public opinion.  
Although, initially, only the politically motivated appeared to be concerned by the 
war, public sympathy for the Republic’s plight increased as the war progressed and 
the response to fund raising appeals was substantial.  Yet, public sympathy did not 
necessarily translate into support for intervention.62 
The question of intervention was one of the few issues to show a clear divide 
between Labour and Conservative attitudes. Not that either party was completely 
united on the issue.  The majority of Conservatives supported the Government’s 
policy, though Anthony Eden and Winston Churchill had doubts.  Taylor suggests that 
the left-wing of the Labour party was inspired by the Republican cause, while the 
leadership remained committed to disarmament.63  Paul Preston’s interpretation of 
events suggests that Labour's response was more complex than Taylor allows, and 
was influenced by the hostility of many trade unionists to communists.64  Pugh also 
emphasises the importance of hostility to the communist party and sees Labour's 
response to the Spanish Civil War as significant because, coupled with Hitler's rise to 
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power, it encouraged the party to move towards support for re-armament.65  The party 
was also divided along religious lines, and Tom Buchanan notes that there was a 
strong Catholic minority that was opposed to the Spanish Republic and was outraged 
by assaults on the Church.66 
The position of the British Government was also less than clear-cut, and its 
foreign policy continued to employ behind the scenes intriguing with France despite 
the leaking of the Hoare-Laval pact.67  Preston contends that Britain was so 
committed to preventing another European war that the National Government applied 
pressure on France to support a policy of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War.68  
Buchanan supports Preston's view on the motivation of the National Government, 
ascribing it largely to a sincere desire to prevent the war spreading.69  Buchanan 
claims that diplomatic historians, such as Douglas Little, who attribute the National 
Government's policy to ‘malevolent neutrality’ resulting from its natural antipathy to 
a left of centre Spanish democracy, have failed to appreciate the complexity of the 
situation.70  Little and Preston have both pointed out that British firms with 
commercial interests in Spain were sympathetic to the Nationalist cause.71  
The British Government and public both initially supported non-intervention.  
Taylor suggests that government policy fitted the public mood as they wanted peace 
and disliked communism.72  However, Buchanan argues that as the public saw 
developments being influenced by German, Italian and Soviet intervention they 
became convinced that the outcome of the Spanish Civil War would have wider, 
international repercussions.  Supporters of both sides were convinced that the future 
of ‘European civilisation’ was at stake, with one side fighting against the overthrow of 
democracy, and the other protecting Christian civilisation from barbarous 
communism.   
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Interestingly, clear differences emerge in the positions adopted by the British 
press towards the war in Spain.    According to Graves and Hodge, the Mail, Sketch, 
Morning Post, and Observer only reported news that discredited ‘the Reds’, while the 
News Chronicle and the Herald supported the Republicans, although they later toed 
the party line on non-intervention.   The Express and the Mirror were judged to be 
sympathetic to the Republicans but anxious not to antagonise Germany and Italy.  The 
Telegraph and the Times claimed to be impartial, but Graves and Hodge suggest that 
the Telegraph succeeded in this respect better than the Times, which had censored 
some of the articles by its military correspondent that highlighted the potential danger 
to Britain of success for the Axis powers.73  Generally speaking, they are correct in 
their analysis of the press coverage, however, they use a very broad-brush approach 
and do not take into account the variations in attitude within individual papers, or the 
way editorial comment developed as the conflict progressed.  
 
The quality press and the war in Spain   
The Observer, while tending to be more sympathetic to the Nationalist cause and 
prepared to print reports of Red atrocities garnered from German news agencies, also 
published reports of the killing by insurgent bombers of women and children who 
were doing their weekend shopping.74  The paper could see no good outcome to the 
civil war only cruelty, tragedy and an end to democracy, resulting in either a 
Nationalist or Communist dictatorship.  The editorial line was that Britain needed to 
keep rigidly aloof from the Spanish Civil War, in order to preserve diplomatic 
relations and avoid further conflict.   ‘We can partake in no course that connives at the 
“Red ruin” in the hope of countering the black.’75  Contrary to the assessment of 
Graves and Hodge, the Observer did report adversely on Nationalist activities.   The 
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paper ascribed the destruction of Guernica to ‘the exclusive work of German 
aeroplanes and German bombs’, categorizing it as a horrible and stupid atrocity and 
calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces.76  
The Manchester Guardian also saw danger for democratic government from 
both the left and the right in Spain, and was unsure whether there was more of the 
wild beast in a Communist mob or in the Fascist generals leading their ‘Moorish 
soldiers to the wholesale slaughter of the Spanish workmen.’77  On further reflection 
the paper considered that both sides were guilty of brutal atrocities, adding that while 
the actions of the Spanish workers could not be excused they could be explained by 
their previous grievous exploitation; nothing could mitigate the conduct of the 
Nationalist military.78  The paper supported non-intervention, but pressed for the 
maintenance of trade with the lawful government of Spain.79  It printed reports from 
neutral sources and from supporters of both sides.  Following the visits to Spain of 
two groups of British MPs, it published a report from the Liberal MP Wilfrid Roberts, 
who advocated the cause of the Spanish Government on the grounds of individual 
liberty and the dangers of a German influence in a fascist Spain.80  This was closely 
followed by a report from the Conservative MP Anthony Crossley, which could well 
be a contender for the title of most egregious piece of Francoist propaganda ever 
printed in the mainstream press.  Crossley used the terms ‘Reds’ and ‘Whites’ to 
describe the government and insurgent sides, clearly intending the reader to draw 
parallels between the civil war in Spain and the Russian revolution. He portrayed 
‘Nationalist Spain’ as orderly and free from open repression.  While conceding that 
both sides were ruthless, Crossley claimed that the atrocities committed by the Reds 
were worse than those committed by Russian revolutionaries.  Although both sides 
were acknowledged to kill prisoners and those suspected of disloyalty, he asserted 
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that the Nationalists invariably held some sort of trial, even if it was only a formality, 
a distinction that made little difference to the fate of the accused.81  
The Manchester Guardian’s report of the bombing of Guernica was detailed, 
but less sensational than those of the popular press.  The destruction of the town, 
including hospitals, the machine gunning of defenceless women working in the fields 
and of those fleeing the bombing, and the death of a priest who tried to rescue 
children from a burning building were firmly attributed to German bombers, and 
reinforced with the reporter’s discovery of German incendiary shells.  The final 
paragraph of the report emphasised that Guernica had been defenceless.82 The paper’s 
editorial reminded readers that other defenceless Basque towns had also been bombed 
and stressed that there was no direct military objective for any of these attacks, which 
were intended to terrify nearby Bilbao into surrender.83  There was also frequent 
reiteration of protest at the unequal application of the non-intervention policy, and the 
need for the Spanish government to be able to trade normally.84 
Even though the Times did not publish all of the reports from its military 
correspondent, it did provide the most extensive and thorough coverage of the war.  
Its editorials were neutral, written in a tone that expressed regret at the situation but 
offered no solution.85  One explained the Spanish situation as more complex than the 
conflict of what was loosely termed Fascists and Communists, and feared that a 
ruthless dictatorship was the likely outcome whichever side won.86 Another article 
that also raised the spectre of dictatorship, while providing a balanced study of the 
background to the crisis in Spain, noted that ‘terrorism had become rampant. It was 
practised by all classes…’87 The Times did not shy away from reporting the burning 
of churches or the murder of priests, but neither did it sensationalise them.88  A report 
of priests arrested and possibly wounded in an attempt to escape made clear that they 
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had been captured together with a group of rebel officers who had been using a 
machine-gun from the top of a church tower.89  Editorials and reports referred to 
Government or Republican forces on one side and to rebels, insurgents or Nationalists 
on the other.  There were references to savage and bitter fighting, and to summary 
executions on both sides.90  Reports of the fighting in Spain were more detailed than 
other papers and remained neutral.  The Times carried reports of reverses on both 
sides, and included Italian defeats and rumours of ‘mutual distrust’ between the 
nationalities making up the insurgent forces.91 
Throughout the war the Times supported the British Government’s policy of 
non-intervention, and was hopeful that negotiations would lead to the withdrawal of 
foreign participants.92  The Telegraph also expressed similar opinions, and both it, the 
Times, and the British Government accepted the insurgents’ claims that the blockade 
of Bilbao was effective and that the harbour was mined and, therefore, too dangerous 
for British ships to enter, despite the Basque authorities’ insistence that the harbour 
was safe.93  There were, however, significant differences in the way papers reported 
the civil war in Spain.  While the Times maintained a neutral tone in all its reports 
some of the Telegraph’s reports were decidedly partisan.  In particular, Pembroke 
Stephens, reporting from behind the Nationalist lines, wrote enthusiastically about 
Franco’s troops who he claimed ‘often resort to daring expedients when the 
circumstances warrant a risk.’  They were also said to embark on ‘hazardous missions 
with jokes and songs on their lips.’94  When reporting casualties resulting from 
Nationalist advances the Telegraph adopted the technique of omitting agency.  The 
deaths that resulted from Nationalist attacks were not generally ascribed directly to 
those responsible, for example one report from the Madrid front referred repeatedly to 
Government soldiers being ‘found dead’ and also to others being ‘pursued by 
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machine-gun and rifle-fire and hand grenades.’  There was no mention of civilian 
casualties although the village, which was of little military value, had been heavily 
bombed.  The same report made the agency explicit when describing ‘Government 
bombers …killing and wounding many civilians, mostly women and children.’95  The 
killing of civilians by Nationalist forces was rarely mentioned, appearing occasionally 
in an eyewitness report or a couple of sentences from Reuters.96 
The bombing of Guernica highlights the difference in coverage.  A Times 
editorial began by describing it as a ‘tragic story – the pitiless bombardment of a 
country town…’ and continued by pointing out the lack of both resistance and 
military significance:  ‘Its aim was unquestionably to terrorize the Basque 
Government into surrender by showing them what Bilbao may soon expect.’97  An 
eyewitness account that spread over a column in length, described the deadly 
efficiency of the attack by German bombers and the fighter planes that machine-
gunned those fleeing the bombing.98  Although German and Insurgent denials of 
responsibility for the bombing of Guernica were reported, it was made clear that the 
denials were not credible, and attempts to blame Marxists or Bolshevists for the 
bombing were refuted by eye-witness accounts and by the physical evidence of 
unexploded bombs of German manufacture.99  The Times also made it clear that the 
bombing of Guernica was not unique; other non-military targets, such as Durango, 
where the two hundred dead included fourteen nuns who had been machine-gunned, 
were being bombed in an attempt to weaken the morale of the Basques.100 
The Telegraph had included a harrowing report by the Dean of Canterbury 
who had observed the bombing of Durango by German pilots and the machine-
gunning of patients fleeing hospitals and a lunatic asylum by Italian-piloted pursuit 
planes. However, the Telegraph’s correspondents had little to say about Guernica.  
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Christopher Martin’s report published on 28 April 1937, the day after the bombing, 
included a single sentence to the effect that Guernica had been bombed out of 
existence.101  Two days later Pembroke Stephens reporting from Guernica following 
its occupation by Franco’s forces found an appalling spectacle of devastation, but did 
not mention any civilian casualties or what had caused the devastation.102  On the 
other hand, the Telegraph did publish a short eyewitness account by a Basque priest 
that described the machine-gunning of people in the streets and the dismembered 
corpses of old men, women and children.103  Twice the Telegraph printed denials 
from Franco’s HQ that the Nationalists had been responsible for the bombing without 
any comment, although elsewhere on the same page the denials were refuted, once by 
the Basque President and once by Reuters.104 
 
The popular press and the Spanish Civil War 
The popular press was even more clearly divided over the Spanish Civil War than the 
quality press.  The Mail denounced the war as a Moscow plot to further the creation 
of a Spanish Soviet Republic.105  Its editorials, reports and articles always referred to 
the Nationalists as ‘anti-Reds’ and to the elected Republican Government and its 
supporters as ‘Reds’ thus reducing the conflict to a Manichean battle between good 
and evil.106  According to the Mail the aim of the ‘Reds’ was to make Spain a vassal 
state of Soviet Russia.  The Spanish right had combined to fight ‘intolerable 
misgovernment’ and to restore order; in the eyes of the Mail the cause of the ‘anti-
Reds’ was an ‘effort of liberation.’107  General Franco was portrayed sympathetically 
and interviews with him were presented in a positive light.108  One special 
correspondent, Harold G. Carozo, described feeling thrilled by the sight of Franco’s 
‘Carlist companies marching … with their red-gold banners at their head.’109  This 
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was followed by a brief, but unusually picturesque, account of their involvement in 
the fighting around Durango.  While Nationalist communiqués and announcements 
were reported in a factual and straightforward way, statements from the Republicans 
were regularly printed under the headline ‘More tales from the Reds’ accompanied by 
an introduction describing them as ‘the latest propaganda from the Reds, which has 
proved so consistently to have been based on imagination.’110  A report that Germany 
was sending more warships to Spain was headlined ‘Red terror causes grave 
anxiety.’111  Much was made of allegations, not necessarily ill founded, that 
communists tortured and murdered priests and nuns, and more details were published 
than in the quality press or in the Express.112  There were also frequent references to 
the burning of churches; again these allegations were not without some truth, but the 
Mail’s coverage of this issue was more extensive and more heightened in tone than 
other papers.113  
The Mail’s position was made clear in an editorial relating to the aerial 
bombing of Durango and Eibar. Starting with the announcement that the ‘Patriotic 
Government of General Franco will shortly be in control of the whole of Spain’ the 
editorial attributed Franco’s success to the  ‘bombing aeroplanes sent with decimating 
effect against the Red troops and their garrisons in the hills.’114  Despite the 
destruction of towns and villages and the high civilian casualties reported in other 
papers, Franco was portrayed as bringing ‘food and succour to this suffering 
region.’115  The British Government was advised to avoid ‘antagonising the Patriotic 
Government,’ in particular there ‘must be no appearance of interfering on behalf of 
the murderous barbarians who take their orders from Moscow.’116  However, the Mail 
did print a frank report of the bombing of Guernica, describing it as ‘one of the most 
appalling air raids of modern warfare.’117  The killing of eight hundred civilians was 
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attributed to three and a half hours of bombing by German aeroplanes, and to hand 
grenades thrown by the crews of the German aeroplanes into the frightened crowds 
that had gathered for market day: ‘Hundreds raced desperately for the fields, where 
they were systematically followed and machined-gunned from the air by swooping 
fighters.’118  The dead were reported to include fifty women and children incinerated 
when trapped in a bomb shelter.  However, two days later, the fall of Guernica to 
General Mola’s troops was reported without any comment on its destruction and the 
town was described as the ‘key to Bilbao,’ thus ascribing a military significance to 
Guernica that would justify its destruction.  A photograph showing the ruins referred 
merely to a bombing raid, without attributing responsibility, and General Franco’s 
claim that Guernica had been ‘burned to ruins by the Red hordes …’ was printed 
without comment.119 
The Express adopted a much more neutral stance, referring to the protagonists 
as the Republican Government and either the Fascist and monarchist rebels, or the 
insurgents.120  The Republican Government’s supporters were occasionally referred to 
as ‘Red’ in strap lines such as ‘Red mob sprayed with machine-gun bullets.’121  
Similarly some correspondents’ reports also used the term, for example one informed 
readers that the Reds, who were said to be in full control in San Sebastian, included 
armed women, while another noted that the ‘Red Militia fight grimly to save 
Madrid.’122  The Express was also more willing to print news potentially damaging to 
the Nationalists; reports described Fascist troops using machine-gun fire to clear 
communist crowds, and advancing Moors murdering everyone in their path.123  
Despite its more tolerant attitude towards the Republican cause the Express did not 
shy away from reporting the excesses of the Government’s civilian forces, which it 
described as a combination of anarchists, communists and socialists.  The burning of 
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churches and convents in Barcelona was reported but the tone of the reports was more 
factual and less heightened than those of the Mail.124  The facts included in the 
Express coverage were the same as those in the Mail, but they were presented as 
human tragedy affecting both sides rather than justification for hating ‘Reds.’  In 
particular one report that described the killing of priests, by firing squads, and the 
mutilation of their bodies attempted to understand what was happening.  The 
correspondent tried to explain, not just what had happened, but also some of the 
factors that had caused the terrible events.  Unlike the Mail, which attributed the 
violence to the fact that the ‘Reds’ were ‘murderous barbarians’, this reporter showed 
awareness of the background to the violence and of the festering resentments that had 
been set free by the defeat of the Nationalist forces in the early weeks of the war.  The 
depth of feeling unleashed had led to a situation where the ‘mob is uncontrollable and 
class hatred rules.’125  The ‘executioners’ were described as men whose characters 
had been changed by the freedom of revolt.  They were simple folk, sleep deprived, 
drunk on free liquor and in the grip of forces they could scarcely understand.126  The 
Express did not seek to excuse what had been done, but tried to give readers some 
insight into how it had occurred. 
Following the bombing of Guernica the Express was moved to abandon, briefly, 
its much-vaunted neutrality.  Having reiterated claims of even-handedness the leader 
writer felt compelled to continue:  
But there are some things that pass all bounds and cry for protest.  The 
bombing of Guernica is one.  The Basque people met in that place as 
devout Catholics to pray and give praise to God.  They were not under 
arms.  They were not the destroyers of churches or the murderers of priests 
or the ravishers of nuns.  The insurgents have added a new word to the 
vocabulary of massacre – GUERNICA.127 
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The reports of the bombing concentrated on the killing of the innocent, those 
machine-gunned as they tried to flee, women and children burned alive, nurses and 
patients killed in a Red Cross hospital, and an elderly priest blown up while trying to 
rescue children from a burning house.128  Photographs of the ruins were published and 
the denials of the German propaganda ministry were refuted by three experienced, 
accredited, war correspondents who had witnessed German and Italian airplanes 
returning from Guernica:   
There were thirty bombers of the heavy Junker 52 type and fifteen chasers 
of the Heinkel 51 type.  There were also five Italian chasers.  We 
newspapermen were machine-gunned for half an hour by Heinkel chasers 
near Guernica.129 
 
Also reported was the discovery of  “dud” German incendiary bombs and Italian 
torpedo bombs.  The editorial published on the same day mocked the denials of both 
Franco and the Germans.130 
 The Mirror’s coverage of the war was largely couched in neutral tones, with 
the combatants generally being referred to as loyalists and rebels or insurgents.131  
There was a slight bias against the rebels, one particular page contained two items 
relating to Spain. The first was a photograph showing the damage caused by ‘terror 
from the air’ after rebel planes bombed Bilbao killing an eleven year old French 
child, and the second an article about Franco’s arrival in Alcazar with a headline 
describing the waiting crowd as a mob.132  Nonetheless, ‘Red’ atrocities were also 
reported.133  Editorial opinion supported the views of the Archbishop of York and the 
Bishop of Winchester and was critical of the attempted overthrow of a constitutional 
government that had been legally elected.134  Subsequent editorials criticised the 
involvement of the fascist powers in Spain, which had expanded the war to European 
dimensions and potentially threatened Britain’s interests, but remained adamant that 
the Government’s policy of non-intervention was correct.135 
 149
 Clearly the international situation coloured the reporting of the war.  As 
Graves and Hodge note, most mainstream papers, even those that did not support the 
insurgents, were anxious not to offend Germany and Italy.136   Yet, contrary to their 
assessment, the Mirror was critical of the fascist powers and mockingly referred to 
them as ‘gallant gentlemen’ and ‘nice boys’.137  The Manchester Guardian was also 
notable for repeatedly pressing the Government to normalise trade relations with 
Spain’s democratically elected government, which was disadvantaged by the 
Government’s implementation of the non-intervention policy.   Most striking, though, 
was the partisan coverage of the Mail with its focus on denigrating the Republicans 
and demonising anything connected with communism.  In comparison the coverage 
of the Express appeared measured and, at times, insightful.  Overall, there was little 
approval of the intervention of the Dictator states, even from those papers that 
supported the Nationalist cause.   
 
The fascist press and the Spanish Civil War 
The coverage of the war in the fascist press, while less extensive, was remarkably 
similar in tone to that of the Mail.   Blackshirt carried headlines denouncing ‘the priest 
murderers of Spain’, claiming ‘they have burned, they have murdered, they have 
raped’ above allegations that young nuns were violated and thrown naked into the 
street while ‘older nuns and priests were tortured, shot or burned alive.’138   
William Joyce, in Blackshirt, supported the Rebel cause, not because it was 
fascist, but because it was anti-Bolshevik.139 The BUF appeared keen to stress that 
fascism was only a small part of the revolt against the Spanish Government.140  Joyce 
also complained that while the religious freedom of Jews was defended in Britain the 
‘abominable atrocities which the Reds have perpetrated against ministers of religion, 
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their burning of Cathedrals and desecration of convents have evoked in Britain not 
one word of protest from the hypocrites who fly into panic when somebody calls 
attention to the predatory activities of the Jew.’141  A. K. Chesterton accused the 
Liberal and Labour press of failing to report alleged Red atrocities.142  The BUF press 
was keen to remedy this omission.143  It also used the conflict in Spain to reinforce the 
message that Communism attacked Christianity.144  The BUF’s endorsement of 
Franco and its denunciation of atrocities against the Catholic Church garnered 
significant Catholic support and also that of some right-wing Anglicans.145  The 
combined efforts of Soviet Russia and Jewish influence to direct the Spanish Civil 
War, and the exploitation of British workers in the service of Moscow and 
‘international finance’ were also recurring themes.146 
Coverage in Action concentrated on criticising mainstream reports of the war 
and frequently alleged that ‘Red’ atrocities went unreported.147  The Times’ report of 
the bombing of Guernica was heavily criticised in an editorial in Action that insisted 
that the town was of strategic value and, therefore, a legitimate military target.148 
However, this argument was undermined by an earlier article in Blackshirt that 
suggested that the bombing of Guernica was a ‘Red ruse’ to gain sympathy as there 
was no military reason for Franco to bombard the village.149 In the same month 
Chesterton insisted that Guernica had been set alight by Reds and had not been 
bombed by German warplanes.  He went on to claim that if it had been bombed by the 
Nationalists it would have been ‘entirely justified.’150  The claims that retreating 
communists were responsible for the devastation of Guernica were repeated 
regularly.151 
Like the Daily Mail, the IFL was convinced that the Spanish Civil War was a 
battle between ‘Good and Evil’, or ‘gentile Fascism and Jewish Bolshevism.’152  
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Although it was only intermittently expressed, their support for Franco and the 
‘Nationalists’ was clear.  In June 1937 congratulations were sent to Franco on the fall 
of Bilbao.153  The following month the Fascist celebrated the heroism and sacrifice of 
General Moscardo and the 1600 inhabitants of the castle during the siege of Alcazar at 
Toledo.154    Yet rather than reporting events, the Fascist was more concerned with 
warning readers of the supposed machinations of ‘the Jewish Money Power’ in Spain 
and its intent to drag Britain into conflict with the Fascist powers.  Links were also 
made between the ‘terrorism and blood shed’ in Spain and that of the Russian 
revolution both of which were ascribed to Jewish influence.155  H. H. L. accused the 
British Government of aiding  ‘Red Spain’ by bringing Basque refugees to Britain and 
by permitting the press to ‘work up a lying campaign against Franco.’156  Having 
made no comment on the destruction of Guernica, Leese was quick to praise the 
bombing of Almeria, and used the incident to reinforce the message that the Jews 
were manipulating events in Spain.157  
The Fascist complained that the ‘European newspaper reader has become 
hardened to the tales of Jewish Bolshevik mutilations, loppings, rippings and flaying’, 
but hoped that some would be roused to action once they considered the fate of the 
children of executed Spanish Nationalists who were allegedly being sent abroad to 
Russia or Mexico to have their minds poisoned.  The article went on to suggest that 
by accepting Basque children as refugees Britain was robbing Franco of potential 
hostages who could have been used to bargain for the return of ‘these helpless 
innocents.’158   
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CONCLUSION 
The British fascist press consistently expressed anti-internationalist and anti-
communist views, and denigrated and demonised the left in any way possible.  There 
was to be no room for the Labour party in the Corporate State, and trade unions would 
be under state control.  Yet, the fascist papers were careful not to portray the British 
working class as anything other than decent, patriotic and exploited.  For the BUF, 
this was in line with their claim to transcend class differences and reflected their 
desire to claim the working class for fascism and the nation.   
Mainstream attitudes to the left were noticeably at variance with those of the 
fascist papers.  The national press remained committed to multi-party 
parliamentarism, and the day-to-day reporting of political events substantiates 
Worley’s argument that the Labour Party had achieved recognition as a legitimate 
democratic political force.  Except for coverage of general and municipal elections the 
mainstream press was notably less histrionic in its reporting of the political left-wing 
and there was no sustained effort to demonise or dehumanise socialism and 
communism when reporting British politics.  Certainly, while the majority of the 
mainstream papers were hostile to communism, there was nothing in mainstream 
reporting to suggest that the Labour party was anything other than a legitimate 
parliamentary party.  Reports of trade union activity did not indicate any substantive 
fear of revolutionary intent.  Nor did the mainstream share the fascists’ perception of 
communism as a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy bent on world domination. 
However, the British fascist press’ demonisation of the left in relation to the 
Spanish Civil War was very similar in content to that of the Mail, whose stance was, 
once again, closer than any other mainstream paper to that of the fascist press.  
Despite this there is no evidence that the Mail, or any of the other mainstream papers, 
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shared the fascists’ perception that the war in Spain was the result of Jewish 
influence.  Significantly, the majority of the mainstream papers did not adopt the one-
sided, overwrought presentation found in the pages of the Mail and the fascist press.  
While there may have been occasional reports, more so in the Mail, that hinted at a 
convergence of opinion, the majority of the mainstream papers viewed the Labour 
party and trade unions as part of the mainstream: a substantially different position to 
that of the fascists, who advocated a one party corporate state. 
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Chapter Four 
MINDING BRITAIN’S BUSINESS 
 
If G. C. Webber’s analysis of BUF membership statistics is correct, the late 1930s 
witnessed an appreciable rise in BUF membership; one that coincided with, and 
arguably was aided by, the promotion of the BUF’s revived peace campaign.1  
Deploying slogans such as ‘Britain First’, ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ and ‘Britons 
fight for Britons only’ the BUF were attempting to counter what they perceived as 
‘war-mongering,’ ‘international finance’ and ‘old gang’ politicians.2  The campaign 
culminated in what was at the time the world’s largest indoor meeting, held at Earls 
Court on 16 July 1939.3  According to Webber, BUF membership stood at 22,500 in 
September 1939.  This represented a significant increase in popularity for the BUF 
over the four years since October 1935 when the membership was estimated to have 
fallen to around 5,000.4  
At the time, the British Government was pursuing a policy of appeasement, 
which was markedly similar to the foreign policy advocated by Mosley and the BUF.  
Martin Pugh points out that this made it more difficult for the BUF to criticise the 
Government’s policy; even so Mosley believed that the movement would gain 
respectability and recruits from this apparent convergence with mainstream opinion 
and he continued to consolidate the movement’s links with mainstream Conservative 
politics.5  Conversely, D. S. Lewis has claimed that the foreign policy of the BUF 
‘outlined a clear and consistent alternative to that which was pursued by the British 
government.’6  Alternatively, G. C. Webber has described Mosley’s foreign policy as 
subject to change in three significant areas: the League of Nations, the roles of Britain 
and Germany on the world stage, and the underlying cause of war.7 
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International relations are complex and often conducted in secrecy and on 
several fronts concurrently.  This was particularly true of the period between the wars, 
despite the principles of open diplomacy and collective security on which the League 
of Nations was founded.   
This chapter will analyse the contradictory arguments mentioned above and 
examine the extent to which the foreign policy of the British fascists can be seen as 
part of the mainstream. Firstly, having established the Government’s position, the 
response of the inter-war British fascist press pertaining to British foreign policy and 
international events will be compared with that of mainstream publications.  With 
regard to fascist publications, attention will focus on the BUF since it offered a 
proactive and coherent foreign policy as opposed to the more reactive stance of the 
IFL, which largely responded to events as they occurred.    
Secondly, it will be suggested that while the BUF’s foreign policy may have 
been consistent in the sense that it was coherent and logically expressed, it was clearly 
predicated on a perception of the world that became increasingly divorced from 
reality. The research informing the chapter will question Lewis’ assessment that the 
BUF offered a distinctive alternative to the policy of the Government when faced with 
actual events.  In tandem with this it will be shown that where the BUF did advocate 
an alternative policy to that pursued by the Government it was not original or unique.  
Indeed, as both Neil Nugent and Webber have shown, other right-wing groups had 
also advocated similar courses of action.8   
Finally, similarities and disparities with the mainstream press will be analysed 
demonstrating considerable discursive overlap between Tory elements of the popular 
press and the BUF in relation to the League of Nations, the Empire, and appeasement.  
This degree of agreement points to a convergence with the mainstream over certain 
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foreign policy issues.  In order to clarify the extent of this convergence the analysis of 
the relevant issues is divided into three separate sections.  The first discusses the 
British Government’s foreign policy in relation to the League of Nations, the Empire, 
Italy and Abyssinia, and Germany and appeasement. The second critically examines 
the policy of the BUF with regard to the above topics, and the third analyses the 
response of the mainstream press. 
 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT FOREIGN POLICY 
The League of Nations 
In the immediate aftermath of the First World War, the most pressing area of foreign 
policy for the British Government was the implementation of the peace settlement, 
especially the setting up of the League of Nations. The League was intended as a 
mechanism for preventing future wars, though the refusal of the USA to join 
undermined its credibility and effectiveness.   
In Britain, however, there was a general belief that the League represented the 
best hope of maintaining a workable peace.   Despite this there were those, in all 
parties, who opposed the influence of the League.  The dissenters included some 
right-wing Conservatives who regarded it as a threat to British sovereignty.9  Without 
doubt the potency of the League was diminished by the absence of the USA, and the 
withdrawal of Japan and Germany in 1933 damaged it further.  Even so, it had 
achieved some success that year in opposing the implementation of Nazi decrees 
discriminating against Jews in Upper Silesia, and in aiding Assyrian Christians in 
Iraq; the settlement of the 1935 Yugoslav-Hungary dispute was also a notable 
achievement.10   
In addition, the League was popular with the British public, and popular 
opinion was very much in favour of avoiding another war, though not at all costs, as 
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was shown by the peace ballot.  This ballot, organised by the League of Nations 
Union in 1935, demonstrated clear public support for the League. More than 
10,000,000 people voted in favour of sanctions against aggressor countries and 
6,750,000 voted for military sanctions if necessary.11   
 
The Empire 
Although the intrinsicality of Great Britain and her role as an imperial power were 
controversial issues before the First World War, during the inter-war period they were 
overshadowed by Britain’s economic difficulties and concern over events in Europe.  
Policies relating to Southern and Northern Ireland, Egyptian nationalism, the question 
of self-rule for India, and the definition of dominion status continued to be discussed 
and developed, but these issues had a much lower public profile in the late 1920s and 
the 1930s than they had prior to the First World War.  There was cross-party 
consensus regarding the need for imperial reform, no doubt given impetus by the post-
war popularity of the concept of self-determination and the economic cost of 
maintaining the Empire.12  Niall Ferguson argues that a crisis of confidence gradually 
developed amongst the traditional imperial elite, caused by the devastating loss of 
manpower in the First World War and its huge economic cost.  Britain had lost 
750,000 men, a sixteenth of the adult male population aged between fifteen and fifty.  
The national debt had increased by a factor of ten and the Government, faced with 
domestic economic difficulties, was reluctant to invest in the Empire.13 
Nonetheless, there was a vocal minority, the most notable among them being 
Sir Winston Churchill, who vehemently opposed the Government’s gradual dilution 
of imperial power.14  But even Churchill, when Chancellor in 1929, had been reluctant 
to divert funds to the Empire.15 
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 In 1921 the Irish Treaty had been signed, giving Southern Ireland dominion 
status.16 Also that year, negotiations began to find a form of independence for Egypt 
that would safeguard British interests, particularly in relation to the Suez Canal. These 
would not be successfully concluded until 1936.17  The Government’s proposals for a 
new constitution for India were set out in a White Paper issued on 17 March 1933.18  
After lengthy and sometimes heated debate the Government of India Act received 
royal assent in 1935 providing a limited form of self-government at the provincial 
level.19   Churchill described the Act as ‘a surrender to incompetent extremists.’20  
This was a view shared by the Mail and also by Britain’s fascists. 
 
Britain, Italy and Abyssinia 
That the League's reputation was badly damaged by its handling of the Italian 
invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 is clear, indeed A. J. P. Taylor declared that 
the League died with the Hoare-Laval pact.21  The British Government’s response to 
the crisis, which Pugh has described as duplicitous, was a significant factor in the 
League’s failure.22  In public, Britain took a strong stance in support of the League 
and against the Italian invasion; Sir Samuel Hoare, the foreign secretary, spoke 
robustly in favour of economic sanctions against Italy, and these were imposed. 
Behind the scenes Britain and France, anxious not to alienate Italy and risk, losing a 
potential ally had negotiated an agreement that would satisfy Italian demands.  
According to Mowat, when the details of the Hoare-Laval pact were leaked there was 
a public outcry and most of the press, with the noticeable exception of those papers 
owned by Beaverbrook and Rothermere, condemned the pact.23   
However, this is an overstatement of the events.  Hoare’s visit to Laval had 
been discussed in the press for several days prior to the publishing of the terms of the 
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proposed pact and press speculation regarding the terms was pretty close to the mark.  
As Mowat notes, the Express and Mail supported the pact, but, the Times was not 
entirely critical, recognising that the proposals were merely the basis for negotiation.24  
Both the Times and the Mail pointed out that the League had mandated the French and 
British Governments to seek grounds for conciliation.25  Nonetheless, there was 
considerable public opposition to a settlement that partitioned Abyssinia, thereby 
substantially rewarding the aggressor nation, and the Cabinet withdrew its support for 
Hoare. He was forced to resign and was replaced by Anthony Eden. Despite the furore 
over the Hoare-Laval pact, once Italy had defeated the Abyssinian forces the outcome 
was accepted, and sanctions were lifted in 1936.26   
The imposition of sanctions against Italy failed to prevent the conquest of 
Abyssinia and, therefore, weakened belief in the process of collective security and 
strengthened arguments that the League was ineffective. While the British 
Government insisted that it continued to support the League and its principles it also 
claimed the right to act independently or in conjunction with others, notably France, 
to resolve issues it considered within its purview.  Neville Chamberlain justified this 
strategy on the grounds that the League was unable to act effectively in carrying out 
some of the functions it was created to undertake and, therefore, the Government was 
obliged to deal with the reality of the situation.27  Chamberlain’s strategy of 
appeasement took its first, faltering steps in an attempt to reach a rapprochement with 
Italy, but Germany rapidly became the main focus of attention.  
 
Britain and Germany 
Two factors appear to have influenced the attitudes of successive British 
Governments to Nazi Germany.  The first is that, although Britain had supported 
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France over the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, these were increasingly perceived as 
being punitive.  The National Government, led by Ramsay MacDonald, supported the 
end of reparations payments by Germany and regarded French delaying tactics as a 
threat to European peace.28  The Government was also concerned by the French 
rejection of the disarmament proposals that Anthony Eden had devised to meet 
Hitler’s demands for equality in armaments.29  Seen in this light the German re-
occupation of the Rhineland, despite being a violation of the treaty, was condoned by 
many, including the Times, as redressing a legitimate grievance.30  While there was a 
widespread acceptance that Germany had been badly treated there were also concerns 
about the nature of the Nazi regime.   
The second factor has already been mentioned in the previous chapter in 
connection with the policy of non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War: the fear of a 
war involving the European powers.  This was the driving force behind the 
Government’s espousal of non-intervention, though its application of the policy 
prevented the Spanish Government from buying arms from British suppliers while 
Franco received supplies of men and armaments from both Germany and Italy.31 
In retrospect the policy of appeasement has been heavily criticised.32  
However, strategically, Britain was not ready to fight another war and, economically, 
could not afford the costs of rapid rearmament.  Thurlow argues that Britain was also 
influenced by the reluctance of the Dominions to become entangled in a European 
conflict.33  Mowat, in contrast, denounces appeasement as being against Britain's real 
interests and ignoring the moral issues.  He suggests that war was not the certain 
outcome of any alternative to appeasement, but fails to provide any details of the 
alternatives.34  Alternative outcomes are a matter of speculation.  What is certain is 
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that after the carnage of the Great War there was a widespread and profound 
reluctance to engage in another conflict of the European powers if it could be avoided.   
The strategy was well received in both the Tory quality and popular press, 
though it had less appeal for the liberal and left-wing papers.  The Government’s 
policy of appeasement suited the public mood. The Munich Agreement was, initially, 
very popular with both the press and the public and it was not until Germany invaded 
rump Czechoslovakia that popular support for appeasement waned.   
 
FASCIST FOREIGN POLICY 
British fascists and the League of Nations 
After the war Mosley was a supporter of the League of Nations seeing it as a well 
conceived mechanism for keeping and, if necessary, enforcing the peace by 
international action.35 In 1920 Mosley became secretary to the League of Nations 
Union, but by 1923, following the League’s failure to take economic and military 
sanctions against Italy for its occupation of Corfu he was disillusioned and began to 
talk of withdrawal from the League and an isolationist Britain.36  Although Mosley 
had lost faith in the League long before he embraced fascism, the policy of the BUF, 
initially, was one of reform rather than rejection.  Mosley maintained that the League 
was ineffective, futile and dangerous.  Despite this, he claimed that fascism would 
transform it and use it for ‘different purposes’ that supported British interests.37  He 
did not give explicit details of how this would be achieved or how he imagined other 
nations would react to this transformation, but a clue to his thinking is apparent in his 
statement in the June 1935 edition of Blackshirt that nations that were ‘competent to 
lead must give leadership …’38 He appeared to envisage a two tier League, in which 
the European powers, united in Fascism, decided the fate of ‘the backward and 
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uncivilised nations of the earth…’39 By 1936, Mosley rejected any possibility of 
reform and advocated direct links between what he anticipated as being the fascist 
governments of Britain, France, Germany and Italy.40  The BUF clearly considered 
that the League was being used as a mechanism for maintaining the dominant position 
of the democratic powers and, therefore, regarded it as inimical to the growth of 
fascist states. Writing in Action in August 1937, Raven Thomson described it as a 
manifestation of misguided idealism exploited by the colonial powers to maintain the 
injustices of the Treaty of Versailles.41  ‘Misguided’ was also the term used to 
describe the League of Nations Union and the peace ballot.42 
The Fascist generally went further than other publications in its assertions that 
the League was controlled by Jews, claiming that the ‘League of Nations is of course 
run by the central banks of the Big Powers; that is to say, by the Jews of France and 
the U.S.A.’43  Similar views were expressed in a letter to Action by the poet Ezra 
Pound when he declared that the League was a ‘shop front for Basel and international 
usury’ and by E. D. Hart, who argued that ‘international finance’ had ‘bought it up 
lock, stock and barrel.’44  The IFL also shared more general fascist attitudes to the 
League.  Leese contended that ‘as long as it survives in its present form it is a constant 
source of danger to this country …’ and berated its ‘utter futility and incompetence.’45   
 
Fascists and Empire 
The BUF’s policy in relation to the Empire was predicated on the need to keep the 
Empire intact to service its economic policy of autarchy within the Empire, and to 
provide military support and raw materials for a fascist Britain that would be isolated 
from Europe.46 Mosley and the BUF continued to advocate Empire autarchy 
throughout the 1930s.47  This policy was comparable in several respects to that of a 
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number of right-wing groups during the inter-war period.  Citing the work of Bernard 
Semmel, Neil Nugent has pointed to the similarities between the policies of the BUF 
in relation to empire autarchy and those of British social imperialists, most notably the 
Tariff Reform League (TRL) founded by Joseph Chamberlain.48   Semmel notes that 
TRL propaganda stressed the need for ‘protection from the self-seeking destructive 
foreigner’ and advocated ‘British work for British Workers.’49  The TRL rhetoric 
would surely have had resonance for the BUF, as would its allegations of foreign 
goods being ‘dumped’ on the British market. Similarly the BUF would recognise a 
kindred spirit in the TRL’s ambition to wean the working class away from 
socialism.50  Webber’s analysis of right-wing thinking on nationalism and imperialism 
from 1918 to 1939, also makes clear the analogy between BUF policy and that of 
imperial isolationists and right-wing supra-nationalists.51   
The mantra of the BUF was ‘buy from those who buy from Britain’, and their 
policy was to exclude foreign foodstuffs and to buy exclusively from Empire sources, 
which would eliminate the need for the imposition of tariffs or quotas.52  
Consequently they were vehemently opposed to the Government’s India Bill, which 
they regarded as emblematic of a surrender of British pride and pre-eminence.53  In a 
speech at the Albert Hall, Mosley accused the Government of surrendering both the 
Empire and Britain’s position in the world. He argued that India owed a debt to 
Britain, and that Britain had a moral obligation to govern. He claimed a fascist 
government would not allow tariffs against British goods and would prevent the 
development of an industrial infrastructure in India.54  In furtherance of its economic 
aims the BUF already advocated the forcible reassertion of British authority in India 
and the suppression of opposition to British exploitation anywhere in the colonies.55 
As early as June 1933, Joyce had promised that a fascist government would liquidate 
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what he claimed was the ‘fake movement’ of seditious nationalism which, he alleged, 
benefited only the parasites of the political class.  He made plain that those who 
financed it would be made to answer with their lives and property, and ‘the whole 
framework of pseudo-parliamentary government [would] be swept away.’56  An 
example of the methods the BUF intended to use appeared later that month in the 
‘Special RAF Pageant’ issue of the Blackshirt, which advocated the bombing of rebel 
villages in remote districts as a humane and effective method of maintaining order in 
the Empire.57 The article disparaged any condemnation of the practice and claimed 
that there was no evidence that women and children had ever been killed in such a 
raid as prior warning was invariably given.   
The BUF was convinced that Britain had a right and a duty to govern India 
and would not countenance its surrender.58  In January 1935, Mosley, speaking at 
Burnley, claimed it was the corrupt influence of international finance, and not the 
Indian peoples, who were demanding self-government.59  With the passing of the 
1935 India Act imminent, Joyce admitted it was too late to halt the surrender of India, 
but pledged that a fascist government would re-capture India, close the Indian cotton 
mills and punish the traitors.60  
This ruthless, bullying attitude was also to be applied to other parts of the 
Empire; opposition was to be suppressed, and the needs of Britain would take 
precedence over those of the inhabitants of the colonies whose land and property 
would be liable to seizure if a fascist government deemed it in Britain’s interests.61   It 
is unlikely that the BUF’s admittedly brutal policies on the suppression of opposition 
and the exploitation of colonial resources would engender much long term public 
support given the way that the popularity of General Dyer plummeted once the details 
of the 1919 Amritsar massacre became public.62   
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International acquiescence to the BUF’s foreign policy was to be ensured by 
allowing Italy to develop an empire in Africa, Japan to exploit Northern China, and 
Germany to expand eastwards.  Thus, according to Mosley, fascism would ensure the 
peace of the world and bring tranquillity to India as  ‘[n]othing but the will of man is 
necessary to raise India from the depths to the heights.’63    
The IFL also opposed the India Act; predictably it perceived the slackening of 
British authority as part of a Jewish plot to dissolve the Empire and as a surrender to 
the forces of anarchy.64  However, Leese was willing to grant autonomy in all areas 
except foreign policy to what he described as the fighting races of India who he 
believed possessed ‘the noble instinct’ and were capable of self-sacrifice in the 
service of a cause greater than themselves.65  The fighting races, including the Sikhs, 
Rajputs, Punjabi Mohammedans, Dogras, Pathans, and Ghurkhas, would be allowed 
to maintain nation states within the Empire.  According to Leese, the rest of India 
could not be regarded as ‘really national’, being slave races that would be ‘happy 
under just Nordic rule, which should be absolute over them.’66 
 
The BUF, Italy and Abyssinia 
Reacting to the Government’s public response to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, the 
BUF was adamant that no British interest was compromised by the Italian action and 
that Britain should not embroil itself in matters that were none of its concern, 
particularly as Britain was not equipped to deal with the consequences of enforcing 
sanctions, which the BUF was convinced would provoke a war with Italy that would 
escalate into a world war.67 Contrarily, the IFL declared that: ‘Despite the vapourings 
[sic] of Mosley, the crux of Italy’s actions is a threat on [sic] British interests…’68 The 
BUF rejected the notion that Italy and Abyssinia were equal in the eyes of the League; 
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under fascism, with its ‘leadership principle’, the superiority of the white races would 
be maintained and the, allegedly, debased and uncivilised peoples would be forcibly 
deterred from jeopardising civilisation and committing atrocities.69  
The BUF supported the Italian invasion and opposed sanctions arguing that 
the Abyssinian government had forfeited any right to the League’s protection on the 
grounds that Abyssinia should never have been admitted to the League because of its 
barbaric and poverty stricken condition, which, it asserted, de-legitimised the 
regime.70 Examples of the barbaric nature of the Abyssinians included the torture of 
captured Italian prisoners, the use of ‘dum dum’ bullets, aggression towards 
neighbouring states, the mutilation and murder of civilians, the continuance of the 
slave trade, the existence of child marriages, and the fact that syphilis was endemic.71  
An article in Action claimed that the Italians’ use of poison gas was justified because 
the Abyssinians had abused the Red Cross symbol and committed atrocities.  
The BUF also claimed that Italy was being singled out, as sanctions had not 
been applied to other nations that had transgressed in a similar fashion.  To the BUF it 
was clear that Italy was being punished for being a fascist state.72 In addition it was 
argued that international oil companies and international finance were leading the 
‘howl of protest against Mussolini.’73 Interestingly, while the BUF claimed that Jews 
were orchestrating the demand for sanctions against Italy, the IFL was concerned that 
Mussolini was under Jewish influence.74 The Fascist went so far as to say that: 
‘Mussolini’s attitude towards Jews is one of miserable toadying.’75 
Alleging that the Government’s apparent support for sanctions against Italy 
would lead to war, Mosley, under the banner ‘Mind Britain’s Business’ with its clear 
connotations of isolationism, began a series of public meetings in August 1935 in 
support of a peace campaign designed to raise awareness of the danger of war and to 
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mobilise public opinion against it, culminating in a ‘monster’ petition against war 
launched in September.76  The Blackshirt boasted that thousands of people came to 
the meetings and that the peace campaign generated increased levels of public support 
for the BUF.77  Yet, this did not translate in to an increase in membership, which 
continued to decline.78  
The BUF argued on the one hand, that if sanctions were effective they would 
inevitably lead to war. On the other, if they were ineffective, it was hypocrisy to 
support them and would lead to an embarrassing climb-down by the British 
Government when it became obvious that they had failed.79  Its assessment of the 
situation was correct in that the imposition of sanctions was ineffective and once 
hostilities had ceased the Government dropped the question of sanctions. That the 
Government appeared reluctant to take unilateral action to enforce sanctions and 
requested French support was ascribed, of course, to the effects of the peace 
campaign.80 
As the 1930s progressed Italy featured less prominently in the fascist press as 
Germany took centre stage, but reports and comments, such as those noting the 
success of Mussolini’s plans to raise the birth rate and the improvement in Italian 
living standards, were usually congratulatory.81 
 
British fascists and Germany 
Although the majority of the British mainstream press expressed concern at some 
elements of the nature and practice of the Nazi regime, the BUF press, unsurprisingly, 
continued to regard it with approval and frequently pointed out the superiority of 
conditions in Germany compared to Britain.82   An account of life in Germany 
published in Action found nothing but peace and contentment.83  Another example 
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described the German ship of state as safe with Hitler at the helm and Göring 
navigating.84  Hitler’s ‘superb achievements’ were also extolled, using statistics 
supplied by the Führer, and there was praise for Nazi policies to encourage workers 
‘back to the land’.85  In contrast, the BUF proclaimed that British leaders brought 
humiliation to the country; only Mosley and the BUF could return Britain to its 
rightful place in the world.86   
If news from Germany reflected badly on fascism and could not be ignored it 
was reinterpreted through a fascist lens.  For example, the Blomberg scandal (see 
below) was given a positive spin, with the Fascist crediting Hitler with ending the 
class war in Germany.87   In some cases it was difficult to justify Nazi policy or dress 
the facts in any positive light. Therefore, the BUF attempted to distance itself from 
events, such as the persecution of the German Churches. Action stressed that nothing 
similar would occur in Britain and ascribed it to ‘the curious folk-lore ideology of 
certain sections of the Nazi Party, which is purely local and German in character and 
… finds no shadow of response in British Union.’88  However, criticism of the Nazi 
regime did not sit well with the BUF and within a fortnight the Rev. H. E. B. Nye 
played down the persecution of the German Churches as necessary for German unity, 
given that the Protestant Churches were not willing to merge into one body.  He 
considered that the persecution might be divinely inspired, inflicted as God’s 
punishment for “our unhappy divisions”.89   
Clearly, there were significant similarities between the BUF’s policy on 
appeasement and that of the Government, although the BUF saw Hitler’s actions in a 
more positive light.  The BUF supported all of Germany’s expansionist actions and 
was vigorously opposed to any British ‘interference’ in matters that were not Britain’s 
concern.  Coming to terms with Germany’s ambitions was portrayed as being in 
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Britain’s best interests.90  The movement’s press repeatedly urged that Britain should 
renounce all east European commitments, return the mandated colonies and negotiate 
a degree of European disarmament, while simultaneously demanding Britain’s 
defence be strengthened.91  Except for the return of the mandated colonies, this was 
very similar to Government policy.  Both the fascists and the mainstream press 
criticised the pace of the Government’s rearmament programme, but not its direction.  
The policy of the IFL was also very similar, the notable difference being that they too 
opposed the return of the mandated colonies.92 
 As was to be expected both the BUF and the IFL supported Germany’s annexation 
of Austria. The Fascist trumpeted that Austria had been ‘emancipated.’93  The BUF 
was equally convinced of the positive nature of Hitler’s expansion of the Reich, and 
John Emery, Action’s industrial expert, maintained that Austrian workers had 
everything to gain and nothing to lose from joining Germany.  Historically, he 
claimed that a clear desire for economic union with Germany had been expressed in 
earlier plebiscites.94  The same issue proclaimed from the front page that there was no 
British interest in Austria, and lauded ‘Hitler’s triumphant progress’ and enthusiastic 
reception.95   A. K. Chesterton, in the ‘Reveille’ column, asserted that Hitler had 
liberated Germany from the Treaty of Versailles and had set Austria free.96  A few 
pages later he reiterated these claims in more purple prose and prophesied a future 
filled with promise: ‘Today her people are linked indissolubly in brotherhood with a 
resurgent Germany, serene in her strength, superbly organised, superbly led, able to 
command for them a brighter, happier future and a loftier way of life.’97  R. Gordon 
Canning was moved by events to even more mystical and pseudo-philosophical 
verbiage.  Proclaiming, in a passage so convoluted as to be unintelligible, that 
‘Germany Confounds Spengler’ he declared:  
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The dynamic force of the German race, cleansed of the devitalising, 
corrupting elements which have crept in for the last few years, has, under 
the spiritual force of National Socialism and a Hitler, thrown off the dead 
hands of Schopenhauer pessimism, and under a Nietschean urge of “yea” to 
life has arisen to bestride central Europe a living force and splendour, the 
saviour of his race.’98 
 
Despite his verbosity it is plain that Gordon Canning saw Hitler as a knight in shining 
armour and was alluding to German philosophy in an attempt to give substance to 
Hitler’s character and policies and their ‘revitalisation’ of the German race. 
 The increase in international tension surrounding the annexation encouraged 
Mosley to resurrect the peace campaign with a new slogan: ‘Britain First.’99 The 
campaign coincided with a growth in membership, though Webber attributes this 
chiefly to dissatisfaction with the Conservative party, and suggests that BUF support 
was drawn largely from disaffected Conservative voters in the middle and anti-
socialist working classes.  Based on his analysis of BUF membership patterns, 
Webber argues that by 1939 the movement was predominantly middle class.100   
 According to Special Branch reports, the public meetings associated with the 
campaign were well attended, peaking in July 1939 when Linehan estimates 11,000 
attended a meeting at Earl’s Court.  Relying on the same Special Branch report Pugh 
puts the figure closer to 20,000, with up to 10,000 having paid for their ticket.101  
Clearly, the similarity between the BUF’s foreign policy and that of the Government, 
which initially enjoyed considerable public approval of its policy of appeasement, 
enabled potential supporters to view the BUF as part of the mainstream. 
 British fascists were also sympathetic to Hitler’s demands that Czechoslovakia 
relinquish the Sudetenland and its largely German population. Mosley urged that 
Hitler’s demands should be met and rejected the idea that Hitler would break his word 
or move beyond the boundaries that he had agreed.102  In an attempt to bolster 
Germany’s claim to the disputed territory the BUF repeated Nazi propaganda 
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claiming that the large German minority in Czechoslovakia was disgracefully 
mistreated, and described the beleaguered state as ‘that most evil spawn of the Treaty 
of Versailles’, an ‘unhappy little synthetic conglomeration of peoples’, and a 
‘ramshackle state.’103  
 Action quoted figures showing that half the population of Czechoslovakia were 
non-Czech, and a third were neither Czech nor Slovak.  Among these were 3.5 million 
Germans who wanted to join Germany.  Consequently, according to the BUF, it was 
only right that Hitler should come to their rescue.104  As in the popular press, it was 
repeatedly stated that Britain should mind its own business, which did not include 
Czechoslovakia or anywhere else in Eastern Europe; Britons should only fight to 
defend Britain.105   
 The BUF and the IFL were equally convinced that Jewish influences were at work 
behind the scenes, pressing for Government commitment to the preservation of 
Czechoslovakia.  Both Mosley and Leese quoted Earl Winterton, speaking in the 
House of Commons in 1934, as saying that the ‘whole of the land in Czechoslovakia 
belongs to Jewish money lenders.’106   
 The attitude of British fascists towards Chamberlain, appeasement and the Munich 
Agreement was varied.  While it was not surprising that they were opposed to any war 
with Germany, the reaction of the IFL to Chamberlain’s peace efforts was 
unexpected.  At a time when the mainstream press had begun to question whether the 
Munich Agreement had been an unalloyed blessing, the Fascist declared: ‘Thank you, 
Mr Chamberlain.  One man alone saved Britain, and her Empire, from chaos and 
possible destruction; Neville Chamberlain.’107  His meeting with Hitler was described 
as in line with fascist policy, that is Aryans acting in their own interests without 
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Jewish interference.108  In April 1938 Chamberlain was further commended for 
continuing to fight for peace.109   
 The BUF was less consistent in its response.  Mosley, writing in Action, 
acknowledged that Chamberlain had rejected the giving of military guarantees to 
Czechoslovakia, but remained critical of the possibility of Britain’s involvement in a 
war arising over Czechoslovakia.110  In May 1938 Action acknowledged that 
Chamberlain, Hoare and Halifax had some sense of responsibility and desire for 
peace, although it was feared that Jewish interests were manoeuvring to replace 
Chamberlain with the War Minister, Hore-Belisha.111   
 This mild approbation was short-lived.  Two weeks later Chamberlain was 
accused of pursuing a dishonest foreign policy.112  Action did, however, congratulate 
Chamberlain on his courage and good sense in securing agreement with Hitler, but 
stressed his advanced age and his dread of aeroplanes, which, implicitly, compared 
unfavourably with Mosley. In a further attempt to undermine his statesmanship and 
authority, it was also claimed that the BUF could have solved the problem in one visit 
to Germany instead of Chamberlain’s three, as forging an agreement would have been 
much easier for an ‘authoritarian ruler, who could speak for his nation.’113   
 Chamberlain’s alleged frailty was also raised in Blackshirt, which advised readers, 
in future, not to rely on him to withstand the pressure from forces intent on war.114  
Chamberlain’s achievement was further down-played by claims that he was using 
National Socialist methods of diplomacy; that only the success of Mosley’s campaign 
to alert the people of Britain to the danger of war had strengthened the will of the 
people which had braced Chamberlain’s resistance to the pressure of the ‘war 
mongers’; and that the agreement was based on Mosley’s plan for peace.115  
Regardless, the claim that Mosley had been advocating a similar solution to the 
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Czechoslovakia crisis three days before the Munich agreement was signed would be 
unlikely to convince any but the staunchest of BUF members that he had influenced 
the agreement.116  Nonetheless, according to Action, it was Mosley who had stood like 
a rock, stiffening the will to peace and preventing the British people from being 
panicked into war.117  It appears that when Government policy coincided with that of 
the BUF, the latter claimed to have influenced the former, and in order to maintain the 
superiority of the fascist system of government it was necessary to criticise the 
implementation of the policy. 
 Following the German occupation of the Sudetenland in September 1938 there 
was no criticism of Hitler or the Nazi regime in the British fascist press.  Action cast 
Hitler in the role of peacemaker asserting that his rapid action had ended the Czech-
Slovak clash.118  Mosley remained adamant that Eastern Europe was of no concern to 
Britain and he was not worried that Germany was growing stronger.119  Any criticism 
in the mainstream press of Germany’s action was berated as only serving to make 
relations between Germany and Britain more difficult, when the people of Britain 
wanted friendship with Germany and to ‘Mind Britain’s Business.’120  Michael 
Goulding, prospective BUF parliamentary candidate, assured readers that as the 
continued existence of Czechoslovakia had become unviable Hitler had acted quickly 
to prevent Russia extending Communist hegemony and to restore law and order.121  
 Having previously claimed that Czechoslovakia had been created for the purpose 
of encircling Germany, the BUF began to contend that Germany was now subject to 
economic encirclement.122  In response to the German occupation of Czechoslovakia 
in March 1939, the BUF insisted that Hitler had acted on the invitation of the 
Slovakian premier to contain internal disruption.123  Hitler’s rapid response was 
praised for preventing a potential extension of communist hegemony across 
 181
Czechoslovakia.124  Stressing that Britain had no interest in Eastern Europe, and once 
more quoting Winterton, Mosley repeated the claim that Jews owned all the land in 
Czechoslovakia.125  He was insistent that it was not in Britain’s interests to thwart 
German ambitions in Eastern Europe.126  Germany’s actions had a noticeable effect 
on public opinion and on Government understanding of German intentions, but had 
no impact on fascist perceptions. 
 During the late spring and summer of 1939, as Hitler turned his attention to 
Poland and Mosley intensified his peace campaign, the same old refrain was played 
again and again.  The Poles were alleged to be oppressing Germans in Danzig, Jews 
controlled Poland, Britain had no interest in Poland, British lives would be lost for no 
advantage, and the Labour party had betrayed the working class by promoting war.127  
Labour’s alleged betrayal of the workers was said to leave the British people no hope 
of salvation until the BUF’s ‘British policies’ were implemented.128  Speaking at 
Islington, Anne Brock-Griggs continued to portray the movement as the solution to 
the nation’s ills claiming that only Mosley and the BUF stood ‘organised to express 
the will of the people.’129  Following the signing of the Nazi-Soviet pact Mosley 
announced that it was absurd to contemplate going to war over Poland as there was no 
way to get aid or military assistance to there in time to be of any use.130  Alluding to 
First World War propaganda, Action warned that all that could be done was to ‘bomb 
German babies and get our own bombed in return’131 
 The IFL adopted a similar line regarding the lack of any British interest in Poland, 
but Leese developed the theme further and claimed that it was ‘the Prudential 
Assurance Company that is interested in Poland, and that Company is linked up with 
Jewish interests all over the world.’132  Leese backed up his claim by explaining that 
the Prudential invested in Jewish run-companies such as Imperial Chemical Industries 
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and Marks and Spencer and also owned an insurance company based in Warsaw, 
which was linked to other Polish based companies with Jewish connections.  In an 
attempt to demonstrate that the Jews controlled Poland, Leese quoted the Times and a 
Foreign Office source to corroborate his claim that the chief landowners in urban 
Poland were Jews.  Finally, in what was obviously meant to be the clinching point of 
his argument, he implied that the Polish foreign minister, Colonel Beck, held his post 
because he was the Jews’ spokesman and was of Jewish birth.133   
 The IFL shared the opinion of the Express that there would be no war in 1939.   In 
May, Leese claimed that the Jews had failed in their efforts to bring about a war with 
Germany and insisted that the Germans were ‘our friends, not our enemies.’134  A 
couple of months later ‘H.H.L.’ was convinced that there would be no war in the 
autumn of 1939, or for many years to come and only fools influenced by a biased, 
Jewish press believed the rumours that Hitler was preparing for war.135  The claim 
that war was not imminent was repeated in August.136  However, by the time 
September’s issue of the Fascist went to press Leese was less sure of a peaceful 
future; he claimed that the Jews had started the last war and the same was happening 
again.137 
  
RESPONSE OF THE MAINSTREAM PRESS 
The mainstream press and the League of Nations 
The response of the mainstream press to the League varied considerably, as can be 
seen from the reactions to the 1935 peace ballot.  The Manchester Guardian, the 
News Chronicle, and the Herald enthusiastically supported the peace ballot.138  The 
Mirror also viewed the ballot in a positive light.139  Predictably, the Express was 
hostile and three years later was still giving vent to its hostility.140  When the vote was 
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published in June 1936 the Manchester Guardian reported that the Mail ignored it, the 
Express elected to publish only the result of the final question, which had received the 
least favourable response for the League’s position, and the Times and the Telegraph 
had relegated it to the inside pages. Despite the attempts by some papers to play down 
the significance of the ballot, the Manchester Guardian claimed that, with ninety-
seven percent of nearly 12,000,000 people voting in favour of the League, there could 
be no doubt that the League commanded considerable public support.141  Mowat 
suggests that the National Government was more publicly sympathetic to the League 
of Nations following the peace ballot.142  
The attitude of the mainstream press towards the League remained less 
enthusiastic than that of the general public.  The Telegraph published anti-League 
opinions, particularly in relation to the handling of the Manchuria crisis, and 
expressed the view that Japan’s withdrawal, in response to criticism in Geneva, would 
threaten the stability of the League and might lead to its demise.143  While the 
Telegraph defended Japan’s position, the Times was supportive of the League, 
blaming Japan’s rejection of any criticism for the difficulties faced by the League in 
attempting to resolve the crisis.144  The Times was, however, concerned that without 
Japan the League would become even more preponderantly European and would have 
less influence in the Far East.145   
There were also concerns that the continued failure of the disarmament 
process would ‘deal a smashing blow at the League of Nations, still further weaken 
the already debilitated principle of international conciliation, and render 
immeasurably more difficult all common efforts …’146 Despite this the Times 
remained loyal to the League seeing it as a symbol of a new order of international 
society.147  Editorials continued to defend the League, supporting its principles, while 
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acknowledging a need for some constructive reform.148  Overall, the Times perceived 
the League’s power of collective action as having immense potential and was 
convinced that it acted as a deterrent.149  
In the popular press, the Express and, to a greater extent, the Mail, inclined 
towards a slightly more heightened rendition of the line taken by the Telegraph, while 
the Mirror was closer to the Times in attitude.  As early as 1931 the Express urged 
that Britain should withdraw from the League, and from Europe, and concentrate on 
the Empire.150  ‘Beachcomber’ was unimpressed by threats to expel recalcitrant 
members, comparing it to telling a boy that if he was not good he would not be 
allowed to kiss his auntie.151   
Appealing to national sentiment, later Express editorials reminded readers that 
the capital of Great Britain was London, not Geneva, and repeatedly warned readers 
against ‘the fatal legacy of the League’ - a legacy which meant that the enforcing of 
resolutions would be left to Britain.152   
The leader columns of the Mail berated the League for its failings, and its 
stance on Manchuria came in for particular criticism.  The League was accused of 
taking foolish action that could lead to war in the Far East.153  Japan was exonerated 
of all blame and portrayed as the only hope of peace in the region, while the League 
was described as helpless.154  The views of the Mail’s special correspondent, G. Ward 
Price, were reiterated in an editorial that claimed that without the support of the 
League China would never have forced Japan to act; she would have been obliged to 
accede to Japan’s earlier demands.155 
While the Mirror printed criticism of the League, it did not necessarily share 
the pessimism of the views it reported, although by the latter months of 1933 it was 
concerned that the League’s reputation was badly damaged and urged that less chatter 
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and more action was required.156  The Mirror explained to readers that it had been a 
supporter of the League and the disarmament process ‘while these ideals retained 
some essence of hope and practicability.’157  Unfortunately, the absence of several 
world powers left the League unrepresentative and, the Mirror felt that the 
diminishment of the League, coupled with the reduction of Britain’s armaments, was 
cause for grave concern.  The Mirror continued to support the principles of the 
League, but had lost faith in disarmament: ‘Our era of splendid isolation is over.  In 
the complicated scientific and economic conditions of the world to-day, it is 
impossible to stand alone… the wisest course is to put our trust in more aeroplanes 
rather than words and conferences.’158 
Throughout, the liberal press remained supportive, and the Manchester 
Guardian staunchly declared that ‘the more others default, the stronger must be our 
support.  The League is capable of reform, if others have left or are threatening to 
leave, that is not because of its defects.’159 
There was a degree of consensus between the attitudes of some elements of 
the mainstream press and those of British fascists towards the League.  The fascists 
may have expressed their views more forcibly than the mainstream, but they were 
broadly similar in sentiment to those of the Telegraph, Mail and Express.  Britain’s 
commitment to the League was perceived as supporting interference in the affairs of 
other nations, and in the eyes of British fascists, the Express and the Mail, was not in 
keeping with their policy of imperial isolation. 
 
The mainstream press and the Empire 
If the BUF’s policy of Empire autarchy bore the imprint of Joseph Chamberlain’s 
Tariff Reform League, so too did the Empire Free Trade Crusade launched by 
 186
Beaverbrook on 8 July 1929.160  The Crusade aimed at binding Britain and the Empire 
into a close economic unit and advocated taxing all goods imported into Britain, 
except for those from within the Empire.  Adrian Bingham argues that Beaverbrook 
and Rothermere had an ‘an idealised vision of the Empire and the heroic qualities of 
its inhabitants.’161 Yet, as a Canadian, Beaverbrook’s commitment to the Empire was 
genuine and longstanding.  He complained in the Sunday Express that while there was 
a general sentiment of goodwill towards the Empire, ‘the practical side of Imperial 
development has been forgotten.’162  In support of the campaign the Express began to 
print the image of a crusader, in red, on the paper’s masthead.   
Beaverbrook was also motivated by the desire to oust Baldwin from the 
leadership of the Conservative party.  Rothermere felt even more strongly that 
Baldwin was ruining the party.  He believed that Baldwin had thrown away the 
victory that had been handed to the Conservatives by the Mail’s publication of the 
Zinoviev letter.163  Although he had doubts about the merits of taxing food, together 
with Beaverbrook he founded the United Empire Party (UEP) on 18 February 1930.164  
250,000 readers subscribed £100,000.  Two ‘Empire Free Trade’ candidates were 
successful in by-elections at Twickenham and West Fulham and there was support for 
the movement from prominent businessmen.165   
By the end of June Rothermere had accepted the need for taxes on imported 
food and the pair were confident of their eventual success.  Their papers urged 
support for Empire Free Trade, particularly during by-elections.166  Baldwin came 
very close to resigning, but in March 1931 he rallied the party behind him with his 
most famous speech, attacking the press barons for ‘aiming at power, but power 
without responsibility – the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.’167  
Baldwin’s victory was sealed on 20 March when Duff Cooper, the official 
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Conservative candidate, defeated the UEP candidate, in the St. George’s Westminster 
by-election. Duff Cooper had been supported by the editors of the Times and the 
Telegraph who were alarmed at the damage that was being inflicted on the 
Conservative party.  Within days Beaverbrook had negotiated a truce with Baldwin 
and all that remained of the Crusade was the image of the crusader, which was 
retained on the masthead of the Express.168  In April, the Express advised Empire 
Crusaders to vote for the Conservative candidate in the East Woolwich by-election.169 
Both the Mail and the Express remained committed to the Empire and both 
continually berated the Government for devoting scarce resources to foreign 
commitments and failing to invest in the Empire.170  Their leader columns continued 
to demand Empire Free Trade and increased home production.171  Again, both were 
critical of the Government’s India policy and they were also concerned that not 
enough was being done to ensure the Empire’s defence.172  The Mail was particularly 
vehement in its criticism describing the policy as ‘truckling to treason’, and compared 
it to the handing over of Ireland in response to Sinn Fein pressure.173  Beaverbrook 
was less insistent on retaining the status quo within the Empire, and the 
‘Beachcomber’ column, in the Express, and David Low, the Evening Standard’s 
cartoonist, mocked the stereotypical characters associated with diehard 
imperialism.174 
The quality press adopted a neutral approach to Beaverbrook’s initial EFT 
crusade.  The Times regarded it as useful in directing attention to the possibilities of 
trade within the Empire, but thought EFT would be difficult to implement due to the 
need to secure the agreement of the governments of the Dominions.175  The creation 
of the UEP was not welcomed.  The Times pointed to the similarities between its 
policy and that of the Conservative party and claimed the UEP had no hope of 
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success.176  The paper recognised that the most likely result was to split the 
Conservative vote and that the founders of the UEP hoped to undermine Baldwin’s 
leadership.177  Its support for Baldwin was unequivocal.178  Similarly, the Telegraph 
supported the Government’s policy on trade within the Empire and deplored the 
‘manifest folly of the internecine conflict’ in the Conservative party ranks.179 
Unsurprisingly, both papers backed the Government’s policy on India, and the 
White Paper and the report of the Select Committee on India were equally warmly 
received.180  
Although the popular Tory press shared the desire of the British fascists to 
retain control of the Empire and to create a self contained economic union within it, 
they did not advocate the brutal imposition of British authority envisaged by the BUF. 
 
The mainstream press, Italy and Abyssinia  
According to Graves and Hodge, the attitude of the British press to Mussolini and 
Fascist Italy was split down party lines.  The left-wing press opposed the 'gangster 
methods' used against socialists while the Conservative papers asserted that Mussolini 
had saved Italy from a Red revolution and regarded Fascism as representing no threat 
to the British Empire.181 
When Mussolini became prime minister the leader column in most papers 
commented on the event, but the Mail had other priorities: its readers needed to be 
warned of the Bolshevist threat of the Labour party leadership and its designs on the 
private property of ordinary citizens, including ‘every woman's clothes and 
jewellery.’182  Later the Mail gave its approval to Italian Fascism and when the Nazis 
came to power they, too, were accorded its blessing.   
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The Express was less supportive of Fascism and National Socialism. Graves 
and Hodge attribute this to its readers being more progressive and open-minded than 
those of the Mail.183 Reports from Italy were frequently unflattering. The Express 
was critical of Rome Radio, and reported that Mussolini was looking for a face-saving 
way of withdrawing from the Spanish Civil War because of economic difficulties at 
home and the need to reinforce troops in Abyssinia, where Abyssinian soldiers in the 
Italian army were said to be mutinying in four districts.184  Editorial comment in the 
Express acknowledged that Mussolini was a shrewd ruler and that good relations with 
Italy would be to Britain’s advantage, but advised that when Mussolini sought 
‘reconciliation’ he meant ‘cash’ and while Britain might want peace it did not want to 
pay blackmail.  Potential investors were warned to look long and hard at the Italian 
State budget and counselled to invest at home or in the Empire.185  An accompanying 
article declared Italy and Germany were partners in exacting ransom from the rest of 
the world but, as the interests of the two dictators were incompatible and Italy was 
struggling militarily and financially, there was no need to talk of war.186 
In relation to Abyssinia, the quality press presented Mussolini as the clear 
aggressor in the conflict. The Times and Telegraph both championed collective 
sanctions against Italy and supported the Government’s public stance.187  The 
Telegraph’s coverage of the war and its background was couched in neutral terms, but 
clearly expressed sympathy for the difficulties faced by the Abyssinian Emperor, 
Haile Selassie, who was attempting to end slavery and trying to improve conditions in 
Abyssinia.188  Italian claims that Abyssinia was not fit to be a member of the League 
were refuted on the grounds that it was Italy that had instigated Abyssinia’s 
admittance in 1923.189  The Times encouraged contributions to a fund for medical aid 
to Abyssinia.190 
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Opinion in the popular press was divided.  The editorial columns of the Mail 
could clearly have been culled from the pages of the Blackshirt or Action.  The 
imposition of sanctions was opposed, as the Mail believed they would not work, and 
was certain that interference in matters that were not Britain’s concern would lead to 
war.191  Ward Price purveyed the line that the Government had abandoned the 
principle of ‘Britain First’, and made accusations very similar to those of the fascists, 
including claims that Abyssinia was ‘a barbarous, slave-owning country which should 
never have been admitted to the League …’192 While these accusations were not 
unfounded, they took no account of the attempts at reform which the Emperor was, 
admittedly, struggling to introduce.  
Meanwhile, the Express supported the Government’s decision not to take 
unilateral action, and, based on the belief that France would not agree to anything but 
modest sanctions, was confident that there would be no expansion of the conflict to 
Europe.193  Although the policy of ‘Splendid Isolation’ continued to be advocated, the 
Express was critical of Italy and sympathetic to Abyssinia.194 
Clearly the Mail was more radical then other mainstream papers in its 
presentation of events in Abyssinia, and once more the similarity between its views 
and those of British fascists was notable. 
 
The mainstream press, Germany and appeasement 
Richard Cockett has suggested, with some justification, that, in dealing with 
Germany, self-censorship was widespread throughout the British press.195  
Chamberlain was unhappy with Foreign Office (FO) policy in relation to the fascist 
powers. As part of his ongoing struggle to make progress with appeasement, while the 
FO advised taking a firmer line with the dictators, he sought to manipulate the press 
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so his view was always given prominence over that of the FO. To this end he 
centralised the flow of news from Whitehall using the lobby system. Cockett claims 
that Chamberlain adopted a ‘personal touch’ towards newspaper proprietors and 
editors to persuade them into greater self-censorship.  This was thought to be 
important for the success of appeasement as Halifax had learned from his discussions 
with Goebbels and Hitler that a pre-condition of any settlement would be the ending 
of what the Nazis regarded as press attacks on Germany and, particularly, on Hitler, 
who was ‘absurdly sensitive to adverse press comment.’ 196   
 According to Cockett, Geoffrey Dawson, editor of the Times, was the first to feel 
the personal touch and he responded positively.  Following a discussion with Halifax 
he wrote a leader that outlined German grievances and hoped for a settlement of 
territorial issues, which was well received in Germany, but caused concern in 
Prague.197  This was followed by a couple of articles that supported claims of 
continuing discrimination against Czechoslovakia’s large German minority despite 
the Czechoslovakian government’s attempt to move to a more equal arrangement.198  
It is true that Dawson regularly saw both Halifax and Chamberlain to discuss the 
Government’s foreign policy, however Cockett’s claim that they manipulated Dawson 
and that he slavishly followed Chamberlain’s policy is not convincing.  Dawson had 
enjoyed a close friendship with Halifax for many years and Halifax’s biographer 
describes their working relationship as symbiotic, although the Times was, on 
occasion, more pro-Germany than Halifax considered suitable.199   
 Dawson had also been on friendly terms with previous prime ministers, Baldwin 
and Bonar-Law, and developed a similar relationship with Chamberlain. His 
commitment to pursuing a negotiated settlement to international disputes pre-dated 
Chamberlain’s attempts to direct press comment on Germany.  The discussions he had 
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with Chamberlain were not as one-sided as Cockett implies; at times it was Dawson 
who bolstered Chamberlain’s resolve.200   
 Nonetheless, Chamberlain did try to direct what was published in the major 
papers.  He met with senior figures in the British press, including Major Astor, owner 
of the Observer, Lord Southwood of the Herald, and Sir Walter Layton of the News 
Chronicle to explain the potentially serious implications for Britain if the 
Government’s foreign policy failed.  These meetings appear to have borne fruit for the 
Government.  So seriously did Southwood take Halifax’s warnings of the delicate 
nature of international negotiations that journalists at the Herald complained about the 
pressure put on them not to be too critical of foreign policy.  Garvin, editor of the 
Observer, encouraged by Astor, supported appeasement and Beaverbrook was also 
enthusiastic about Chamberlain’s diplomatic efforts. The Mirror was one of the few 
national papers not to have contact with the Government.201 
 The Telegraph also responded to pressure from Chamberlain; claiming that ‘the 
freedom of the Press’ was an empty phrase it urged that the ‘irresponsible press’ 
should be stopped from sabotaging peace.202  However, by November 1938 the 
Telegraph had rallied to the cause of press freedom.  In the face of Cabinet attempts 
to suppress information, it declared that democracy could not function if the press 
were muzzled.203 
 Despite the Times’ support for appeasement, its encouraging editorials and 
Dawson’s attempts to exclude anything that could be regarded as unfair criticism, 
events in Germany continued to be reported, including unrest in the army and the 
internal re-organisation of the Nazi Party.204  The paper was appalled by the forceful 
annexation of Austria, describing it as the ‘latest and the worst demonstration of the 
methods of German foreign policy.’205 Subsequent editorials referred to ‘bully tactics’ 
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and ‘brutal methods.’206  Similarly, editorials in the Telegraph referred to ‘ruthless 
aggression’ and condemned German action in Austria, but remained supportive of the 
Government’s policy of appeasement.207   
 The Munich Agreement was generally warmly received.  However, the 
Telegraph’s editorial was less than fulsome: ‘Peace, even at a price, is a blessing 
…’
208
  Given a couple of days reflection, the paper’s leader writers were even less 
certain of what had been gained and began to give more consideration to the price and 
who was paying it.  It was suggested that Chamberlain could have been firmer with 
Hitler and that, given Hitler’s preference for force rather than negotiation, the 
Government needed to increase Britain’s defensive capabilities.209  The following 
day’s editorial expressed sympathy for Czechoslovakia and, while continuing to be 
grateful for Chamberlain’s efforts, was mildly critical that better terms had not been 
negotiated.210   
 By December the Telegraph’s disconcertion at the post-Munich situation led to a 
leader column that admitted that appeasement had been less successful than had been 
hoped.211  Although the Telegraph continued to support appeasement, its confidence 
in the policy was less marked and the need for Britain to be defensively strong was 
reiterated.212  The paper published unflattering reports of events in Germany relating 
to the persecution of the Churches, falling standards of living and food shortages, and 
also criticised the German press and Hitler’s foreign policy.213   
 Throughout the spring and summer of 1939 the Telegraph supported the 
possibility of negotiation with Hitler, but reminded readers that Hitler’s duplicity 
meant it was impossible to trust German assurances and that other methods were 
likely to be necessary to ensure peace.214  To this end the paper advocated a close 
relationship with France and higher defence spending.215  Distinguishing itself from 
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the popular press, the Telegraph recommended the Government not to be timid in 
making commitments via non-aggression fronts, and supported the guarantee of 
Polish independence.216  As August drew to a close the Telegraph reflected the mood 
of a country that was poised on the brink of war; one that was united, composed and 
resolved to keep its commitments.217  Hitler was seen as the only threat to peace and 
security; the decision for peace or war was his alone.218 
 With the exception of the Mirror, the popular press also enthusiastically supported 
appeasement.   The Mirror opposed German aggression and compared the annexation 
of Austria to being seized by gangsters, and noted that gangsters could only be 
disarmed by force.  It insisted that appeasement had failed and would continue to fail; 
it was time for the Government to stop negotiating and re-arm.219    
 The Mail shared the Mirror’s desire for re-armament.  It ascribed Hitler’s success 
to ‘the ruthless display of might, coupled with the threat it might be used’, and saw a 
clear lesson for Britain: ‘Arm, arm, arm … Arm and keep out of unnecessary foreign 
entanglements … [this quarrel is] no concern of ours.’220  Yet in November 1938 
readers were advised that, under German control, Vienna was better than before: a 
city of ‘women, song, and strong men.’221  A year after the annexation it reported that 
Austria was little changed and still charming.222     
 The Express, in line with its policy of ‘Splendid Isolation’, was also unconcerned 
at the fate of Austria, regarding the Anschluss as inevitable.223  Emrys Jones confided 
to readers that German domination would have slight impact on Austrians, many of 
whom were so poor that ‘Nazi poverty’ would be little extra burden.  He maintained 
that if there were few who were enthusiastic, most were not averse to becoming part 
of the Third Reich.224  In its editorial comment, the paper was adamant that Britain 
had no right to interfere, and, as Austria was a German province, should not attempt 
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to ‘… keep Germans apart.’225 Austria was ‘Hitler’s business.’226  Despite this it 
would be unfair to describe the overall feel of the paper as pro-Nazi, unlike the Mail, 
which carried positive reports from George Ward Price on Hitler’s Germany and his 
‘triumphal drive’ through Austria; the Express repeatedly mentioned that Hitler 
looked small and tired.227   
 During the Austrian crisis the Express continued to report events in Germany, 
including that the paper together with sixteen other foreign papers had been 
confiscated for reporting the scandal caused by General Blomberg’s ‘secret’ marriage 
to a typist.  Blomberg was forced to resign by an outraged military hierarchy, even 
though Hitler and Goebbels had been witnesses at the wedding.228  Hitler responded 
by sacking thirteen Generals, and making himself ‘Supreme War Lord.’229  The paper 
interpreted these events as a positive sign for peace in Europe, claiming that Germany 
was divided at senior levels and that Hitler had not overcome the army, which 
advocated a more moderate foreign policy than Hitler wanted.230  
  Interestingly, the Express repudiated claims that, as none of the dissident 
Generals had been shot, Hitler was more ‘decent’ than Stalin: ‘That decent fellow at 
any rate sadly forgot his old school tie on June 30 1934. At that time not fewer than 
two hundred Storm Troopers fell under the bullets of his execution squad.’231   
 The Express also reported events that showed Germany in a poor light, including 
reports that the German press were ‘muzzled’, that women wept in Berlin when Pastor 
Niemöller was sent to a concentration camp, that Baron von Cram, a member of 
Germany’s Davis Cup team, was being held by the Nazi police, that Hitler had failed 
in an attempt to purge the officer corps at Allenstein, and that Hitler was a dangerous, 
romantic dreamer with an almost dual personality.232   
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 Both of the Tory popular papers were resolutely opposed to any British 
commitment to protect Czechoslovakia and the arguments and stock phrases familiar 
from the weeks leading up to the annexation of Austria were once again rehearsed. 
The editorial comment was depressingly similar.  Initially, during the spring of 1938, 
the main line of argument was that Czechoslovakia was ‘no concern of ours’; it had 
been created by the League of Nations and was ‘no business of Britain’s.’233  The 
Express added to this mix the conviction that Czechoslovakia would not give in 
without a fight and that the German army was not yet in a position to engage in 
one.234   
 Although the Express and the Mail supported Chamberlain’s policy of 
appeasement, in the days immediately following the signing of the Munich 
Agreement on 29 March 1938 neither paper made any editorial comment on it.  
Towards the end of the year the Express, despite insisting on a policy of isolation, was 
slightly less sanguine about Hitler’s expansionism and suggested that in pursuing 
appeasement Chamberlain needed to use a ‘long spoon.’235  Shortly after this, the 
Express published a cartoon that showed ‘Democracy’ dozing with the lamp of 
freedom slipping from her grasp while Goebbels spread Nazi propaganda and offered 
‘New lamps for old.’236  
 On 15 March 1939, the day after the Express asserted that the Czechoslovakian 
issue had been settled at Munich, German troops marched into Bohemia and Moravia.  
The Express and the Mail excused the demise of Czechoslovakia on the grounds that 
it was an ‘obvious vassal state of Germany’ and its collapse was ‘natural and 
inevitable.’237  There was no pleasure expressed at Czechoslovakia’s demise, the 
Express described it as a ‘sad, bad wretched moment’, yet, according to the Mail, the 
shock was not its destruction but in the ‘swift and brutal manner of its end.’238 
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 It was not until the middle of August, however, that the Mail acknowledged the 
realities of Nazi foreign policy and recognised its intent to ‘smash Poland as an 
independent nation.’239  This revelation prompted it to declare that ‘the German mask 
comes off and the truth is revealed for all to see.’240  Readers were reassured that 
Britain was in a state of readiness to meet any eventuality, as was France, and both 
were resolved to preserve the integrity of Poland.241  From this point on the Mail, 
while not relinquishing the hope of peace, was supportive of the decision to ‘stand by 
Poland’ and expressed pride in Britain’s preparedness and steadfastness.242 
 The Express continued to oppose ‘European commitment’, although from the 
beginning of August 1939 it did not voice that opposition as strenuously as before, 
having conceded that public opinion, albeit mistakenly, supported it.243  The paper 
reluctantly acknowledged some benefit from an alliance with France, but urged the 
ending of any obligations to Eastern Europe.244 Convinced that Hitler would be 
deterred by the scale of the destruction that would result from conflict in Europe, the 
Express reaffirmed its belief  ‘that there will be no European war this year.’245  By the 
middle of the month the leader writer was taking comfort in Britain’s increased armed 
strength, noting that the country was now ready for war if necessary.246   
 The alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union appeared to make the 
possibility of war more palatable for the Express, as it clarified the issue: ‘The 
democracies will be ranged against the Totalitarian States, and all the world will know 
that we are fighting so that freedom and liberty shall not perish in Europe.’247   
Although the scales had fallen from the eyes of the Express in relation to Hitler, it 
appeared that the paper still had faith in Mussolini: ‘the Duce has worked 
magnificently for peace in Europe … Italy, we know, will take no military 
initiative.’248   
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CONCLUSION 
Webber has pointed to the changeable nature of BUF foreign policy, specifying three 
areas of modification, firstly in regard to the BUF’s attitude to the League, secondly 
in its vision of a world order that was originally to be led by British example and was 
later modified to include an equal but different role for Germany, and, finally, in the 
re-location of the primary cause of war, which was no longer stated to be competition 
between the nations for markets, raw materials and investment opportunities, but was 
instead laid at the door of the Jews.249  Webber’s analysis, while valuable, does not 
cover the full extent of BUF foreign policy.  When considered in terms of the Empire, 
non-intervention in European affairs, and appeasement, there was a considerable 
degree of consistency, one could even say rigidity, to the BUF’s policies.  It remained 
unchanging in the face of world events; committed to a vision of a fascist Europe.  To 
maintain that vision it was necessary to justify all actions of the fascist states.   
 From the evidence presented here it is clear that Lewis’ contention that the BUF’s 
foreign policy provided ‘a clear and consistent alternative’ to that of the British 
Government is unsustainable. As Pugh points out, in relation to appeasement its 
policies were similar in many respects to those pursued by the Government.  This 
remained the case up until the German invasion of Czechoslovakia.    Several aspects 
of BUF foreign policy were also shared with other groups, such as the Tariff Reform 
League, and there were marked similarities to the policies of some elements of the 
popular press in relation to the League of Nations, appeasement, isolation, and empire 
autarchy.  
 The resemblance of the BUF’s policy to the Government’s appeasement policy 
lent respectability to the BUF and made membership appear more acceptable to the 
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mainstream middle class. The success of the BUF’s peace campaign indicates that it 
had found an issue around which it was possible to generate a sense of political 
legitimacy and inclusion in the mainstream.   
 When faced with changes of which it disapproved, for example the India Act, the 
BUF responded by simply declaring that a fascist government in Britain would re-
impose British authority. The leadership appeared to have an unshakeable faith in the 
power of its collective will.  While the movement’s policies on the Empire were very 
different from those of the Government they were poorly thought through and its 
brutal plans to re-impose British authority across the Empire lacked credibility. 
 The Express, the Mail, and to a lesser extent, the Telegraph shared with the 
British fascists a distrust of, and even a contempt for, the League of Nations.  Yet, the 
mainstream papers did not allege that Jews controlled the League.   
 The repeated declarations in the fascist press that Britain would only fight for 
Britons, and that minding Britain’s business was the primary concern, were 
comparable in tone and frequency to those of the Tory popular press.250  There were 
also demands in the BUF press that the Empire should be Britain’s first responsibility, 
but this point was laboured less than in the Express and the Mail.  Despite the clear 
similarities between the opinions expressed in some of the mainstream popular press 
and the fascist press in relation to foreign commitments, the Express and the Mail did 
eventually recognise the failure of appeasement and they ascribed that failure to 
German aggression.  The popular press, once resigned to the inevitability of war 
committed itself wholeheartedly to British victory.  The British fascists remained 
convinced that the coming war was the work of Jewish malevolence and that 
friendship with Germany was both possible and desirable. 
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Clearly, there was a significant degree of convergence between British fascists 
and the mainstream in relation to appeasement during the late 1930s.  Mosley and the 
BUF used the peace campaign to exploit this in a relatively successful attempt to gain 
legitimacy, improve their public image, and boost recruitment.  Nonetheless, as events 
unfolded, they did not adapt their foreign policy and continued to advocate further 
German appeasement.  As public attitudes towards Germany hardened, mainstream 
opinion began to diverge notably from that of the BUF.   
In the coverage of events leading up to the Second World War the major areas 
of difference between the fascist and mainstream press were firstly, the fascist 
insistence that there was a conspiracy, instigated by France but supported by Russia 
and Britain, to encircle Germany politically and economically.251  Secondly, the 
fascists claimed that all the major political parties, but particularly the Labour party, 
were intent on a war with Germany, as were ‘the war-hungry press’, and that the Jews 
were the driving force behind all of these groups. 252  Finally, and most significantly, 
the mainstream press was constantly giving the Government advice through its leader 
columns.  They believed there was action the Government could and should take, or 
action it should refrain from.  The British fascists, most notably the BUF, believed 
that democracy was doomed to fail and only they could govern effectively, so their 
comment on the Government’s actions was almost always confined to a formulaic 
response along the lines of the Government was wrong, or weak, or corrupt and only 
fascism could save the Nation.253  Elements of the mainstream press were strongly 
critical of Government policy, but, colloquially speaking, they were inside the tent; 
the fascists were on the outside.        
                                               
1
 G. C. Webber, ‘Patterns of Membership and Support for the British Union of 
Fascists’, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 19 (984), pp. 575-606. 
 201
                                                                                                                                      
2
 Action, 23 Apr 1938, p. 2; 30 Apr 1938, p. 1; 14 May 1938, p. 17; 3 Sep 1938 & 18 
Feb 1939. Blackshirt, Jun 1938, pp. 2 & 6; Jul 1938, p. 2; Aug 1938, p. 2; Sep 1938, 
pp. 2 & 6. 
3
 Stephen Dorril, Blackshirt (Viking, London, 2006), p. 457.  A transcript of Mosley’s 
speech is available at: http://www.oswaldmosley.com/britain-first.htm. [18 March 
2010].  
4
 Webber, ‘Patterns’, p. 577. 
5
 Martin Pugh, Hurrah for the Blackshirts! Fascists and Fascism in Britain Between 
the Wars (Jonathon Cape, London, 2005), pp. 273 & 279. 
6
 D. S. Lewis, Illusions of Grandeur (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
1987), p. 182. 
7
 G. C. Webber, The Ideology of the British Right 1918-1939 (Croom Helm, London, 
1986), pp. 121-2. 
8
 Neil Nugent ‘The Ideas of the British Union of Fascists’ in Neil Nugent & Roger 
King (eds) The British Right (Saxon House, Westmead, 1977), pp. 145; & Webber, 
The Ideology of the British Right, pp. 116-7, & 121. 
9
 See Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991 
(Penguin, London, 1994), p. 34; Martin Pugh, The Making of Modern British Politics 
(Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982), pp. 277, 286; A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the 
Second World War 1919-1939 (Folio, London, 1963), p.101.   
10
 Martin Gilbert, A History of the Twentieth Century Volume Two: 1933-1951 
(Harper Collins, London, 1998), p. 67; Taylor, The Origins, pp. 75 & 88. G. 
Kaeckenbeeck, ‘The Character and Work of the Arbitral Tribunal of Upper Silesia’ 
Transactions of the Grotius Society, vol. 21, Problems of Peace and War, Papers Read 
Before the Society in the Year 1935, ( Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1935), pp. 38-39.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/743063.  Christian Raitz von Frentz, A 
Lesson Forgotten: Minority Protection under the League of Nations; The Case of the 
German Minority  in Poland 1920-1934 (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999), 
pp.160-9. 
11
 Taylor, England 1914-1945 (Folio Society, London, 2000), p.330. 
12
 Pugh, We Danced, p. 405. 
13
 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (Allen Lane, 
London, 2003), pp. 319-23. 
 202
                                                                                                                                      
14
 Hobsbawm, Age Of Extremes, p.211. 
15
 Pugh, We Danced, p.408. 
16
 Gilbert, A History (vol. 1), pp.619-20. 
17
 Gilbert, A History (vol. 1), pp.607 & 787-8; & Gilbert, A History (vol. 2), p. 122. 
18
 Telegraph, 18 Mar 1933, p. 12. 
19
 Gilbert, A History (vol. 2), p. 73. 
20
 Robert Graves & Alan Hodge, The Long Weekend (Hutchinson, London, 1940), 
p.264. 
21
 A. J. P. Taylor, England, p.335. 
22
 Pugh, We Danced, pp.264-5. 
23
 Charles Loch Mowat, Britain Between the Wars 1918-1940 (Methuen & Co, 
London, 1955), pp. 556-61, see also Gilbert, A History (vol. 2), pp. 70-1. 
24
 Express, 11 Dec 1935, p. 12; 12 Dec 1935, p 12; 16 Dec 1935, p. 10; 17 Dec 1935, 
p. 10; &18 Dec 1935, p. 10. Mail, 11 Dec 1935, p. 12; 12 Dec 1935, p. 10; 14 Dec 
1935, p. 1016 Dec 1935, p. 12; 17 Dec 1935, p. 12, & 18 Dec 1935, p. 10. Times, 16 
Dec 1935, p. 15. 
25
 Times, 18 Dec 1935, p. 13. Mail, 18 Dec 1935, p. 10. 
26
 Gilbert, A History (vol. 2), pp. 109-110; & Mowat, pp. 556-61.  See Taylor, The 
Origins, pp. 99-105, for an assessment that points the finger at senior generals and 
admirals who he alleges admired Mussolini and detested the League of Nations.  
Taylor claims it was their deliberately incorrect assessment of the respective strengths 
of the Italian and Abyssinian forces that led the British Government to mishandle the 
situation.   
27
 William R. Rock, Appeasement On Trial (Archon Books, Hamden, 1966), p.6. 
28
 R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement (Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 
1993), pp. 15-6. 
29
 Ibid, pp. 17-9. 
30
 Mowat, pp. 564-5. Pugh, pp. 285-6.  Parker, pp. 62-5.  Gilbert, p.195, also stresses 
the influence of the Times in encouraging Chamberlain in pursuing the policy of 
appeasement. 
31
 Parker, p. 84. 
32
 In addition to Cockett and Rock see Cato, Guilty Men, (Victor Gollancz, London, 
1940). 
 203
                                                                                                                                      
33
 Thurlow, p. 135. 
34
 Mowat, p. 591. 
35
 Oswald Mosley, My Life (Thomas Nelson & Sons, London, 1968), pp. 136 & 140. 
36
 Dorril, pp. 55 & 66.  Robert Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley (Papermac, London, 1990), 
pp. 93-6, 122-3.  Mosley, My Life, pp. 140-4. 
37
 Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain – Extracts, pp. 41-2, 
www.oswaldmosley.com/downloads/free-ebooks.htm. [March 2007, no longer 
available to download] 
38
 Blackshirt, 7 Jun 1935, p. 2. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Skidelsky, p.425. 
41
 Action, 21 Aug 1937, p. 10. 
42
 Action, 2 Apr 1936, p. 7. 
43
 Fascist, Mar 1933, p. 2. 
44
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, p. 10; & 9 July 1938, p. 2. See also Action 19 Mar 1939, p. 
10. 
45
 Fascist, Nov 1933, p. 2; & Dec 1933, p. 2, this issue also described the League as a 
‘standing joke.’ 
46
 Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain ( BUF, London, 1932), pp. 132-137. 
47
 Oswald Mosley, Tomorrow We Live: British Union Policy 1938 (Greater Britain 
publications, London, 1938), pp. 27-8, & 32. 
48
 Nugent, pp. 145. 
49
 Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 
1895-1914 (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1960), p. 117. 
50
 Semmel, pp. 100 & 118. 
51
 Webber, pp.115-21. 
52
 Fascist Week, 27 Apr- 3 May 1934, pp. 2 & 5; 
53
 Blackshirt, 1 Feb 1935, p. 6; & 15 Feb 1935, p. 6. 
54
 Blackshirt, Mar 29 1935, p. 2. 
55
 See also Fascist Week, 11-17 May 1934, p. 1. 
56
 Blackshirt, 16 Jun 1933, pp.1 & 4. 
57
 Blackshirt, 24 Jun- 1 Jul 1933, pp. 1 & 3. 
 204
                                                                                                                                      
58
 Blackshirt, Mar 29 1935, p. 2.  Fascist Week, 2-8 Feb 1934, p. 5; 4-10 May 1934, p. 
5; & 11-17 May 1934, p. 1.   
59
 Blackshirt, 18 Jan 1935, p. 4.   
60
 Blackshirt, 24 May 1935, pp. 1 & 6. 
61
 Oswald Mosley, The Greater Britain, pp. 137-138. 
62
 Ferguson, pp. 326-8. 
63
 Fascist Week, 2-8 Feb 1934, p. 5. See also Blackshirt, 18 Jan 1935, p. 4; & 1 Feb 
1935, p. 1; & 8 Feb 1935, p. 9; 20 Sep 1935, p. 2. 
64
 Fascist, Sep 1933, p. 1 & 2, Aug 1934, p. 1. 
65
 Fascist, Mar 1934, p. 4 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 Blackshirt, 19 Jul 1935, p.2, 13 Sep 1935, p.6 & 7; 20 Sep 1935, p. 2; & 4 Oct 
1935, p. 2. 
68
 Fascist, Oct 1935, p. 1; see also Nov 1935, p. 2. 
69
 Blackshirt, 7 Jun 1935, p. 2. 
70
 Blackshirt, 30 Aug, pp. 6 & 7.  See also, Blackshirt, 13 Sep 1935, p. 1; 20 Sep 
1935, p. 2; & 27 Sep 1935, p. 4. 
71
 Blackshirt, 30 Aug 1935, p. 5; 13 Sep 1935, pp. 3 & 6.  Action 28 Feb 1936, p. 8; 
16 Apr 1936, p. 3; & 30 April 1936, p. 6 & 7.  
72
 Blackshirt, 30 Aug, p. 6; 20 Sep 1935, p. 5; & 4 Oct 1935, p. 5. 
73
 Blackshirt, 6 Sep 1935, p. 2 & 3.  
74
 Fascist, Sep 1935, p. 1 & 2; & Nov 1935, p. 1.  
75
 Fascist, Dec 1935, p. 3.  Earlier, Mussolini was described has having ‘Ratted’ after 
he allowed Freemasons and Rosicrucians to hold lodge meetings and permitted four 
Jews to sit in the Senate, see Fascist, Apr 1934, p. 2. 
76
 Blackshirt, 23 Aug 1935, pp. 2 & 4; 30 Aug 1935, p. 1, 5 & 6; 6 Sep 1935, pp. 1–2, 
& 5; & 20 Sep 1935, p. 1-2. 
77
 Blackshirt, 6 Sept 1935, pp. 1,2, 4, 5 & 8; 13 Sep 1935, pp. 1& 9; 20 Sep 1935, p. 
1-2; & 27 Sep 1935, pp. 1, 2; & 4 Oct 1935, p. 2. 
78
 Thomas Linehan, British Fascism 1918-39: Parties, ideology and culture 
(Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2000), p.102-5. Only in east London did 
membership increase, and this was likely to be a result of increased antisemitic 
propaganda rather than the popularity of the peace campaign. 
 205
                                                                                                                                      
79
 Blackshirt, 13 Sep, p. 10; 20 Sep 1935, p. 4. 
80
 Blackshirt, 6 Sep 1935, p. 1. 
81
 49% of married women were said to have four or more children. Action, 12 Mar 
1938, p. 4.  It was also suggested that Italy was faring better than Germany, 
materially. Action, 6 Jan 1938, p. 18. 
82
 Action, 20 Jan 1938, p. 6; & 12 Feb 1938, p. 2. 
83
 Action, 17 Sep 1938, p. 4.   
84
 Action, 29 Jan 1938, p. 6. 
85
 Action, 26 Feb 1938, p. 4; & 23 Jul 1938, p. 20. 
86
 Action, 4 Feb 1939, p. 2. See also Action, 7 Jan 1939, p. 5 for an article by John 
Emery on the country’s need for modern leaders in which he claimed that ‘the only 
hope is British Union under the leadership of Mosley.’ 
87
 Fascist, Apr 1938, p. 2. See also Action, 20 Jan 1938, p. 9, & 12 Feb 1938, pp. 2 & 
4. 
88
 Action, 6 Jane 1938, p. 8. 
89
 Action, 20 Jan 1938, p. 9. 
90
 Action, 28 Feb 1936, p.12. 
91
 Action, 7 May 1936, p. 3; 19 Mar 1938, p. 1; 12 Nov 1938, p. 7; & 29 Apr 1939, p. 
2.  Blackshirt, Nov 1938, p. 6 & 8; & May 1939, p. 2, 6 & 8. 
92
 Fascist, Oct 1933, p. 2; Mar 1934, p. 2; Dec 1935, p. 2; Mar 1937, p. 3; Dec 1938, 
p. 2; & May 1939, p. 3. 
93
 Fascist, Apr 1938, p. 1. 
94
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, p. 5.  Emery is referring to regional plebiscites conducted in 
1921, for a more detailed explanation see the Fascist, May 1938, p. 2.  
95
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, pp. 1 & 4. 
96
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, p. 2. 
97
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, p. 9. 
98
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, p. 4. 
99
 Action, 23 Apr 1938, p. 2; 30 Apr 1938, p. 1,  & 14 May 1938, p. 17. 
100
 Webber, The Ideology of the British Right, pp. 43-6 & 86. 
101
 Linehan cites a Special Branch report dated 16 July 1939. Linehan, British 
Fascism, p.114.  Pugh, Hurrah, p. 286.  Both Dorril and Nicholas Mosley estimate the 
 206
                                                                                                                                      
audience at more than 20,000. Dorril, p. 457. Nicholas Mosley, Rules of the Game 
/Beyond the Pale (Pimlico, London, 1998), p. 417. 
102
 Action, Oct 1938, p. 1. 
103
 Action, 5 Mar 1938, p. 2; 12 Mar 1938, pp. 2 & 4; 19 Mar 1938, p. 10. 
104
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, p. 10; 4 Jun 1938, p. 2; & 24 Sep 1938, p. 4.  Blackshirt, Sep 
1938, pp. 2 & 6. 
105
 Action, 12 Mar 1938, p. 4; 3 Sep 1938, p. 10; 24 Sep 1938, p. 11; & 18 Mar 1939. 
106
 Action, 28 May 1938, p. 7. Fascist, Apr 1938, p. 1.The quote was used again in 
Action, 3 Sep 1938, p. 1; 24 Sep 1938, p. 2; 8 Oct 1938, p. 7; 25 Feb 1939, p. 1 & 25 
Mar 1939, p. 1.  Earl Winterton was an Irish peer and Conservative MP who was 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster between 1937-9. 
107
 Fascist, Nov 1938, p. 1. 
108
 Ibid. 
109
 Fascist, Apr 1939 p. 4. 
110
 Action, 2 Apr 1938, p. 1. 
111
 Action, 21 May 1938, p. 3. 
112
 Action, 4 Jun 1938, p. 4. 
113
 Action, 8 Oct 1938, p. 2. 
114
 Blackshirt, Oct 1935, p. 5. 
115
 Action, 24 Sep 1938, pp. 7 & 10 
116
 Blackshirt, Oct 1938, p. 5. 
117
 Action, 8 Oct 1938, p. 1. 
118
 Action, 24 Sep 1938 
119
 Action, 25 Mar 1939, p. 1 & 10. 
120
 Action, 18 Mar 1939, p. 20. 
121
 Blackshirt, May 1939, p. 8. 
122
 Action, 12 Mar 1938, p. 4; 1 Oct 1938, p. 12; 25 Mar 1939, p. 10; & 14 Apr 1939, 
p. 10. 
123
 Action, 25 Mar 1939, pp. 6 & 10. 
124
 Blackshirt, May 1939, p. 8. 
125
 Action, 25 Mar 1939, p. 1. See also, Action, 1 Apr 1939, pp. 1 & 2. 
126
 Action, 1 Apr 1939, p. 7. 
 207
                                                                                                                                      
127
 Action, 8 Apr 1939, pp. 1, 3, 9 & 10; 15 Apr 1939, pp 4 &. 10; 22 Apr 1939, pp. 1, 
3, 4, 7 & 10; 29 Apr 1939, pp. 2 7 17; 6 May 1939, p. 20; 7 Jun 1939, p. 3; 8 Jul 1939, 
p. 3; 22 Jul 1939, pp. 10 & 11; & 29 Jul 1939, p. 3. 16 Sep 1939, p. 5; & 30 Sep 1939, 
p. 5. 
128
 Action, 18 Feb 1939, p. 3. 
129
 Action, 8 Apr 1939,p. 17. 
130
 Action, 26 Aug 1939, p. 1. See also 2 Sep 1939, p. 4. 
131
 Action, 2 Sep 1939, p. 8. 
132
 Fascist, May 1939, p. 1. 
133
 Ibid. 
134
 Fascist, May 1939, p. 2. 
135
 Fascist, Jul 1939, p. 2. 
136
 Fascist, Aug 1939, p. 2. 
137
 Fascist, Sep 1939, p. 1. 
138
 The History of the Times vol. IV, part II  (Written and published at the office of the 
Times, London, 1952), p. 896. 
139
 Mirror, 10 Apr 1933, p. 12. 
140
 Express, 4 Mar 1938, p. 10.  
141
 Manchester Guardian, 29 Jun 1935, p. 12. 
142
 Mowat, p. 542. 
143
 Telegraph, 21 Feb 1933, p. 10; & 27 Feb 1933, p.10. 
144
 Times, 24 Jan 1933, p.11; & 14 Feb 1933, p.13. 
145
 Times, 28 Mar 1933, p. 15. 
146
 Times, 13 Feb 1933, p. 13.   
147
 Times, 4 Aug 1933, p. 11. 
148
 Times, 23 Nov 1933, p. 15; & 7 Dec 1933, p. 15.  See also 28 May 1934, p. 15, 
when the Times again praises the work of the League. 
149
 Times, 4 Aug 1934, p. 11. 
150
 Express, 30 Apr 1931, p. 10. 
151
 Express, 23 May 1932, p. 10. 
152
 Express, 22 Feb 1933, p.10; & 25 Feb 1933, p. 8. 
153
 Mail, 6 Feb 1933, p. 10 
154
 Mail, 16 Feb 1933, p. 10; & 22 Feb 1933, p. 10. 
 208
                                                                                                                                      
155
 Mail, 27 Feb 1933, p 10. 
156
 Mirror, 28 Sep 1933, p. 11.  See also Mirror, 26 Sep 1933, p. 4, for a report of a 
speech by the League’s President critical of its performance, and 16 Oct 1933, p. 12, 
for an article by Shaw Desmond on the League’s failures.  Shaw Desmond was a 
successful novelist and in 1934 was a founder member and Vice-President of the 
International Institute for Psychical Research. 
157
 Mirror, 21 Nov 1933, p. 13. 
158
 Ibid. 
159
 Manchester Guardian, 22 Dec 1933, p. 8. 
160
 Anne Chisholm & Michael Davie, Lord Beaverbrook (Alfred A. Knopf, New 
York, 1992), pp 279-80, 288. Alan Wood, The True History of Lord Beaverbrook 
(Heinemann, London, 1965), p.185. 
161
 Adrian Bingham, Gender, Modernity and the Popular Press in Inter-War Britain 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), p. 185. 
162
 Graves & Hodge, p. 251. 
163
 Mail, 24 Sep 1930, p. 10. 
164
 Chisholm & Davie, pp. 287, 289, 291 & 293. 
165
 Graves & Hodge, p. 251. Express, 26 Sep 1930, p. 1. 
166
 Express, 4 Sep 1930, p. 10; 17 Sep 1930, p. 10; & 23 Sep 1930, p. 10. Mail 1 Sep 
1930, pp. 10 & 11. 
167
 Chisholm & Davie, p. 305. The potent final sentence is believed to have been 
written by Baldwin’s cousin Rudyard Kipling who had worked for Beaverbrook and 
was a friend of Rothermere. S. J. Taylor, The Great Outsiders (Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson, London, 1996), p. 274. 
168
 Chisholm & Davie, p. 306. 
169
 Express, 15 Apr 1931, p. 8. 
170
 Express, 12 Mar 1934, p. 12; 16 Feb 1938, p. 10; 17 Feb 1938, p. 10; & 5 Mar 
1938, p. 10. Mail, 14 Apr 1937, p. 12 
171
 Express, 10 May 1932, p. 10; 23 May 1932, p. 10;  &16 Feb 1938, p. 10. Mail, 25 
Apr 1934, p. 12. 
172
 Express, 10 Apr 1931, p. 10; & 16 Mar 1933, p. 10; 23 Apr 1937, p. 12; & 2 May 
1938, p.10.  Mail, 22 Sep 1930, p. 10; 7 Apr 1931, p.11; 13 Apr 1931, p. 10; 7 Oct 
1932, p.12 & 3; 23 Mar 1934, p. 25; 16 May 1934, p. 10; & 25 Jul 1934, p. 10. 
 209
                                                                                                                                      
173
 Mail, 24 Apr 1931, p. 10; & 15 Jan 1934, p 10. 
174
 Ferguson, pp. 317-8. 
175
 Times, 8 Aug 1929, p. 11; 9 Oct 1929, p. 15; 20 Nov 1929, p. 15; & 30 Jan 1930, 
p. 15. 
176
 Times, 25 Feb 1930, p. 15. 
177
 Times, 18 Feb 1930, p. 17; & 25 Feb 1930, p. 15. 
178
 Times, 29 May 1930, p. 17; 2 Mar 1931, p. 13; & 30 Mar 1931, p. 13. 
179
 Telegraph, 26 Sep 1930, p. 10; & 30 Sep 1930, p. 10. The paper was also highly 
critical of the attempts by the Express and the Mail to portray the reconciliation 
between the UEP and the Conservative party as being the result of concessions by the 
Conservative leadership.  Beaverbrook was heavily criticised for misrepresentation. 
See Telegraph, 1 Apr 1931, pp. 12 & 13; & 10 Apr 1931, p. 10. 
180
 
 Times, 28 Mar 1934, p. 15; 30 Apr 1934, p. 15; 7 Jun 1934, p. 15; 12 Nov 1934, p. 
15; 20 Nov 1934, p. 15, 21 Nov 1934, p. 15; 23 Nov 1934, p.15, 3 Dec 1934, p. 15; & 
19 Mar 1935, p. 17. Telegraph, 18 Mar 1933, p. 12; & 15 Feb 1934, p. 12. 
181
 Graves & Hodge, p. 248. 
182
 Graves & Hodge, pp. 248-9. 
183
 Graves & Hodge, p. 250. 
184
 Express, 2 Feb 1938, p. 1; 8 Feb 1938, P. 1; &16 Feb 1938, p. 2. 
185
 Express, 5 Feb 1938, P. 8; 8 Feb 1938, p. 10; 12 Feb 1938, p. 10, 15 Feb 1938, p. 
10. 
186
 Express, 12 Feb 1938, p. 12. 
187
 Times, 16 Sep 1935, p. 13; 4 Oct 1935, p. 15; 10 Oct 1935, p. 15; 11 Oct 1935, p. 
15; & 15 Oct 1935, p. 15. Telegraph, 3 Oct 1935, p. 14; 4 Oct 1935, p. 14; 5 Oct 
1935, p. 12; 10 Oct 1935, p. 14; 11 Oct 1935, p. 14; 14 Oct 1935, p. 12; & 15 Oct 
1935, p. 14. 
188
 Telegraph, 7 Oct 1935, p. xii.  
189
 Telegraph, 7 Oct 1935, p. 12. 
190
 Times, 12 Oct 1935, p.13. 
191
 Mail, 1 Oct 1935, p. 12; 2 Oct 1935, p. 10; 3 Oct 1935, p. 12; 4 Oct 1935, p. 12; 10 
Oct 1935, p. 12; 14 Oct 1935, p. 12; 15 Oct 1935, p. 12; 16 Oct 1935, p. 12; & 18 Oct 
1935, p. 14. 
192
 Mail, 4 Oct 1935, p. 12. 
 210
                                                                                                                                      
193
 Express, 5 Oct 1935, p. 10. 
194
 Express, 7 Oct 1935, p. 10; 8 Oct 1935, p. 12; & 7 Dec 1935, p. 10.  See 9 Oct 
1935, p. 4 for reports of Italy using gas bombs.  
195
 Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth (George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 
1989), pp. 31 & 189. 
196
 Cockett, pp. 39-42. 
197
 Cockett, p. 42.  The actual date of the Times editorial is 29 Nov 1937, p. 15 and not 
1938 as Cockett says. 
198
 Times, 2 Dec 1937, p. 15; & 3 Dec 1937, p. 17. 
199
 Andrew Roberts, The Holy Fox: The Life Of Lord Halifax (Phoenix, London, 
1997), pp. 19, 25, 92, & 109. 
200
 John Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times (Hutchinson, London, 
1955), pp.152, 215, 218, 359,  & 373. 
201
 Cockett, pp 27, 42-3 & 189. 
202
 Telegraph, 8 Mar 1938, p. 15. 
203
 Telegraph, 23 Nov 1938, p. 14. 
204
 Times, 10 Feb 1938, p. 14; 11 Feb 1938, p. 14. 
205
 Times, 12 Mar 1938, p. 13. 
206
 Times, 14 Mar 1938, p. 15; & 21 Mar 1938, p. 13. 
207
 Telegraph, 12 Mar 1938, p. 14; & 15 Mar 1938, p. 16. 
208
 Telegraph, 1 Oct 1938, p. 12. 
209
 Telegraph, 3 Oct 1938, p. 10. 
210
 Telegraph, 4 Oct 1938, p. 16. 
211
 Telegraph, 12 Dec 1938, p. 12. 
212
 Telegraph, 14 Dec 1938, p. 14; 15 Dec 1938, p. 14; 20 Dec 1938, pp. 14 & 15. 
213
 Telegraph, 13 Oct 1938, p. 10; 7 Nov 1938, p. 14; 8 Dec 1938, p. 15, 12 Dec 1938, 
p. 11; 14 Dec 1938, p. 14; & 16 Dec 1938, p. 11. 
214
 Telegraph, 17 Mar 1939, p. 16; 18 Mar 1939, p. 14; 12 Jun 1939, p. 12; 26 Jun 
1939, p. 12; & 29 Aug 1939, p. 10. 
215
 Telegraph, 7 Feb 1939, p.14; 16 Feb 1939, p. 14; 23 Mar 1939, p. 16; 30 Mar 
1939, p. 16; & 31 Mar 1939, p. 16;  
216
 Telegraph, 20 Mar 1939, p. 12; 25 Mar 1939, p. 14; 29 Mar 1939, p. 16; & 30 Jun 
1939, p.14. 
 211
                                                                                                                                      
217
 Telegraph, 18 Aug 1939, p. 12; 23 Aug 1939, p. 12; 25 Aug 1939, p. 12; 28 Aug 
1939, p. 8; 29 Aug 1939, p. 10; 30 Aug 1939, p. 10; & 31 Aug 1939, p. 10. 
218
 Telegraph, 21 Aug 1939, p. 12; 24 Aug 1939, p. 12; 29 Aug 1939, p. 10; & 30 
Aug 1939, p. 10. 
219
 Mirror, 12 Mar 1938, p. 11; 14 Mar 1938, p. 13 & 15. 
220
 Mail, 12 Mar 1938, p. 8. 
221
 Mail 21 Nov 1938, p. 12. 
222
 Mail, 23 Feb 1939, p. 12. 
223
 Express, 16 Feb 1938, p. 10. 
224
 Express, 17 Feb 1938, p. 10. 
225
 Express, 12 Mar 1938, p. 12. 
226
 Express, 28 Mar 1938, p. 10. 
227
 Mail, 7 Feb 1938, p. 10; & 15 Mar 1938, pp. 13 -4. 
228
 Express, 4 Feb 1938, p. 1; 5 Feb 1938, p. 1; & 7 Feb 1932, p. 10. Express, 15 Mar 
1938, p. 2; & 16 Mar 1938, p. 2. 
229
 Express, 5 Feb 1938, p. 1; 7 Feb 1938, p. 2; & 12 F3b 1938, p. 10. 
230
 Express, 5 Feb 1938, p. 8. 
231
 Express, 7 Feb 1938, p. 10. 
232
 Express, 11 Feb 1938, p. 10; 12 Feb 1938, p. 2; 7 Mar 1938, p. 9; 8 Mar 1938, p. 
5; 14 Mar 1938, p. 12; & 28 Mar 1938, p. 7. 
233
 Mail, 4 Mar 1938, p. 12. For similar sentiments see Express, 5 Apr 1938, p. 10; 14 
Mar 1938, p. 12; 17 Mar 1938, p. 110; 30 Apr 1938, p. 10; & 30 Apr 1938, p. 10. 
234
 Express, 14 Mar 1938, p. 12, 18 Mar 1938, p. 1; & 21 Mar 1938, p. 10. 
235
 Express, 15 Nov 1938, p. 12. 
236
 Express, 21 Nov 1938, p. 12. 
237
 Express, 14 Mar 1939, p. 10. Mail, 15 Mar 1939, p. 12. 
238
 Express, 15 Mar 1939, p. 12. Mail, 16 Mar 1939, p. 12. 
239
 Mail, 21 Aug 1939, p. 8. 
240
 Ibid. 
241
 Ibid. 
242
 Mail, 23 Aug 1939, p. 10; 25 Aug 1939, p. 8; & 30 Aug 1939, p. 8.  See also 22 
Aug 1939, p. 8; 24 Aug 1939, p. 8, 28 Aug 1939, p. 8; 29 Aug 1939, p. 8& 31 Aug 
1939, p. 8. 
 212
                                                                                                                                      
243
 Express, 1 Aug 1939, p. 10, & 15 Aug 1939, p. 8. 
244
 Express, 4 Aug 1939, p. 8 
245
 Express, 4 Aug 1939, p. 8. 
246
 Express, 15 Aug 1939, p. 8. 
247
 Express, 26 Aug 1939, p. 8. 
248
 Express, 2 Sep 1939, p. 8. 
249
 Webber, The Ideology of the British Right, pp 121-2. 
250
 Action, 19 Mar 1938, pp 10 & 11; 3 Sep 1938, p. 10; & 24 Sep 1938, p. 11. 
Blackshirt, Sep 1939, pp. 2 & 6. 
251
 Action, 26 Feb 1938, p.2; 2 Mar 1938, p. 4; 19 Mar 1938, p. 4; 7 May 1938, p. 4; 
& 4 Jun 1938, p. 2; 18 Jun 1938, p. 3; 1 Oct 1938, p. 12; 8 Oct 1938, p.10; 25 Mar 
1939, p. 10; & 15 Apr 1939, p. 10.  Blackshirt, May 1939, p. 8.  Fascist, Aug 1939, p. 
2. 
252
 Action, 26 Mar 1938, p. 5; 2 Apr 1938, p. 1; 3 Sep 1938, p. 1; 24 Sep 1938, p. 11. 
Blackshirt, Apr 1938, p. 4; Oct 1938, p. 5; 8 Apr 1939, p. 1; & 15 Apr 1939, p. 9. 
Fascist, Sep 1938, pp. 1 & 2; Nov 1938, p. 1; Apr 1939, p. 1 & 3-4 & May 1939, p. 2. 
253
 Blackshirt, May 1939, p. P.1.  Action, 7 Jan 1939, p. 5; 14 Jan 1939, p. 8; 11 Feb 
1939,p p. 3 & 4; &18 Feb 1939, p. 3. 
 213
Chapter 5 
 
DECADENCE, DECLINE, AND 
RENEWAL - BRITISH CULTURAL 
PERCEPTIONS 
 
According to J. B. Bury, the theory of human progress is predicated on a view of 
history that sees humanity slowly and continually advancing in a definite and 
desirable direction.1  During the interwar period there were many who doubted 
the validity of that theory.  Cultural pessimism, a profound belief that a nation or 
civilisation is in a continuing state of decline that cannot be reversed, resonated 
with many who perceived that liberal principles had failed, resulting in a decadent 
and weak society devoid of meaning.2  Developing out of fin-de-siècle anti-
rationalism, the cultural pessimist movement had deep roots in Germany and 
fostered a reaction by the traditional elite against modernity.  The unitary 
worldview of cultural pessimists recognised the validity of only one set of beliefs 
or values and perceived these as fundamental to the social institutions and cultural 
life of the nation, sustaining its identity and organic wholeness.  The educated 
elite saw themselves as interpreting the national culture and identity, and acted as 
guardians against an encroaching modernity that embodied a plurality of meaning 
and promoted a coercive individuality together with utilitarian values such as 
wealth, power and status that resulted in complete spiritual enervation.  To 
revitalise the nation and restore its organic unity would require a transformation 
of society.3   
In Britain there were also significant numbers who shared these views, for 
example the Dean of St. Paul’s, W. R. Inge, regarded the concept of ‘progress’ as 
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a ‘pernicious superstition’, and H. A. L. Fisher argued that he could discern no 
pattern or meaning in the study of history.4  Dan Stone has also identified a 
widespread sense of cultural pessimism among members of the ‘Back to the 
Land’ movement.  The movement was a response to a perception that rapid 
changes in modern society threatened Britain’s traditional patterns of social and 
cultural life.5 
According to Thomas Linehan, cultural regeneration was as significant an 
element in British fascism as the need for economic or political change.6  
Nietzsche, Bergson, Sorel, Le Bon and Spengler were among those who inspired 
British fascists’ understanding of culture. The works of British writers such as 
Coleridge, Carlyle, Ruskin and Morris were also influential.7  Recent work by 
Tony Collins, Martin Durham, Julie Gottlieb, Michael Spurr and others has 
advanced our understanding of the cultural forces at work within and upon British 
fascist organisations.8  Careful study of the fascist press shows it was the 
perception of Britain as a nation in decline, losing its pre-eminence on the world 
stage, and abandoning its traditional core values that provided the essential 
impetus motivating British fascists. This chapter will concentrate on the cultural 
aspects of the ideology and policy of British fascists, examining, in particular, 
their analysis of a perceived national descent into decadence, apathy and lethargy, 
and the remedy they prescribed to reverse that decline. The degree of difference 
between the constrained cultural mores of the British fascists and the relatively 
varied cultural perceptions represented in the mainstream press suggests that the 
fascists’ cultural pessimism did not strike a chord with the public and this 
reinforced a tendency within British fascism, particularly so in the case of the 
BUF, to define itself increasingly in opposition to mainstream society. 
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THE FASCIST CULTURAL DIAGNOSIS  
A nation in decline 
All British fascist groups subscribed to the notion that Britain was threatened by a 
rising tide of decadence, a failure of masculine vitality, and a lack of respect for 
traditional values.  Throughout the inter-war period, concerned at the apathetic 
unawareness of the general public, the fascist press made every effort to 
promulgate the message that Britain was decaying, decadent, and approaching a 
crisis that only fascism could resolve.9  During the 1920s the BF’s President, 
Brigadier General R. B. D. Blakeney, while obsessed with communism and 
Jewish conspiracy theories, was concerned that internationalism was a subtle 
means of sapping national virility.10  The Fascist Bulletin demanded a return to 
‘VIRILITY’ in order to 
put an end to the disease that has brought us to our present deplorable 
condition.  Softness, sentimentalism, flabby compromise … are 
amongst the many symptoms of the malady.11  
  
There was, however, no intellectual underpinning to the allegations of decadence 
and decline published in Fascist Bulletin, as these were largely based on the 
observations of Blakeney himself.   
Similarly the perceptions of cultural decline articulated in the pages of the 
Fascist were mainly the result of Leese’s obsession with antisemitism, though this 
was supplemented with a little Social Darwinism and the racial theories of the 
German social anthropologist, Hans K. Günther, and the British archaeologist, 
Lieutenant Colonel L. A. Waddell.  Leese simplified Waddell’s theories for the 
Fascist’s readers and claimed the natural nobility of the Nordics led them to treat 
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other races as equals, which, coupled with interbreeding, inevitably led to the 
rebellion of the lower races.12  The logic of this process was not fully explained. 
The BUF advanced a more reasoned diagnosis of Britain’s cultural 
decline.  Heavily influenced by Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, first 
published in Germany in 1918 and in England in 1926, the BUF and its press 
adopted an organic concept of culture.  Spengler’s influence can also be seen in 
BUF attitudes to democracy, liberalism, the arts, the city, authoritarian leadership, 
the ‘Will to Power’, barbarism, and the media.13  Linehan points out, however, 
that the BUF did not share Spengler’s pessimistic view that Western Civilisation 
could not be rejuvenated.14  
Evidence of decline and decadence in Britain was regularly provided in 
articles in Blackshirt and Action. The BUF’s interpretation of Spengler’s theories 
placed the First World War as the pivotal factor in Britain’s descent into 
decadence.  The first issue of Blackshirt contained an article blaming ‘our rulers’ 
for the declining state of the nation:   
They have failed to realise that they laid their world in ruins in 
1914, and that it is gone beyond all possibility of revival.  The 
post-war world is ours, not theirs!  Only the deadheads will not 
surrender what used to be their stronghold.  They prefer England 
to crumble into dust under their rule rather than let somebody else 
start salvage operations.15 
 
The article drew on a significant feature of the fascist perception of corruption 
and decline in Britain: the betrayal of the sacrifices made by soldiers and their 
families during the First World War. This issue attracted many former veterans of 
the Great War to fascism, including A. K. Chesterton and Henry Williamson, who 
had both been traumatised by their experience of war.16  The promises of ‘homes 
fit for heroes’ and the social progress implied in the extension of the franchise 
was mocked by the reality of life in the 1930s for many ex-servicemen and their 
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families.17  Chesterton wrote of the betrayal of the warrior-dead, and the ‘outrage 
and affront to the memory of [their] sacrifice.’18 T. P. Moran also expressed 
concerns for war veterans whose disillusionment grew as ‘year by year their 
condition has become more hopeless and they and their dependants more poverty-
stricken.’19   The fascist press was keen to exploit what it perceived as widespread 
disenchantment. 
 
British manhood 
During the Boer War the number of men unfit for military service was such that 
imperial prowess and national efficiency were threatened, leading to state 
intervention to improve the vitality of the nation’s men. Joanna Bourke describes 
these events as a political crisis of masculinity.20  In the aftermath of the First 
World War masculinity was perceived by some to be threatened in a more 
personal and individual way.  Men’s place in society was less secure than 
previously; their role as breadwinners was undermined by economic depression, 
industrial rationalisation, labour unrest and the increasing confidence of women in 
politics and the labour market. The stress on masculinity by British fascists during 
the inter-war period could be regarded as reasserting the role of men in a society 
undergoing rapid change.  Throughout the period there was a continued emphasis 
on men’s physical fitness. As late as 1937 a cartoon in Action showed three out of 
four army recruits as undernourished or unfit.21 
In the 1920s the BF had been deeply concerned at the alleged spread of 
degeneracy among men whose vitality was sapped by erotomania and 
neurasthenia: ‘Our most urgent necessity at the moment is for a revival of 
masculinity and a clean, healthy outlook on life.’22  The BF feared that England 
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was ‘in danger of becoming a drooping, lifeless plant,’ lacking a virile and 
aggressive patriotism capable of heroic self-sacrifice: ‘We have a kind of sleepy 
sexless patriotism.’23  Men needed to be physically fit in order to meet the drive of 
their natural instinct, as ‘in man the instinct is born to secure the safety of the 
tribe.’24   
Fascists regarded physical weakness as feminine and the attribution of 
what they considered female characteristics as an insult.  Hence members of the 
Government and other political opponents were portrayed as women, often old 
women.25 The IFL was also concerned about the ‘effeminate policy’ adopted by 
the Government.26  Within the BUF, great emphasis was placed on virility and 
masculinity as driving forces in the nation’s achievements.  Chesterton referred to 
the ‘great creative urge of the masculine spirit.’27  For his part, G. de Burgh 
Wilmot believed that masculinity was being stifled and complained that ‘today … 
“men” are ashamed to be men.’28   For Wilmot  ‘man’ and ‘warrior’ were 
synonymous, and it was time that the voices of men were heard ‘above the squeak 
and gibber of effeminate cowards and shameless decadents.’29 The masculinity 
promoted by the BUF emphasised male bonding; one story in Action told the tale 
of two close friends who fought bitterly and bloodily over a girl.  The story ends 
with a vaguely homoerotic air as the exhausted men decided that ‘wenches don’t 
amount to much’ and clasped each other’s hands.30 
 
The problem with young people today… 
Concerns about the fitness of British men to meet the challenges of the modern 
age were also reflected in attitudes to young people.  Julie Gottlieb has suggested 
that there is some truth in the BUF claims that there was an atmosphere of crisis 
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in relation to masculinity, and that part of this was a concern that young men were 
growing up without a strong sense of what it meant to be a man.31 The BUF 
proclaimed that only fascism understood youth, and youth would play an integral 
part in saving the nation from communism.  Weaknesses in the education system 
were viewed as contributing significantly to the dilemma in which young men 
found themselves and the League of Nations was alleged to be responsible for the 
‘world of unreal and idyllic calm around the youth of today, which had led to 
pacifism and a disinterest in their country.’32 
Fascists saw the post-war generation as decadent and undeserving of the 
privileges and freedoms made possible by the sacrifices of those who endured the 
horrors of the First World War.33  Blackshirt claimed that:  
True Fascists realise that the present craze for relaxing and pleasure 
will make the young generation as ignorant as the old … The 
obsession for spectatorial sport forms a grave national danger … 
Citizenship is an ACTIVE not a passive state.34 
 
Action also advised against being a spectator rather than a participant.35 Although 
the Blackshirt acknowledged that ‘the steady British character’ was more able to 
withstand the temptations of immorality and debauchery than other nations there 
was concern that the nation’s youth were overindulging in entertainment and 
drink to such an extent that the morale of the nation was being undermined.36 
Similarly, the IFL believed that ‘Post-war Society had forgotten the 
meaning of “Noblesse Oblige,” and …require[d] to be taught a lesson.’37  
However, according to Leese, it was not the fault of Britain’s youth that there was 
a ‘steadily declining standard of honesty in thought and action among the people 
of this country’; it was the lowering of social standards that permitted Jewish 
influence to dominate that had led to the degeneration of British youth.38  The BF 
also thought that the young were particularly vulnerable to exploitation:  ‘Youths 
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often think it rather fine to hold extreme views …’39  However, once the British 
worker ‘gets over the vagaries of youth’ he could be relied on as a true patriot.40 
 
Dangerous women 
Women working outside the home were considered to have a deleterious effect on 
the rearing of children and, consequently, on the nation.  Martin Durham, quoting 
the author and feminist Winifred Holtby, points out that fascism attempted to 
restrict women’s opportunities and to disadvantage them politically and 
economically ‘in the sacred names of marriage and maternity.’41  Evidence from 
the British fascist press confirms Holtby’s assessment. The IFL considered that 
women were not suitable for public life, as they had ‘little or no creative idea.’42  
A woman’s primary focus was her children, which meant she was unfitted for 
public life: ‘The instinct of women is to secure the safety of her children, and, if 
she can, her husband; it cannot act otherwise than to narrow her outlook.’43 Leese 
was convinced that women’s place was firmly in the home and it was there they 
would ‘find their true employment once more.’44  The IFL opposed the payment 
of ‘doles’ to women on the grounds that they should be maintained by their 
husbands or parents, or take domestic work.45  The BUF, again showing the 
influence of Spengler, also thought that the tendency of women to ignore their 
destiny as wives and mothers threatened the stability of the state and the future of 
the race.46  Raven Thomson, bemoaning the fact that unemployment among 
women had decreased more than among men, claimed that women were 
undercutting men in the workplace.47  In an ideal, that is fascist, world there 
would be no need for married women to work.48   
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The restrictions British fascists sought to impose on women’s lives were not 
confined to their activities outside the family.  Birth control was frequently 
attacked in the pages of the Fascist on the grounds that it represented ‘racial 
suicide.’49 In 1936, Mosley had also claimed that contraception was not in the 
national interest.50  The IFL regarded marriage and the raising of a large family as 
the ideal state for both men and women, although Leese and his wife had no 
children.  Roles within the family were clearly and inflexibly defined:  
No man worthy of the name will be governed by a woman; but all men 
need the help and influence of women; unmarried men and unmarried 
women are not living the normal life; it is the married who are 
normal.51 
 
It seems clear that British fascists viewed the behaviour of women as a potential 
threat to national stability that needed to be curbed. 
 
Anti-urbanism 
Concerns regarding the failing virility of the nation’s manhood and the baleful 
influence of intellectuals were also linked to anti-urbanism and the BUF 
expressed a distrust of city life that was seen as separating city dwellers from the 
traditions of rural life that had previously sustained them.  Again the influence of 
Spengler is clear.  City life, it was claimed, drained the vitality of, and encouraged 
effeminacy in, its residents; promoted materialism and disrupted an individual’s 
moral and spiritual compass.52 Towns and cities were described as ‘already over-
populated’ and unable to meet the needs of former country folk who were left to 
‘drift into semi-starvation.’53  Those who grew up in the cities were ‘undersized 
and under-developed’ and prone to mental and physical illnesses.54  Henry Gibbs 
claimed that Britain was breeding criminals, because in many places, including 
London and the depressed areas, children had insufficient food and had resorted 
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to stealing.55  The BUF’s anti-urbanism corresponds to the ‘negative’ strand of the 
back-to-the-land movement, identified by Dan Stone.  There is a notable degree of 
convergence between both groups, especially in their perception of the threat 
posed by the inherent dysgenic capacity of those living in cramped, dirty cities.56  
Jews were considered by both to be a particular danger. 
 
Degeneration of the arts and culture 
British fascists were also keenly concerned by developments in the arts and 
popular culture.  Reflecting their obsession with order and control in all aspects of 
society, British fascists demanded form, clarity and a manifestation of beauty and 
integrity in artistic and cultural expression.57  The nature of culture and the role of 
the arts in a fascist state were closely debated in fascist circles during the inter-
war period.  In the BUF some, including de Burgh Wilmot, subscribed to the 
Göring school of cultural appreciation; others found inspiration in ‘great’ works 
of literature, music and art. De Burgh Wilmot had demanded that all culture be 
destroyed on the grounds that it was all decadent and unmanly, a dangerous 
disease.58  This was disputed by Edwin C. Cornforth, writing in Blackshirt who, 
while accepting that ‘modern’ culture was degenerate, argued that the ‘Greeks, 
the greatest athletes of all time, were also the greatest artists.’59  According to 
George L. Mosse, establishing a link between fascism and classical images of 
masculinity was often a way for fascists to define masculinity and male beauty 
while avoiding homoeroticism.60  Sharing Spengler’s view that the arts had 
become specialised and were remote from the reality of most people’s lives, Theo 
Lang argued that politics had become detached from the arts and from ‘the culture 
of man.’  He declared the BUF’s devotion to the cultural heritage of the nation 
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and looked forward to a time when the state would be able to utilise the nation’s 
cultural power. Characteristically, he was vague as to how this was to be 
achieved.61  Anne Cutmore, a frequent contributor to the BUF press, also sprang 
to the defence of ‘culture’, by which she meant works such as ‘the paintings of 
Brangwyn, the sculpture of Jagger, and the music of Delius.’  She deplored de 
Burgh Wilmot’s inability to differentiate between what was worthwhile and what 
was not: 
Are we to destroy all the works of art in Great Britain, or the little 
muddied streams of forced and warped thinking emanating from the 
long-haired men and sandaled women in Bloomsbury’s dirtier 
boarding-houses?62   
 
Bloomsbury loomed large in the BUF’s diagnosis of cultural decline.  
Interestingly, some members of the Bloomsbury set believed that ‘people of 
action’, with a will to power and a drive to dominate and impose themselves, were 
compensating for a lack of artistic expression and constituted a threat to the 
traditional elitist perception of culture.63 The BUF shared Spengler’s view that 
Enlightenment principles led to a detachment from the real world, which in turn 
led to artifice and physical and spiritual exhaustion.  Hence intellectual activity 
was viewed with suspicion.  Disdain for the ‘Intelligentsia’ and ‘clever’ people 
cut off from reality was clearly expressed.64  As with other opponents of fascism, 
attempts were made to emasculate intellectuals figuratively.65  In addition to 
attacking their masculinity fascists often referred to the Bloomsbury Set as some 
sort of virus or disease infecting the body of the nation.66    
If there was heated debate about the value of culture in national life there 
was certainly consensus among British fascists regarding the work of the sculptor 
Jacob Epstein.  Frank Leslie, in an article calling for censorship of modern art to 
prevent damage to the morale of the nation, described Epstein’s sculptures as 
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absurdities and allegorical monstrosities.67  H. C. Daniel considered them 
representations of gross materialism, a debased and immoral form.68  Referring to 
Epstein’s Christ, Chesterton complained that ‘in the Christian belief God created 
man in his own image.  Epstein seems to have reversed the process.’69  An article 
in Action threatened to remove all ‘his monstrosities’ from Britain.70 
British fascists approached popular culture with great caution.  The concept 
of leisure does not sit well in the fascist mindset and they regarded entertainment 
for its own sake as too frivolous for the vanguard of the fascist revolution.  The 
BF distrusted the cinema, considering it as alien-controlled and ‘artfully utilised 
to give at least some impulse on the revolutionary path during the course of an 
evening.’71  Similarly, the IFL regarded the film industry as Jewish controlled.72  
‘Junius’, writing in the Blackshirt, described Jewish influence in the cinema as a 
threat to British international prestige, particularly in the Empire, and claimed that 
British films could be successful if the Jews were cleared out of the industry.73  
The weekly newsreels also came in for criticism, and Fox Movietone News were 
accused of censoring their content in response to pressure from Jewish interests.74  
British fascists also deplored the American domination of the cinema and 
complained that many films sneered at sex and motherhood.75  ‘Alien’ films were 
said to exploit viewers’ animal instincts.76   
Linehan has linked much of the British fascists’ attitude to the cinema to the 
discourse of cultural elitism and its critique of the mass media.77  Cinema was 
perceived as a method of escaping the realities of post-war life, luring the 
population into a hedonistic avoidance of their duty to the nation in the fascist 
battle against decadence and decline.  More dangerously, British fascists believed, 
the cinema not only distracted young people from the ideals of duty and service, it 
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also corrupted and perverted them.78  Excessive eroticism, the glorification of 
criminals and the distortion of history were all identified as factors contributing to 
the undermining of moral values and a proper respect for authority.79   
Similarly, the BBC was regarded as being under ‘alien’ influence, producing 
radio programmes that did not reflect the listeners’ interests.80  Fascists 
complained that there were too few British performers on the radio, and the 
majority of the programmes were so dreary that many listeners were switching to 
the more cheerful music of continental stations.81  The broadcasting of a 
Bessarabian orchestra particularly incensed one fascist critic.82   
The fascist press presented a picture of Britain as a country in decline, 
reeling under a combined assault on its traditional values and culture from 
degenerates, intellectuals, socialists, and misguided women, whose activities 
served to weaken the nation and advance Jewish interests. 
 
THE FASCIST PRESCRIPTION 
Revitalising the nation 
Fully subscribing to fascism’s palingenetic myth, British fascists believed only 
they could regenerate and revitalise the nation.83  Despite their heartfelt 
commitment to a perception of Britain as a nation in terminal decline, a 
perception that drew deeply on Spengler’s vision of Western Civilisation, they 
remained equally committed to the optimistic belief that fascism would rescue 
Britain.  This departure from Spengler’s thinking can be seen as resulting from 
fascism’s inherent belief in revolutionary rebirth.  Roger Griffin explains fascist 
analysis as based on a cyclical rather than linear perception of time.84  As the 
situation worsened, the time of renewal came closer. 
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British fascists insisted that national renewal could be achieved only 
through sacrifice and service, a belief that was shared by embryonic fascist groups 
such as the English Mistery and the English Array.85  The IFL proclaimed that 
‘[t]rue civilisation by its very nature demands discipline and a certain sacrifice of 
personal liberty in return for greater blessings.’86  The acknowledged aim of 
democratic civilisation was to achieve the greatest good for the greatest number, 
but for fascists these perceptions were illusionary, real progress was made 
possible only by the rejection of materialism and acceptance of a life of sacrifice 
and service.  The Fascist Bulletin made clear to members that fascism entailed 
‘personal service and self-denial’ and that to merit the title ‘Fascist’, members had 
‘to sacrifice something for the cause, to work for it, and to get something done!’87  
The IFL called for the ‘[f]ormation of a new governing caste of character and 
service.’88  In a Blackshirt article headlined ‘Liberal Thought Is Spiritual 
Slavery’, Cornforth argued that ‘submitting to the discipline of principles of life 
greater and wider than our personal desires’ leads to true freedom.89  For E. D. 
Randall there was a mystical, even religious, element to the sacrifice and self-
denial demanded by fascism, ‘the Blackshirt lives his creed’ and ‘the creed we 
serve teaches us that struggle is ennobling and that its action on the soul of man 
imparts a sacramental strength.’  Chesterton reminded BUF members that they 
were dedicated to the ‘sweat and agony of labour’ and the building of the fascist 
state was ‘the cardinal purpose of their lives.’90  The standard of living to be 
enjoyed in a future fascist state would depend on the service an individual gave to 
the state.  ‘Paradoxical as it may seem, freedom is dependent on self-sacrifice.’91 
Both the IFL and the BUF saw the state as transcending social divisions and 
envisioned a future fascist Britain as a classless meritocracy based, in the case of 
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the IFL, on an aristocracy of ‘character, service and brains’ with the emphasis on 
‘character’ rather than ‘brains.’92  The qualification reflects the movement’s 
distrust of intellectuals. The BUF claimed to rely on a combination of patriotism 
and talent to ensure that ‘[o]pportunity shall be open to all, but privilege to none.’  
Position and reward were to be restricted to those with talent who served the state, 
without regard to class.93  The concept of the fascist state as a meritocracy was 
repeatedly stressed:  
He or she who works the hardest, and best serves the state, will 
receive the greatest benefits, but no man will be allowed to acquire 
or control, by luck, accident, or fraud huge fortunes which 
necessarily impoverish the rest of the nation.94 
 
 Loyalty to Britain was the acid test, ‘in this matter as in all others, we know no 
class distinction.’95  Again and again the BUF stressed this alleged lack of class 
division.96 The corporate state was to provide the mechanisms for class co-
operation. 
There was a belief in comradeship and classlessness that was born out of a 
romanticised perception of the experience of the First World War, and the BUF 
were keen to stress that in the Blackshirt movement ‘[m]en of all ages and types 
and classes come gladly together, just as in the war …’97  Though the author of 
fascist songs such as Mosley and Britain Awake, the young Blackshirt E. D. 
Randall, was unlikely to have had any first-hand experience of the comradeship of 
the trenches he was inspired by the idea it represented, declaring: 
We are proud to lead the vanguard  
Of the Nation’s risen youth, 
In the classless revolution,  
In the comradeship of truth.98 
 
The wearing of a uniform was seen as a sign that class was irrelevant in 
fascism.  The IFL defended the wearing of a uniform as it was cheap, comfortable 
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and smart, as well as testing the courage of new recruits who had to wear it ‘in the 
face of public ignorance.’99  For the BUF, the uniform, particularly the black shirt, 
represented something almost mystical; it was a symbol of unity, comradeship 
and classlessness, signifying the modernity and strength of the movement.100  The 
BUF was insistent that the wearing of the black shirt broke down class barriers; 
certainly, it symbolised the movement’s anti-liberalism and the submersion of the 
individual.101  Philip M. Coupland has shown, however, that there were a variety 
of uniform styles and insignia reflecting the complex hierarchy of the BUF.  
According to the BUF these differences represented only the degree of service 
given to the cause, but the quality and type of material used varied considerably.  
The BUF itself sold two classes of shirt, some members had their shirts tailor 
made, and Mosley was said to wear silk.102  Despite the rhetoric, class still 
mattered in the BUF.103 
 
The New Man 
The uniform also heightened the masculine image of British fascists who 
continually emphasised aspects of masculinity relating to strength, hardness and 
fortitude.  While their opponents were portrayed as weak, soft and feminine the 
fascists themselves were always shown as hard, vigorous, and determined 
looking.  For British fascists the revival of masculinity underpinned national 
renewal.  One Royal Navy cadet prescribed fascism as the answer to feeble 
leadership:  ‘Fascism is the embodiment of what our calling needs – manhood in 
authority.’104   
The revitalisation of the nation would not be an easy task and violence and 
aggression were perceived as healthy expressions of the male character.  
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Chesterton described the ‘Blackshirt legions’ as ‘the soldiers of Britain’s civic 
life.’105  The BUF maintained a low-key admiration for what it saw as the robust 
methods of continental fascism.  There was tolerance of the ‘boyish brutality of 
the young Nazis’ and the penalties of the rod and castor oil, and sound 
spanking.106  A later article by ‘Lucifer’ commented on the fear of the 
parliamentary parties at events in Germany, adding ‘even now the faint odour of 
castor-oil is wafted to them in their dreams.’107  In a similar vein Randall turned 
criticism of the BUF’s reputation for violence into a positive characteristic: ‘We 
glory in our unsubtlety, in our vital sanity.’ He celebrated their reputation as thugs 
and louts ‘if these words mean that we are proud to be men, fearless in fight, 
dauntless in faith, steadfast in comradeship and resolute in allegiance!’108 
 The ideal of manhood was not easily achieved and preparation for the 
struggle to come included physical training and sporting activity.  Blackshirt 
called on BUF members to ‘live like athletes.’109  The BUF was keen that 
members be ‘players not spectators.’110  In a report from a BUF summer camp, 
Howard French, described the men as physically and mentally fit, ‘their bodies 
are tanned, their muscles are supple and their minds are in tune.’111  However, 
photographs of BUF members in swimwear taken at various summer camps do 
not confirm this assessment.112  Michael Spurr has noted the significance of sport 
for the BUF in defining both the male and national identity, pointing to Mosley’s 
claims that sportsmanship and athleticism were integral to fascism.  Spurr 
develops the argument, posited earlier by Tony Collins, that by emphasising the 
BUF’s adherence to the mainstream sporting ethos of ‘Muscular Christianity’ as 
promoted in public schools, youth organisations and the ‘Boy’s Own’ type of 
publication, while contrasting this with their continued denigration of Jewish 
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sportsmanship, the BUF attempted to identify itself with accepted constructs of 
British masculinity and morality.   The emphasis on sportsmanship allowed the 
BUF to create a specifically British image of fascist masculinity, distinct from 
that of Italy and Germany.113 
 
Revolutionary youth  
Concurrent with their attempt to create a distinctly British form of fascist 
masculinity, the BUF was adamant that British youth needed to be inspired with 
British ideals.  They were convinced that schools were failing to provide that 
inspiration, and consequently the education system needed to be adapted to 
prepare young Britons for the challenges of the twentieth century.114  Blackshirt 
advocated a revolutionary new education policy for boys up to the age of 
eighteen, however, there was no mention of education for girls.  Until they 
reached the age of seven boys were to be introduced only to play and amusement, 
although their nutrition and general health would be monitored.  Between seven 
and fourteen they would devote their time to developing their physique, playing 
non-competitive games, swimming, reading, writing, and drawing.  At fourteen 
academic study would be introduced and the decision as to whether the youth 
would go into a trade or the professions would be made and his education tailored 
accordingly.115  Physical education for youth seemed to be a priority within the 
BUF and the Government’s failure to implement an effective system of physical 
training in schools was berated.116  The BUF also promoted the Blackshirt camps, 
stressing that boys who grew up under the inspiration of Mosley’s leadership 
would not neglect Britain. 
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A woman’s place 
Gottlieb’s insightful analysis of women in British fascist movements highlights 
the important role of women in the BUF.  Their enthusiasm was a significant 
factor in the growth of the movement and, in its attempts to escape the political 
margins, the BUF depended heavily on their support.  Theoretically, the BUF 
adopted a more progressive attitude to women than their German and Italian 
counterparts, though Gottlieb suggests that support for female empowerment was 
unlikely to have continued in practice.117  Indeed, developments within the BUF 
itself support the view that, in practice, attitudes to women were more reactionary 
than in theory.  Between 1935 and 1938 some of the women who held office in 
BUF, including the chief organiser of the Women’s Section, Mary Richardson, 
prospective parliamentary candidate, Sylvia Morris, and the BUF North West 
London organiser, H. Carrington-Wood, became disillusioned with the BUF’s 
dictatorial internal structure.118  During this period the Women’s Section was 
increasingly marginalised by what Gottlieb has described as ‘the BUF’s male-
youth-gang mentality and [its] reactive masculinism.’119 
Certainly, in relation to women’s issues, the content of the BUF press during 
the late 1930s did not reflect a vibrant and progressive movement.  The subject of 
education for girls received scant attention, though Anne Brock-Griggs, the BUF 
Women’s Propaganda Officer, did argue that they should be educated up to the 
age of fifteen and not allowed to leave school at fourteen to help at home or take 
up employment.  She made the case that raising the school age was ‘vital, not 
only for the sake of our children, who must be trained for future citizenship, but 
also for the welfare of the community as a whole.’120  The type of education to be 
provided was not specified, but clearly girls were to be trained to serve the nation. 
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Brock-Griggs, while stressing the importance of women in the corporate 
state, was frequently vague as to the specifics of their role.121  They would be able 
to influence the fixing of wages and prices, through their representation on the 
industrial corporation, but how much influence they would have compared to that 
of the employers and government is not clear.122  Many of her columns were 
related to family and household concerns and emphasised the significance of 
motherhood.123  The marginalisation of women’s interests within the BUF is 
demonstrated by the intermittent appearance of the women’s page in Action and 
its the positioning at the rear of the paper.124 
The BUF often stated that married women would be allowed to work, if they 
wished to do so, and they would be paid on an equitable basis with men, but, as 
the corporate state would ensure higher wages for men, there would be no need 
for them to work.125  Raven Thomson made clear that while it was not the 
intention of BUF policy to ‘thrust women out of industry and the professions’ that 
would, inevitably, be the result of the higher wages that would be provided by the 
corporate state.126  It appears that the BUF’s advocacy of equal pay for equal 
work was not driven by a sense of fairness, but by its desire to prevent employers 
hiring women because they could be paid less than men.  
Unsurprisingly, the BUF also suggested women’s natural role was the 
family and domestic matters.127  Blackshirt asserted that fascism would appeal to 
women, especially mothers, who lived through their children and who would 
appreciate the saner, fairer world that fascism would provide:  
There are questions such as health, housing, and education which are 
almost entirely women’s province, yet up to now have always been 
decided by theoretical experts with a total lack of practical 
experience, instead of mothers whom they effect.128 
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Fascist perceptions of the relationships within marriage are illustrated by a 
short story in Action, in which the League of Nations is mocked.  One of its main 
characters is a young wife who disobeys her husband and misguidedly sets off to 
a foreign country as part of a group of pacifists hoping to prevent a war.  Her 
husband follows and rescues her, also saving her from the spanking meted out to 
the other pacifists by the natives of the country. The wife, while appearing 
grateful, manages to transfer the blame to her husband for letting her leave 
England.129  The story feeds perceptions of women as childlike, wayward, 
manipulative and in need of a firm hand.  In practice, the BUF preferred to keep 
women and men segregated.  Women had their own, separate, martial arts and 
first aid classes and were only allowed in the Black House, as guests, on the third 
Wednesday of the month.130  The first Blackshirt summer camp, held at Pagham 
in 1933, was open to all BUF members and families were encouraged to attend, 
but the 1934 camp was for male members only.131  Subsequently, separate camps 
were held for men and women, with the, shorter, women’s camp being held at the 
end of the summer.  
The concept of separate holiday camps for men and women might have 
appealed to Leese, who occasionally took his holidays apart from his wife.132  
Unquestionably the IFL’s attitude to women was more rigid than that of the BUF.  
IFL policy was emphatic that a woman’s place was in the home: 
Let our employers hire male labour wherever possible, and women 
will then be able to find their true employment once more.  The true 
solution to female unemployment is in finding work for men so that 
they can afford to marry.133 
 
Apart from advocating the abolition of universal suffrage, the IFL had little else to 
say about women. 
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Back to the Land 
The summer camps were a minor part of the BUF’s attempt to encourage 
members to live the healthy life.  All British fascist groups had expressed 
concerns regarding the fitness of the nation’s men, and the IFL and, especially, 
the BUF related this to the evils of city life.  The IFL advocated a policy of de-
urbanisation as the first of four steps designed to improve the health of the nation. 
The second step, apparently inspired by Social Darwinism, was the reduction of 
humanitarianism, ‘permitting the natural forces of nature to assert themselves.’ 
The third was the introduction of strict laws to prevent inter-race marriage 
between Britons and Jews, and the final step required the sterilisation of those 
carrying hereditary diseases.134 
The BUF was not so clinical.  Linehan has shown that members of the BUF 
had a nostalgic, romanticised view of rural life.  They perceived it as offering a 
healthy way of life, balanced by the natural rhythms of the countryside, and 
preserving the essence of British character and culture.  The BUF’s reverence for 
nature was most tellingly expressed by Henry Williamson.135  This nostalgic 
desire to preserve and restore a romanticised rural life was shared by Jorian Jenks, 
who wrote the countryside column in Action, and argued for the retention of small 
farms and their associated crafts.136  Mosley claimed that those raised in the 
country were ‘steady virile stock’ essential to the nation’s survival.  While the 
BUF’s perception of the city relied heavily on Spengler’s pessimistic assessment, 
Linehan argues that they did not share his terminal prognosis.137  Linehan’s 
reasoning is supported by Chesterton’s description of the BUF’s plans to remodel 
the cities to provide a healthier environment.138  Despite the romanticised visions 
articulated by back-to-the-land advocates, such as Williamson, BUF policy relied 
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on science and technology to revitalise the country and revive its economic 
fortunes.139  This contradiction is compatible with the concept of ‘reactionary 
modernism’ developed by Jeffrey Herf to explain the dichotomy between the anti-
modernist, irrationalist and romantic nature of Nazi ideology and the rational and 
pragmatic use of modern technology in practice.140 
The BUF’s interest in the concepts of the back-to-the-land movement and 
the recognition of common concerns led to discussions on co-operation and a 
possible merger with the English Mistery and later the English Array.   Despite 
their mutual neuroses, there were such fundamental differences in their plans for 
government that alliance was impossible, though there was no objection to 
instances of co-operation at a local level.  The most notable areas of difference 
were the BUF’s intention to create a dictatorship rather than strengthen the role of 
the monarchy and the aristocracy, and the BUF’s plans to centralise authority.  
The BUF’s tendency to pander to women was also a point of contention.141 
 
Fascist culture 
British fascists were convinced that Britain’s cultural life was as much in need of 
a thorough overhaul as its political and economic institutions and they offered a 
positive, albeit somewhat vague and often conflicting, approach to rejuvenating 
the cultural life of the nation.  Cornforth was confident that a fascist state would 
‘create a culture that will be a living flame in the heart of every man and woman 
of our race.’ The essential spirit of this revived culture was to be  ‘A manful 
appreciation of Life.’142  Similarly, Cutmore believed it was still possible for great 
art to be produced, ‘works of such a power and magnificence, of such 
overwhelming sincerity that they will irresistibly draw the people towards 
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them.’143  Lang proposed that the arts should be at the heart of the fascist 
administration, binding ‘government to our national cultural expression.’ The 
fascist state would support men whose work was ‘soundly based upon great 
national pride; men to whom art is something vital, something real, something 
worthy of a nation’s effort.’144 
Fascists envisioned a film industry in Britain that would be free from 
Jewish influence from production to exhibition.  British films would dominate the 
cinema screens and Hollywood would no longer be allowed to corrupt the nation 
or undermine its traditions and institutions.  Henry Gibbs urged that British films 
should reflect the true vitality of British life.  Documentaries, or dramas based on 
the lives and work of the people of Britain were what was required.145  Linehan 
notes that the films that Gibbs admired fitted well with fascist preoccupations 
with back-to-the-land images of hardy folk, close to nature, and uncorrupted by 
modernity.146  Films that uplifted the spirit and enriched the life of the nation, 
especially those that had heroic and patriotic themes, were also to be 
encouraged.147  Nazi Germany was pointed to as a model for a revived British 
film industry.  That German and Italian cinema continued to show the escapist 
and inconsequential films that the audiences favoured, and overt propaganda films 
represented only a small proportion of those shown, received less attention.148  It 
is unlikely that British fascists would have been able to alter the nation’s 
cinematic tastes with any more success than their continental counterparts. 
British fascists deplored the appearance of foreign performers on the 
British stage and urged more state control.149  While the mechanics of the 
proposals for bringing about the nation’s cultural rebirth remained vague, the 
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intention was clear: the state would regulate all aspects of the nation’s cultural 
life. 
 
THE MAINSTREAM PRESS: CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS  
The state of the nation  
The mainstream press did not fully share the fascists’ perception of national 
decline.  There was no sense of crisis, just an awareness that the times were 
changing and not always for the better.  Alison Light has suggested that some 
inter-war novels evoke a romantic Toryism that conjures up a past that is nobler, 
more exciting and less hemmed-in than life between the wars.150  Some articles in 
the quality press also, particularly the Tory papers, created that sense of 
celebration of, and yearning for, a more glorious time.  There was no expression 
of anguish or any deep-seated disillusionment with the status quo.  Throughout 
the inter-war period the leader columns of the Times and the Telegraph continued 
to support the Government on most issues and the overall tone of the papers was 
one of maintaining the existing state of affairs, while encouraging considered and 
moderate improvement.151   There is no evidence to suggest that the Tory quality 
press or its readers thought the post-war generation was endangering the nation by 
mindlessly pursuing pleasure.  The papers remained committed to liberalism. 
The editorials of the popular press were more frenetic and frequently 
conveyed the impression that the Government’s actions, or its lack of action, were 
either driving the nation into decline, or failing to arrest the waning of Britain’s 
power and prestige.152  Other sections of these papers also expressed criticism of 
the Government.153  Nonetheless, there were also articles that contradicted the 
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claims of gloom and decline. J. D. Strange, returning to England after several 
years abroad, challenged ‘this talk of the old country going to the dogs.’154 
Rather than criticising the pursuit of pleasure, the popular press 
encouraged it.  Its attention was not as strictly focussed on national and 
international issues as the quality press. There was a noticeable concentration on 
the domestic.155  Lifestyle articles tended to be aspirational.156  In keeping with 
the growth in disposable household income and the rising number of women with 
their own income, consumerism was celebrated.157  Features and regular gossip 
columns kept readers up-to-date with the doings of the great, the good and the 
downright notorious.158  Advice and lifestyle columns were popular, offering 
encouragement to those ill-at-ease in a changing, more flexible, society where 
gender roles and social class were less clearly and rigidly defined. The popular 
papers occasionally flirted with anti-liberal ideas, in their admiration for the 
accomplishments of Hitler and Mussolini or, in discussing the advantages of 
dictatorship or the failings of parliamentary democracy, but they always returned 
to the liberal fold. 
 
Mainstream society and class distinction 
Unlike the fascist press, the quality papers reflected and reinforced the existing 
class hierarchy.  Regular court and society columns reported the activities of the 
aristocracy.  The names of those who were to be received by the King or Queen at 
Buckingham Palace that day were published in the daily ‘Court Circular’ columns 
of the Times and the Telegraph.  Still, there was an acknowledgement that for a 
number of readers some accommodation had to be made in the attempt to retain 
the material standards and values of the previous generation.  An article in the 
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Times, accepted that space in the family home was ‘generally becoming more and 
more limited.’  Lack of space in ‘small households’, such as the three storey 
Georgian house described in the article, made planning a nursery difficult.159  The 
Times also ran a series of recipes for small households.160  The readers of the 
quality press were assumed to know how to behave in polite society and there 
was, consequently, a dearth of articles giving advice on etiquette.   
The popular press was less hidebound by the class system, as befitted their 
more aspirational content.  Celebrities featured heavily, although the Mail 
retained its court column and the paper featured the aristocracy in the gossip 
columns.161  The gossip columns in the Mirror also kept readers up-to-date with 
the engagements, marriages, and changes of hairstyle of the aristocracy and well-
to-do. The Mirror’s tone was perhaps a little less respectful than other papers.162  
Although in the early to mid 1930s there was a preponderance of aristocratic 
gossip, celebrities and politicians also graced the Mirror’s gossip columns.163  
The ‘Talk of London’ column, written by ‘The Dragoman’ in the Express, 
contained a mix of society, celebrity and sporting gossip.164  ‘The Dragoman’ also 
had a tendency to mock the eccentricities and less honourable aspects of the 
aristocracy.165  As the decade progressed, however, celebrities generated much 
more coverage in the popular press than did the aristocracy. Throughout the 
period the activities of the film industry were of particular interest.166    
The popular press promoted the notion of a more socially mobile society 
with a less rigid class structure.  But, despite some support for a more fluid class 
system the popular press did not overtly share the fascists’ professed desire for a 
classless society. On one occasion, however, the Express came close to fascist, or 
possibly socialist, views on class. Over the 1930s the paper’s attitude to ‘high 
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society’ became more dismissive.167  In 1938 after announcing that the Express 
did not print social gossip, the paper went on to claim that readers were not 
interested in the activities and clothes of the members of ‘Society’ before turning 
what had been a criticism of gossip into a critique of the class system arguing that 
it created two nations with nothing in common and that, for the good of the nation 
and their own benefit, the rich and the proud should be dissuaded from the view 
that ‘their sole business was the (more or less) stately consumption of goods 
created by other people’s labour.’168  Despite this, the social and fashion activities 
of the royal family remained newsworthy, as a front-page headline declaring ‘The 
Queen wears a new crinoline gown’ demonstrates.169   
The Mail never wavered in its interest in the aristocracy and in March 
1938 lauded the start of the London Season and its new crop of debutantes.170  
The paper did, however, reject the social observation of class boundaries, Anne 
Temple recommended that a reader who had ‘risen in the social world’ should not 
try and hide her origins but instead take pride in them.171   For those readers who 
were not at ease in their social setting, the Mail offered advice on etiquette and 
how to avoid the embarrassment of a social faux pas.172  For the popular press, 
class became less significant as the 1930s progressed, and they engaged with, and 
encouraged, a more dynamic and varied social structure. 
 
Mainstream perceptions of masculinity 
Mainstream perceptions of masculinity were more diverse and complex than those 
of British fascists.  Generally the quality press did not adopt a didactic approach 
in their presentation of the masculine ethos.  The tenor of editorials, news reports 
and articles reflected the culture of the public school, and was reminiscent of 
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‘muscular Christianity’, an expression of maleness inspired by constructions of 
nineteenth century imperial masculinity.  Sonya Rose described this as ‘tempered 
British masculinity’, a combination of strength, endurance, restraint and 
chivalry.173  This perception of masculinity crossed class-boundaries, but it was 
not the only pattern for male behaviour available in the mainstream press. 
While male skills and strength were unashamedly celebrated, and the 
extensive coverage of men’s sporting activities demonstrated the significance of 
sport in defining manliness, the popular press offered a variety of images of 
masculinity.174  Men about town such as ‘the Dragoman’, Charles Graves and 
Tom Driberg, who as well as writing the William Hickey column in the Express 
also provided articles under his own name, were prominently featured.175  
‘Character’ was perceived as important to success for a man; courage, hard work 
and self-belief would enable a man to overcome life’s handicaps.176  
Advertisements presented handsome, healthy young men; some epitomised fresh 
faced boyish charm, others the strong willed type with jutting jaw.177 There was 
also the slightly older and more sophisticated man about town, or, contrastingly, 
the rugged outdoor type.178   Experts, or authority figures, such as doctors were 
portrayed, in advertisements as distinguished, older men often wearing glasses.179   
Cartoon strips provided other images: timid men dominated by their 
wives, mature office managers locked into a war of attrition with the office boy, 
men who were not as smart as they thought they were and were manipulated by 
their wives, and the lantern-jawed heroes of the adventure strips.180  ‘The Pater’ 
comic strip in the Mirror featured a short, fat balding man well into middle age, 
whose tall, elegant wife regularly physically abused him.181  The ‘Little Wife’ 
cartoon in the Mail appeared to be in a similar vein, but there was genuine 
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affection shown between Eve and her husband; her manipulation of him was 
gentle and without malice.  More significantly, there was no violence or public 
affront to his dignity.182  The Mirror’s ‘Useless Eustace’ cartoons also starred a 
short, fat, balding man who was always in trouble or misunderstanding his 
situation.183  These cartoons illustrated a perception that middle class men had 
less control in their homes and work environments than their fathers and 
grandfathers. 
Although there was a growing trend for fathers to be more involved with 
their children’s lives, the tradition of emotional distance continued to be prevalent 
amongst those men exposed to the public school ethos.  Indeed, it was thought 
newsworthy that an Eton housemaster was in the habit of publicly embracing his 
sons after they had achieved some athletic success.184 
In February 1933 the Mail and the Express both published articles on 
modern fatherhood.  The Mail article was written by Miles Malleson, an actor, 
dramatist, and father of two sons by his second wife, Joan, a doctor who 
specialised in contraception and advocated the legalisation of abortion.  Malleson 
claimed that modern fathers took a much greater interest in their children and 
adopted a more involved approach to their upbringing, taking their ‘full share of 
looking after the child from its earliest days.’ Though ‘full share’ was perhaps an 
exaggeration, as Malleson was quick to qualify the statement: ‘Not perhaps, in 
food and clothes and baby ailments, but in his play hours, his questionings, and 
his first lessons.’185  So, he avoided the boring and unpleasant parts but took a full 
share in the fun and interesting aspects of the child’s life. 
The Express article, by an anonymous ‘nursery specialist’, recommended 
that helping with the child would strengthen the bond between them, and the 
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father would gain affection and respect.186  Fathers were encouraged to have an 
active involvement in the care of their children, and to do this intelligently they 
needed to ‘learn how to fulfil their share of responsibility for the health and 
happiness of their children.’187  An increased and active interest in the care of 
their children was part of the ‘domestication’ of men, which also included an 
involvement in housework, home improvement, shopping and shared leisure 
activities.188  There is nothing in the fascist press that reflected mainstream 
recognition of, and moderate support for, men’s greater involvement in domestic 
activities. 
This image of the domesticated male is very different from that portrayed 
in the fiction printed in the popular press.  In the Express, Sapper’s Bulldog 
Drummond is presented as a heroic Englishman, but he is antisemitic, violent, and 
acts illegally to catch and punish criminals.189 In Sapper’s stories brutality is 
relished and there is more than a hint of sadism; foreign equates with evil, and his 
enemies include the Bolshevik, the ‘dago’, and especially the Jew.190  Physically 
he is represented as strong, clean-cut, and firm-jawed.  A man of action for whom 
the end outweighs the means.  He is a figure who would not look out of place in 
the pages of the fascist press, yet he and his friends are presented as role models 
for British youth. 
 
Mainstream concern for youth 
Gottlieb has suggested that there was a lively debate in the British press regarding 
the nation’s youth, related to the ongoing crisis of masculinity that the BUF were 
articulating.191  Yet the sources she uses are not from the national daily 
newspapers and there is no evidence of the debate in either the popular or quality 
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press at this time.  Even the sources relating to Rothermere’s promotion of youth 
and the Blackshirts are from publications with limited circulation.  The first, an 
article  written by the dramatist Hugh Ross Williamson, who at the time was in 
his early thirties, was part of a series published in the weekly magazine Everyman 
reflecting ‘the modern point of view.’ There was no reference to perceptions of 
masculinity.  Williamson concentrated on describing how ‘youth’ viewed politics.  
According to Williamson the only viable choice was between fascism and 
communism.  His choice was clearly for fascism.192  The second source, Malcolm 
MacDonald’s reasoned response to Lord Rothermere, also provides a fitting 
rebuttal to Williamson’s arguments.  MacDonald was careful not to dismiss the 
aims and potential of the Blackshirt movement out of hand, while convincingly 
casting doubt on Rothermere’s arguments.  His most significant point was that 
any benefits to be gained from living in a fascist Britain were uncertain, and the 
price, intolerance and political repression, was too high.193 
During the mid 1920s there had been some concern in the Tory popular 
press about effeminacy and idleness in young men, though Bingham suggests that 
this was largely an expression of opposition to the ‘dole’.194  Additionally, the 
mainstream press did report, over a number of years, meetings of the National 
Association of Schoolmasters (NAS) that showed some teachers were concerned 
that boys were being taught by women. They also argued that the heads of mixed 
schools should always be men as most men ‘would not accept service under 
women.’195  However, this issue was not of major public interest and was not 
generally discussed in the leader columns.196  Joanna Bourke has suggested that 
the issue was being stirred up by a group of ex-army teachers and PT instructors 
who resented what they regarded as female intrusion into their area of 
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expertise.197  The National Union of Teachers did not share the Schoolmasters’ 
concerns, and advocated ‘that appointments should be made regardless of sex.’198 
There were also occasional articles that raised concerns that women were 
gaining ascendancy over men. R. D. Blumenfeld, editor of the Express, observed 
that:  
I have been watching a strange metamorphosis for some time, and I 
am coming more and more to the belief that if the young men do not 
soon take a good pull at themselves they will be left behind by very 
type of woman whose only qualification thirty or forty years ago was 
to play “The Maidens Prayer” on the piano or recite “The Charge of 
the Light Brigade” in the drawing room.199 
   
Interestingly, he did not suggest that women should return to the position of thirty 
years ago, instead he urged young men to work harder and recommended that 
parents ensured that their sons were taught a trade or profession.  The view that 
gender had less impact on ability than had previously been thought was also 
supported by the educationalist Sir Henry Hadow.200  
Other echoes of fascist sentiment appeared in the popular press, even 
when discussing children.  The literary editor of the Express, Reginald Pound, 
having described his young sons’ enjoyment of the historical adventures of Drake, 
Nelson, and Clive, adopted the terminology of the fascists when he mentioned 
‘falsetto-voiced friends’ who ‘deplore the kindling in young minds of the imperial 
spirit.’  He also referred to ‘emasculates’ who challenged the attributes that had 
built the empire.  Unlike the fascists, however, he admitted that the challenge had 
some validity, since there were ‘dark stains on the pages of history.’201 
At first glance the aims of the British National Cadet Association, which 
included the mental, moral and physical training of boys to form their character 
and develop principles of patriotism and good citizenship, and to fit them to assist 
in the defence of home and country in the event of a national emergency, seem 
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reminiscent of fascist youth policy.  However, Lieutenant General Sir Hugh 
Jeudwine, Chairman of the British National Cadet Association and a former 
Director General of the Territorial Army, saw no conflict between liberal 
individualism and patriotism.  While discussing service, patriotism, comradeship, 
will and power, all words that resonate with the fascist mindset, he highlighted a 
significant difference.  
Through … team spirit and comradeship a youth can be led to practise 
good citizenship, to answer the call to service, not as in totalitarian 
states by repression of individuality, but by the expression of that 
individuality towards a common end.  For the young must think for 
themselves and not accept as incontrovertible opinions put forward by 
the generation that is passing away or follow blindly the paths they 
have signposted.202 
 
The education and training of youth were significant issues but, apart from 
Rothermere’s polemics during his support of the Blackshirts, the mainstream 
press did not promote youth as the remedy for the nation’s ills in the way the 
fascist press did. 
 
The role of women 
If youth was the solution, according to the fascist press, then women were a 
notable part of the problem; again this was not a view that was fully shared by the 
mainstream press. Women did not make much of an impression in the quality 
press.  The Times was the only national daily newspaper not to have a regular 
women’s page. There were articles about fashion and columns relating to the 
home and garden, particularly in the Telegraph, but there was little comment on 
women’s role in either the nation or the home. A notable exception was a short 
but sincere plea for better pay and conditions for nurses by the medical 
correspondent of the Times.203  The overriding impression of women’s role given 
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by the Daily Telegraph was that of the traditional homemaker keeping a careful 
eye on the household budget.   
The careers advice offered to the mature female readers of the Telegraph 
was entirely related to the home. Positions as décor consultants, receptionists in 
estate agencies or large blocks of flats, or emergency housekeepers were 
considered suitable for lady readers whose circumstances required them to find 
employment.204  It appears that the women who read the Telegraph were assumed 
to be confident in their roles as household mangers and mothers, needing no 
advice on the latter and requiring little more than suggestions for putting a 
modern gloss on traditional methods for the former.  Lack of coverage indicates 
that the state of one’s marriage was a purely private affair and not an appropriate 
subject for the nation’s breakfast table. 
Similarly, the Times, apart from the occasional appearance of the ‘Mrs 
Miniver’ column between 1937 and 1939, did not concern itself with the role of 
women in the family or the wider world. According to Alison Light ‘Mrs 
Miniver’ represented conservatism in its broadest sense.  The column emphasised 
the quiet, private, life and celebrated the known and familiar.205 The Minivers’ 
fictional marriage appeared companionate, they were equal partners but there was 
a degree of separation that suggested a modern version of the concept of separate 
spheres.  Mrs Miniver was content, socially adept and enjoyed home and 
motherhood without being ‘lost’ in her children.206  She was the fictional 
representation of a woman both self-contained and self-centred, sure of the 
rightness of her upper middle-class values and her perception of the world.207  
Although the Tory quality press regarded women as homemakers, this was in a 
purely private sense, and was not regarded as serving the state. 
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In the popular press women were much more prominent, more vibrant.   
Bingham argues that the popular press were motivated by the need to attract 
female readers in order to increase circulation and to generate revenue from 
advertising.208  There were numerous articles on what was expected of the modern 
women in a variety of circumstances.209  The papers reported, and the leader 
columns discussed, issues relating to women, for example, equal pay or the loss of 
British nationality when marrying a foreigner.210  Comment was usually 
supportive, if somewhat patronising.  The popular press provided a platform for 
women to raise the issues that concerned them, and Ellen Wilkinson MP wrote 
several articles for the Express.211  Striking a less than sisterly note, Elsie Ganner, 
also writing in the Express, insisted that women made bad employers, being 
suspicious of, and unsympathetic to, their female workers.212   
The popular press adopted a more positive view of working women than 
that of the fascists, and encouraged women in the workforce in a variety of 
roles.213  The Mail reported they were soon likely to be gaining employment in 
flying schools, as ten women in Middlesex had recently passed the tests necessary 
for a pilot’s licence.214  The paper also noted that despite their wages being 
generally fifty to sixty-one percent lower than men’s, women were more 
productive than men if work required dexterity or alertness. 215  Ann Baxter, in an 
article in the Express, urging women to fight wage cuts, also argued for women to 
be paid a wage they could live on without having to rely on their parents or 
husbands.  She made the valid point that the war had ‘made many women the 
mainstay of their families.’216    
There was a definite sense in the popular press that the dynamics of 
marriage were changing and love and marriage were frequently discussed.217   
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The Express often ran articles discussing modern attitudes to both, including a 
series that analysed readers’ responses to a questionnaire on the reasons their 
marriages were happy or unhappy.  Wives in happy marriages believed their 
husbands valued their appearance and their domestic skills, shared their views on 
children, discussed their worries, and allowed the wife to have her own opinions.  
Those in unhappy marriages blamed their husband not wanting children, the lack 
of shared friends, religious differences, the husband’s critical attitude or his 
interest in other women.218  The responses suggest that readers who believed their 
marriages were happy were in companionate marriages and indicate that in many 
successful marriages the husband looked to his wife and family for friendship and 
emotional support.  They also show that there was some blurring of the boundary 
between traditional gender roles.  
Despite supportive editorials and encouraging feature articles reflecting a 
more diverse view of what was possible for women, the fundamental 
understanding of a woman’s role in life had not changed significantly. The 
Mirror’s psychologist complained that women were becoming too masculine and 
were exploiting men financially.  Contrarily, he also grumbled that since women 
were increasingly allowed to work outside the home they had become 
economically and emotionally independent.219   Some female columnists 
expressed attitudes similar to those of fascist discourse.  In 1939 Ann Temple was 
adamant that ‘normal womanhood’ revolved around the bearing and rearing of 
children.  Women who did not want children were accused of fear and 
selfishness.220  Patience Strong offered a nauseating picture of a little girl’s future: 
She is like a doll - all pink and sweet - She looks quite sweet 
enough to eat - With creamy skin and eyes of blue, and lips like roses in 
the dew … Oh, may she have a happy life, and live to be a perfect wife - 
to bake sweet cakes and bread and pies - And make some good man 
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strong and wise … And may she never wish to roam - far from her 
happy little home … May she be kind and good and sweet - and make 
somebody’s life- complete.221 
 
A similar tritely sentimental rhyme for a baby boy ended with a very different 
sentiment: 
Each child creates his destiny – who knows what it may bring - Oh, may 
those tiny hands be used to do some splendid thing.222 
 
The advertisements in the popular press also relied heavily on the stereotype of 
the little woman whose life revolved around the home.223 
 The view that family life was central to women’s existence was shared to 
some degree by the mainstream and fascist press, yet, despite the continued use of 
stereotypical images, the popular press also presented positive images of women 
outside the domestic sphere that many fascists would find objectionable. 
 
The nation’s health 
The health of the nation, particularly its men, was an issue, which, while it did not 
feature heavily in the mainstream press, did recur occasionally throughout the 
inter-war period.  Unlike the fascist press, however, the mainstream press did not 
restrict its interest in health to military style fitness and the maintenance of racial 
pre-eminence.  It covered the whole range of health issues, from personal to 
public health, and offered advice on safety in the home, basic first aid, how to 
avoid influenza, and keeping fit. Issues such as the developing national health 
provision, mental health, the effects of unemployment on health, and 
environmental and industrial health were debated.224 
Until 1937 government policy on physical fitness had been restricted to 
the physical education of children, but in 1937, following a poor showing at the 
1936 Olympics, the National Government launched the ‘National Fitness 
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Campaign’ aimed at improving the physical health and vigour of adults. That 
there was no element of compulsion was strongly emphasised throughout the 
campaign. Lord Baden-Powell thought it admirable that young men and women 
were ‘voluntarily taking up physical culture without being forced to do so, as is 
the case in some countries.’225      
A Times article in 1938 supporting the National Fitness Campaign, 
pointed out that fitness classes had to compete with spectator sports which were 
usually more accessible.226  Nevertheless, significant numbers were taking up the 
opportunity to join the classes.  During the 1930s there had been a growing 
interest in fitness, the League of Health and Strength had 100,000 members in 
1931 and by 1939 membership had increased to 162,987.227  The Women’s 
League of Health and Beauty had 130,000 members in 1937.  Keep-fit classes 
were also offered to 300,000 members of the National Council of Girls’ Clubs, 
though not all of them took advantage of the opportunity.228  Zweiniger-
Bargielowska notes that despite similarities between the BUF’s approach to 
physical fitness and that of the League of Health and Strength, fascist attempts to 
annex the fitness movement failed and members rejected fascist politics, finding 
an outlet for their patriotism within the political mainstream.229  The fascist view 
of health was focussed on physical fitness, the mainstream press reflected the 
health concerns of the general public.  
 
Rural bliss  
Both fascist and mainstream papers promoted the view that those who lived in the 
country were healthier than city dwellers. Both the quality and popular press 
regularly featured short nostalgic and sentimental items that promoted an 
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appreciation of rural life and reinforced the impression that the countryside was a 
healthier place to live than the city.  They did not, however, advocate a back-to-
the-land policy.  While encouraging agricultural expansion, the Mirror clearly felt 
that those arguing for such a policy had little chance of success and likened them 
to ‘a voice crying in the wilderness.’230 
The images of rural life presented in the popular press were highly 
sentimental.  The ‘Countryman’s Diary’ column in the Mail presented an 
idealised vision of rural bliss. Each season was shown to offer its own form of 
enchantment.231  Even the less pleasant aspects of life in the country were given a 
positive twist.232   In the Express Andrew Souter wrote nostalgically about idyllic 
landscapes and the traditional method of ploughing.233  Bruce Blunt’s column, ‘A 
Breath of Country Air’ provided a less idealised look at village life, although on 
one occasion he became a little sentimental over baby rabbits.234  The Mail’s 
‘Down on Pat Murphy’s Farm’ was another example of the wholesome decency 
of country folk.235  The similarity between the fascists’ perceptions of rural life 
and those of the popular press are highlighted by Henry Williamson, who wrote 
similar articles for the BUF press and the Express.236  Williamson had recently 
taken up farming and regaled readers with stories promoting the ‘joy of a real job 
of work.’237   
However, there was no concerted campaign in the mainstream press to 
promote the back-to-the-land movement.  While the slogan ‘back to the land’ was 
bandied about throughout the inter-war period there are few press reports of any 
positive developments.  A demonstration in York in 1930 highlighted the 
difficulty the movement faced.   Captain E. T. Morris, President of the National 
Farmers Union, speaking about cereal production encapsulated the problem for 
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farming as a whole. Agriculture needed to be reformed and put ‘on a paying 
basis’ before the countryside could be repopulated.  Without reform, which would 
require considerable government intervention, ‘the “back to the land” movement 
would remain a piece of lip service.’238 
Proponents of what Dan Stone calls organo-fascism, such as Viscount 
Lymington, Rolf Gardiner, Arthur Bryant, and H. J. Massingham, rarely appeared 
in the mainstream press in connection with the back-to-the-land movement.239  
Bryant probably had the highest profile, he was well known for producing 
historical pageants, and appeared regularly on the radio.240  He had also written 
several historical works.241  H. J. Massingham wrote extensively about the 
countryside and published a memoir of Edward John Trelawney.242  Lymington 
was also a minor public figure.  As MP for Basingstoke until his resignation in 
1934 his name was occasionally mentioned in reports of parliamentary 
proceedings.  There were also brief reports of his divorce and remarriage, and of 
his sale of some of Isaac Newton’s papers.243  Gardiner was occasionally 
mentioned in the mainstream press in connection with folk dancing or Anglo-
German relations.244   
In 1941 the four formed the Kinship in Husbandry; the group had a core 
membership of twelve and was conceived by Gardiner as promoting organic 
farming and opposing practices that put profit before good husbandry or reduced 
the number of people working on the land.  Its ultimate aim was the repopulation 
of the countryside in a feudal type system that encouraged local self-sufficiency.  
Lymington had been a member of the anti-democratic, nationalist organisation 
English Mistery until 1937 when, following criticism of his behaviour in the 
aftermath of his divorce, he left to form the English Array.  Gardiner did not join 
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the Array, but was connected to it. On one occasion, at least, he spoke at a 
meeting and he contributed to the Array’s quarterly paper.245  The activities of 
these groups did not noticeably encroach on the consciousness of the mainstream. 
 
The arts and popular culture 
Another issue that generated less heat in the mainstream papers than in the fascist 
press was the arts. There was some debate in the mainstream press regarding art 
and culture, but nothing couched in terms comparable with that in the fascist 
press. The quality papers reinforced the elite perception of art as something that 
needed to be understood to be appreciated, and that understanding was predicated 
on education.  It was in this light that books, plays, the ballet, opera, art, classical 
concerts and recordings were reviewed.246  Summing up the state of modern art 
the music critic, Richard Capell refers to ‘its malaise, its desperate ingenuity, its 
infection from machinery, posters, sport and cheap luxury, in fact, its 
modernity.’247  The mainstream appears more conscious of the complexity and 
variety of the time, able to appreciate the good and to disregard the mediocre or 
worse.   
The mainstream press did not share the fascist suspicion of all things 
Bloomsbury. The Times ran articles that praised Virginia Woolf for her literary 
criticism and defended Bloomsbury intellectuals against charges of ‘detestable 
snobbery.’248  Bloomsbury was also described as ‘the last refuge of the Non-
Conformist conscience in England’ and an ‘urban foreign quarter’ without any 
indication that this was undesirable.249 
Epstein was a controversial figure in the world of art, and his sculptures had 
roused the fury of the popular press.250  Yet, during the 1930s the mainstream 
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press in Britain generally presented him in a sympathetic light.  The Express 
treated him as a celebrity, reporting on work in progress and highlighting the 
protective nature of his shrewd and devoted Scottish wife.251  Both quality and 
popular papers gave favourable reviews of Epstein’s sculptures and paintings, 
though there was also some criticism.252  The only fierce critics were those whose 
religious sensibilities had been offended by a particular work, for example Behold 
the Man, a study of Christ, generated many complaints and the Mirror refused to 
use a photograph of the work.253  These complaints were milder than those in the 
fascist press and did not condemn Epstein’s work in its entirety. 
Unlike the fascist press, the mainstream welcomed the arrival of foreign 
performers and encouraged the employment of ethnic minorities.  The Express’ 
theatrical correspondent urged ‘Dramatists! Don’t Forget Our Negro Actors.’  
This was a headline that would have appalled fascists.  The article praised the 
work of Paul Robeson and mourned the lack of ‘suitable plays for a Negro actor.’  
There was also admiration for Nina Mae Mackinney, ‘the beautiful coloured 
actress’ and variety star who was said to have ‘Knocked the town for a loop’ and 
single-handedly revived the tradition of the stage-door-Johnny.254 
Both quality and popular press reviewed radio programmes, theatre, and 
films.  Reviewers welcomed the release of British films, but were also keen to 
recommend Hollywood films to their readers as well.  They did not share fascist 
fears that the American movies would debauch or degrade their readers, and, 
significantly, audiences were credited with the capacity to exercise critical 
judgement and to boycott films that lacked quality and offered superficiality and 
titillation.  The Express reported, in 1932, that cinemagoers were turning their 
backs on films with a sex theme.255  Similarly, W. A. Mutch, in the Mail, 
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maintained that the British filmgoer was generally well informed and would not 
put up with shoddy work, although his judgement on American ‘films of gangster 
life’ was only slightly milder than that of the fascist press.256   
Although there was mainstream concern at the dominance of Hollywood it 
was expressed in business terms or as the protection of a national asset and not as 
a reaction to a perceived conspiracy.257  Overall it is clear that American films 
were regarded as enjoyable and acceptable entertainment, and the popular press 
devoted considerable space to discussing both the films and the exploits of those 
associated with them. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The mainstream press reflected the complexities of post-war life.  There were 
issues that concerned and, in the case of the popular press, even alarmed them.  
Developments in British culture were not among those issues.  The quality press 
continued to maintain the status quo, reinforcing the class hierarchy and 
traditional gender roles.  To a large extent the popular press did the same, but the 
Express, Mail, and Mirror were willing to explore new possibilities, to investigate 
the changing dynamics of family life, and encourage women in the workforce.   
This openness to wider experiences was part of the circulation battle and an 
attempt to attract as many readers as possible.  Echoes of fascist cultural values 
were occasionally present in all of the papers examined; some representations of 
masculinity, the role of women, the education of boys, concern for fitness, and a 
sentimental attachment to rural life.  However, for the mainstream press these 
were either a minority concern, or one aspect of a more diverse coverage.  Heated 
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debates over issues such as the future of British youth remained the preserve of 
those with a political axe to grind. 
Although cultural developments during the inter-war years did not meet 
with universal approval, and modernism, in particular, was viewed with suspicion, 
fascist demands for the sweeping away of perceived expressions of decadence and 
degeneracy did not find resonance with the general public.  There were signs that 
public taste was changing and that what had once been merely tolerated had 
become accepted, if not embraced.258  It seems that the British attitude to 
modernity lacked the element of destructive energy that Frank Trommler has 
identified in Germany and from which the Nazis were able to draw strength and 
popular support.259  The obsession of British fascists with decadence and decline 
left them largely isolated from the mainstream, and their drive to destroy what 
they perceived as damaging to the nation in order to revive and renew national life 
did not resonate with the majority of the readers of the mainstream press.  More 
representative is ‘The Dragoman’ who, discussing the education of a hypothetical 
daughter, commented that: ‘There is no book that I should forbid her to read.’260  
The mainstream press placed a higher value on individuality and on voluntary 
action than the fascist press.  It also regarded civil organisations as playing a 
valuable role, without the need for state intervention.  The fascists’ need to 
control every aspect of domestic and national life was an alien concept.  As the 
BUF, in particular, tried to implement its cultural values in guiding the manner in 
which its members lived, it created an ethos increasingly divorced from 
mainstream society. 
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Chapter 6 
MEDIA RESPONSES TO MOSLEY AND 
THE BUF1 
As we have seen, the mainstream press viewed British society in a more optimistic 
and positive manner than did the fascist movements.  While there were some aspects 
of fascist policy that resonated with elements of the mainstream, there were such 
significant differences that the majority of the mainstream press regarded the British 
fascists as either cranks such as the BF and the IFL or, in the case of the BUF, as 
adopting a position inconsistent with the dominant perception of British society and 
political life.  Although British fascists claimed that the mainstream media was part of 
a Jewish inspired anti-fascist conspiracy, the range of response from the British media 
to fascism in Britain was diverse and subject to change.  By concentrating on the 
reporting of the activities of Mosley and the BUF this chapter seeks to establish 
whether the British media situated the BUF outside of the mainstream and if, thereby, 
they contributed to the anti-fascist cause.  Additionally, the extent to which the 
BUF’s reaction to what it perceived as a conspiracy against it and its tendency to turn 
inward and become self-contained will be examined to assess if, given the mutual 
antipathy between the BUF and the majority of the mainstream press, the movement 
can be seen as a viable counter culture. 
THE BUF AND THE MEDIA 
The response of the mainstream press to British fascism has attracted little analysis 
and there is no definitive assessment of the extent to which the British media could be 
described as anti-fascist.  Their response to fascism was complex and varied, and for 
some elements of the media there was a dichotomy in their attitudes to fascism that 
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makes the categorisation of their stance in terms of anti-fascism problematic.  This 
was particularly noticeable in the Tory press where the expression of tolerance for, 
and, in the popular press, admiration of, the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany was 
initially commonplace.  Even when these papers began to voice their opposition to 
Mosley and the BUF their criticism did not necessarily extend to other forms of 
fascism, though, as mentioned earlier, criticism of the policies of the Nazi regime 
became increasingly frequent as the 1930s progressed.  The expression of opposition 
to British fascism came in three distinct forms: firstly, the dismissal or ridicule of the 
organisations and individuals concerned; secondly, the provision of a platform for 
those articulating anti-fascist opinions; and, thirdly, the encouragement of the 
confrontation of fascism and the advocacy of a popular front against it.  In only one 
instance, that of the News Chronicle, can all three forms be found.   
The variations of anti-fascism in the mainstream media have not been fully 
considered and academic attention has focussed on the support given to the BUF by 
the Rothermere press during the period January to July 1934.2  The element of the 
historiography most relevant to this chapter is the debate between Martin Pugh and 
Jon Lawrence, sparked by their differing interpretations of the significance of 
Olympia.3  Although the main focus of their analysis is the response of the 
Conservative party, they both consider the reaction of the mainstream press in the lead 
up to and the aftermath of Mosley’s meeting at Olympia in June 1934.  Pugh 
maintains that Olympia was not a propaganda disaster for the BUF as it attracted more 
press attention and reports in the Tory press were not hostile.  On the other hand, 
Lawrence argues that revulsion at fascist violence at Olympia alienated the 
Conservative press and political opinion, and was a significant factor in the failure of 
British fascism.  Of the two, Lawrence’s reading of the Conservative press sources is 
more convincing and his argument takes some account of the developments in the 
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response of the mainstream press to the BUF following the violence at Olympia. Pugh 
offers a more cursory survey of press attitudes.  In Hurrah for the Blackshirts, he 
points out that, following Rothermere’s withdrawal of support, the Mail, the Times, 
and the Telegraph continued to report Mosley’s speeches, and the News Chronicle, 
the Express, the Manchester Guardian, and the Herald were hostile to the BUF.4  
This is a very broad-brush approach, not entirely consistent with his earlier analysis, 
and appears to categorise the papers as either covertly for or openly against the BUF.5  
Pugh’s division of the press into two camps suggests that the reporting of BUF 
meetings provided encouragement to the fascist cause.  This chapter questions that 
approach and, for the first time, clearly differentiates the range of stances taken by 
individual newspapers.  
During the early 1930s the attitude of the mainstream newspapers towards the 
BUF was not fixed, and in the majority of papers it took some time for a consistent 
policy on British fascism to develop, therefore the section on reporting the BUF is 
divided into two parts, pre- and post-Olympia.  Mosley’s Olympia meeting was held 
on 7 June 1934 and had been heavily promoted by the Rothermere press.  In addition 
to BUF members, many political and society figures attended as well as members of 
the public, curious to hear what Mosley had to offer.  Also among the audience were a 
significant number of anti-fascists who heckled Mosley and were violently ejected 
from the meeting.  The excessive force used outraged many of those present and led 
to widespread condemnation of the BUF’s methods.6  For most of the mainstream 
media the events at Olympia represented a clear demonstration that Britain was not 
immune to the violent excesses of continental fascism, a point that was reinforced by 
the violence and disregard for legal process exhibited during Germany’s Night of the 
Long Knives.  Subsequent editorial comment reflected a heightened awareness of the 
potential threat to democracy posed by the BUF. 
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From the founding of the BUF to Olympia: a minor excitement 
Initially, the response of the mainstream media to Mosley and the BUF was not 
hostile.  This was consistent with attitudes to fascism in Italy and Germany during the 
early 1930s.  The mainstream press generally regarded both with a degree of 
complacency, despite reservations regarding the methods used to suppress 
opposition.7  Regardless of the expressions of tolerance, and in some cases 
enthusiasm, for fascism outside of Britain, there was a distinct lack of interest in the 
homegrown variety.  From the beginning, fascist organisations in Britain had rarely 
attracted press attention, and the occasional reports of their activities were not 
supportive.  The British Fascists were widely regarded as insignificant, and the more 
extreme National Fascists, despite being described by the Manchester Guardian as 
‘Dangerous Play-Boys’ who were a nuisance during a time of industrial unrest, were 
also seen as being of no consequence.8  Apart from the trial of Arnold Leese for 
seditious libel in 1936, the Imperial Fascist League was only mentioned in the 
mainstream press when they caused a disturbance, for example, when they courted 
controversy by flying a Union flag embellished with a swastika from prominent 
buildings or when their meetings were disrupted.9  Disappointingly, from Mosley’s 
point of view, reports in the mainstream press of the BUF’s early meetings were 
similar in tone to reports of other fascist organisations in Britain and, while the BUF 
generated more coverage than the others, it was not generally encouraging.  
Mosley had been a figure of interest to the press for some time before the 
founding of the BUF and he provided a touch of glamour that earlier manifestations of 
British fascism lacked. Indeed, Julie Gottlieb has described him as the ‘Rudolph 
Valentino of Fascism.’10  He was the youngest member of the House when he was 
first elected as a Conservative MP.  His first wife, Cynthia, was a noted society 
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heiress, and their joint defection to the Labour party fuelled many column inches in 
the national press.  His decision to leave the Labour party and set up the New Party 
also attracted press interest, though this was not as enthusiastic as he had hoped.  The 
founding of the BUF roused little interest in the mainstream press and the emphasis 
was often on Mosley’s ‘society’ life rather than his political ambitions.11   A portrait 
photograph of Mosley, seated at his desk, published in the Sketch, was typical of his 
representation in the popular press.  Mosley was described as ‘looking the complete 
British Fascist,’ but there was no mention of the BUF’s policies or activities.12   
A notable exception to the general indifference shown by the British press to 
Mosley’s political aspirations was an article by G. Ward Price in the Mail, which 
appeared immediately prior to the official launch of the BUF in October 1932 and 
coincided with the publication of Mosley’s book, The Greater Britain.  Ward Price, 
an admirer of Mussolini and Hitler, praised Mosley’s courage and ability, promoted 
The Greater Britain, and agreed with Mosley’s claim that fascism was a ‘world-wide 
modern creed.’13   
According to Nicholas Mosley, press reports of his father’s speeches during 
the first six months of the BUF’s existence concentrated on the presence of Mosley’s 
family, references to Jews and incidents of violence.14  There is ample evidence to 
endorse this reading of press reaction to the launch of the BUF.15  The mainstream 
press appear to have viewed British fascism as inhabiting the political margins, and it 
was rare for Mosley to find mainstream papers willing to publish his propaganda. 
Seizing one such opportunity, offered by the Mirror, Mosley complained that the 
ideology and philosophy of the BUF were dismissed or ignored while trivial incidents 
of violence were misrepresented as fascist brutality.  Although aggrieved by the lack 
of press interest in the BUF’s political programme, Mosley was adamant that the BUF 
neither needed nor desired the ‘hothouse of a sudden and artificial publicity.’16  When 
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the Rothermere press swung its considerable weight behind the ‘Blackshirts’ in 
January 1934, the movement appeared poised to move into the mainstream. 
 Pugh has suggested that Rothermere’s support for the ‘Blackshirts’ was based 
not on any appreciation of the virtues of fascism, but on a desire to use the movement 
to pressure the Conservative party into adopting policies more in line with 
Rothermere’s own views.17  Comparison of reports of BUF meetings from the Daily 
Mail and the Blackshirt supports this argument.  Coverage in the Mail focussed on 
issues dear to Rothermere’s heart, particularly the Empire.  Blackshirt reports of the 
same meetings said little about the Empire and concentrated on Mosley’s ability to 
hold an audience, local issues, ‘Reds’ and the failures of the parliamentary parties.18    
In keeping with the fascist tendency to deification of the leader, other speakers were 
given less coverage in the Blackshirt and what was reported generally bore little 
resemblance to what appeared in the Mail.19  From the way that his papers represented 
the Blackshirts, it is clear that Rothermere had a limited understanding of the fascist 
agenda and that he did not fully endorse its revolutionary potential.  Nonetheless, he 
did encourage his papers to portray the movement as relevant and necessary for the 
rejuvenation of British society and consequently the Rothermere press continued to 
present the BUF as a vital part of the mainstream. 
Despite the sometimes-strained relationship between Rothermere and Mosley, 
the attempt by the Sunday Dispatch to organise a Blackshirt beauty competition being 
perhaps the most ludicrous illustration of their divergent perceptions of the 
movement, the Rothermere press was relentless in its promotion of the Blackshirts as 
the saviours of the nation and repeatedly urged readers to join their ranks.20  It even 
became the fashion to wear a black shirt in the Mail offices.  When Rothermere 
withdrew his support the news editor sent one of the paper’s correspondents in Berlin 
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a telegram that said: ‘The Blackshirts are in the wash and the colour is running very 
fast.’21   
The support of the Rothermere papers, particularly that of the Mail, led to a 
rapid increase in membership of the BUF and forced other British papers, 
momentarily, to take notice.  Although the Express and the Mirror shared the Mail’s 
generally positive attitude to the continental dictators, the popular press was divided 
in its response to the rapidly increasing presence of the BUF.  Rothermere and 
Beaverbrook continued to cooperate on campaigns to save the British Empire and to 
defeat the perceived threat of the Co-ops, but Beaverbrook did not share Rothermere’s 
enthusiasm for the Blackshirts.  In the Express, Beaverbrook was quick to defend 
democratic principles as essential to the continuation of the Empire.22  He also 
allowed Tom Driberg who penned the ‘William Hickey’ column ‘These Names Make 
News’, an unusual degree of latitude in his attacks on Mosley.23  Apart from reporting 
occasional court cases, the Express ignored the BUF’s activities, having advised its 
readers not to worry about ‘Shirts’ as if it became necessary to save the country it 
would be decided, as previously, by ‘grown-up citizens … through legitimately 
elected representatives.’24  In the Evening Standard, Beaverbrook gave the cartoonist 
David Low free rein to produce a number of cartoons that highlighted Mosley’s 
arrogance and the Blackshirts’ brutality.25  Beaverbrook was clearly keen that the 
BUF remained outside the mainstream and below the political radar. 
Another major element of the popular press, the Mirror, had a tendency to 
blow hot and cold when it came to the Blackshirts.  The reports of court proceedings 
in cases such as the tithe dispute, the castor oil allegations, and charges of violence 
were couched in the neutral tones adopted by the rest of the mainstream press.26   
However, in January 1934 the Mirror reprinted an appeal by Rothermere for recruits 
for the Blackshirts that had originally been published in the Sunday Pictorial.27  
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Subsequent coverage did not reflect the patriotic, disciplined and tolerant movement 
that Rothermere had described.  On occasion the Mirror’s reports treated Mosley’s 
meetings as a spectacle and were full of detail regarding the venue, the numbers of 
Blackshirts, and Mosley’s arrival, but failed to mention the content of the speeches.28  
Other reports concentrated solely on the BUF’s policy.29  While some reports took a 
light-hearted tone, others suggested a darker side to the BUF that did suggest that the 
movement was outside the mainstream.30  
Uniquely, among the mainstream popular press, the Daily Herald concentrated 
its energies on opposing continental fascism.  This was consistent with Labour party 
policy, which was predicated on an understanding of fascism that correlated the rise 
of fascism with the growth of communism, and saw violent confrontation as counter-
productive.  By ignoring the BUF, the paper hoped to prevent it gaining publicity and 
to restrict its activity to the political margins.  With only a couple of notable 
exceptions, the Herald did not actively campaign against British varieties of fascism 
and urged readers to avoid confrontation with the BUF.  One exception was the 
printing of Oliver Baldwin’s fierce rejection of fascism on behalf of British youth 
during which he savaged Rothermere’s arguments for supporting the Blackshirts.31  
There was also an editorial pointing out the fallacy of Rothermere’s claim that the 
BUF was not antisemitic.32  Hannen Swaffer, the Herald’s gossip columnist, 
frequently mocked Mosley and the Blackshirts and was threatened by fascists who 
objected to his column.33  In similar vein to Swaffer’s mocking was a report of a BUF 
meeting that undermined Mosley’s alleged charisma and much vaunted abilities as a 
speaker, and accused him of making even his own followers yawn.34  Interestingly, 
Lawrence notes that, prior to Olympia, the Communist party’s response to British 
fascism was very similar in practice to that of the Labour party, viewing fascism as a 
continental problem. Like much of the mainstream media, the Daily Worker’s attitude 
 282
 
towards the BUF swung between indifference and ridicule.  However, in the days 
before the Olympia meeting readers were encouraged to take a more confrontational 
approach.35 
The quality Conservative papers, the Times and the Telegraph, remained 
largely unimpressed.  They did not trouble their readers with polemics for or against 
the movement, although the Times reminded its readers that while the electorate 
required constructive action this should not be misconstrued as a desire for 
dictatorship.36  Both the Times and the Telegraph continued to report incidents of 
violence, Mosley’s court cases and other occurrences involving the police or the 
courts.37  The reporting of Mosley’s speeches should not be taken as giving tacit 
support; the Times recorded that the people of Birmingham were uninspired by 
Mosley’s creed of action.38  Other speeches were reported in a more neutral manner.39  
The BUF was plainly perceived to be of minor interest and politically insignificant. 
The Observer justified publishing an article on the BUF on the grounds of the 
movement’s rapid growth and Rothermere’s support.  Mosley was described as a 
sincere speaker who argued his case well, though the Observer passed no judgement 
on the merits of that argument.40  The Observer also gave publicity to the creation of a 
BUF branch in Berlin, and to a speech by Mosley in which he attacked Conservative 
leaders who criticised the ‘British Blackshirts as foreign imports while they 
worshipped at the shrine of an Italian Jew.’41  This level of interest indicates that the 
paper perceived some potential for change in the political standing of the BUF. 
Surprisingly, although they would prove to be the most dedicatedly anti-fascist 
of all the mainstream press, some of the liberal papers were initially more 
accommodating.  Although it was the News Chronicle that campaigned most strongly 
against fascism, prior to Rothermere’s involvement some of its articles appeared to 
flirt with the ideology and the leaders of fascism. Disparagement of the National 
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Government and of Parliament was frequent. A. J. Cummings was critical of the 
ineffectiveness of both the Government and the Opposition and claimed that there 
were ‘no young politicians in any party with a glimmer of promise.’42  A week later, 
Cummings developed this theme, claiming that young men in Britain ‘have gone 
flabby’ and that generally speaking the British Parliament was ‘a collection of 
nonentities’ incapable of challenging the ‘old gang.’  The only politician Cummings 
saw as having any potential was Oswald Mosley, who was criticised for having 
‘remained so silent in the midst of our national emergencies that he runs the risk of 
disappearing from public memory.’43  The tone of reports relating to fascist activities 
appears to have been one of amused tolerance; one report described athletic and 
picturesque young men giving fascist salutes, but unable to answer questions.44  A 
similar tongue-in-cheek tone was adopted in reporting the short-lived political career 
of Serocold Skeels, who left the Imperial Fascist League to stand as parliamentary 
candidate for the United British Party.45   
However, the News Chronicle’s editor, Aylmer Vallance, made clear his 
personal political stance:  
Parliament is a sadly imperfect machine?  Agreed.  But the remedy is to 
reform Parliamentary procedure – no insuperable task – and not to weakly 
hand over our responsibilities as citizens to a ruling gang.  Against fascism 
in this country I would fight to my last breath.46  
  
Following Rothermere’s announcement of support for the Blackshirts the paper 
began to take a more robust attitude to British fascism.  The next day, while 
maintaining that the British electorate would not be ‘seduced from their faith in 
democracy’ by dubious promises of ‘Action’ and ‘discipline,’ its editorial cautioned 
that, with Rothermere promoting the possibility of a continental style dictatorship, 
‘farce takes on a more sinister complexion.’47  The paper also printed the views of 
politicians, trade union leaders and other public figures opposed to fascism.48  The 
News Chronicle continued to ridicule Rothermere’s enthusiasm for the Blackshirts, 
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while acknowledging Mosley as a more serious concern, albeit one that was unlikely 
to develop into a serious threat to democracy.49  Cummings described Rothermere’s 
Blackshirt campaign as another of his ‘political idiocies’ and noted that Beaverbrook, 
who he considered a much shrewder politician, had ‘promptly and with a sickening 
thud thrown Fascism and all its works down the cellar steps.’50  Reports of Mosley’s 
speeches concentrated on expressions of dissent from the crowd and Mosley’s plans 
to ensure a fascist government had complete power of action, untrammelled by 
parliamentary procedure.51   
From the beginning, the Manchester Guardian regarded the BUF as a paper 
tiger and Mosley as a pinchbeck candidate for dictatorship.52  Its attitude to Mosley 
was clearly expressed; it did not matter what Mosley said or where he said it.53  The 
paper was scornful of Rothermere’s promotion of the BUF, referring to his previous 
ill-fated political ventures.54  Reports of Mosley’s speeches were neutral in tone, but 
headlines highlighted disorder and violence and large audiences were attributed to 
contingents of Blackshirts from outside the local area.55  Opportunities to mock were 
regularly exploited.56 
Although Rothermere’s support had gained the BUF increased press coverage, 
it is evident from its content that, except for Rothermere’s own papers, particularly 
the Mail and the Sunday Dispatch, the British mainstream press regarded Mosley and 
the BUF as little more than a sideshow, of no real political significance.  However, the 
BUF meeting at Olympia in June 1934 and the subsequent public reaction, coupled 
with growing distaste for developments in Germany, upped the political stakes. 
 
Post Olympia: confrontation or dismissal? 
In his earlier article Pugh recognised the variety and complexity of press responses to 
the violence at Olympia, and there is considerable common ground between his 
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evaluation of the Rothermere and Beaverbrook presses and that of Lawrence.57 
Nevertheless, some elements of his analysis are open to a different interpretation.  His 
assessment of the Rothermere press from initial enthusiasm to polite disengagement 
fits well with the available evidence, as do his conclusions regarding the reasons for 
Rothermere’s withdrawal of support, but his suggestion that as the Mail continued to 
report Mosley’s speeches it was simply not promoting the BUF as blatantly as before 
could be more convincing.58  As part of their coverage of current events, most of the 
mainstream press continued, intermittently, to report Mosley’s speeches.  This cannot 
be construed as even covertly promoting the BUF. However, the Mail, without ever 
mentioning the BUF, continued to criticise the Government for talking instead of 
taking action and on one occasion, in relation to increased aeroplane construction, 
demanded: ‘When will the country discover some leader or organised party that will 
see things as they really are …?’59  Readers would no doubt be aware that the BUF 
shared the Mail’s belief that the Air Force needed to be greatly expanded.   
From the start, the Rothermere press had reported clashes between fascists and 
anti-fascists as a Manichean struggle between fascism and communism, and this 
pattern continued throughout the 1930s.  The most significant of these clashes was the 
Battle of Cable Street  on 4 October 1936, when anti-fascist demonstrators prevented 
the BUF from marching along Cable Street, in Stepney.60  The Mail’s headline over a 
report of the Battle of Cable Street read ‘REDS ATTACK BLACKSHIRTS – Girls 
Among Injured.’61  The paper reported that when Mosley arrived he ‘had a 
consultation with Sir Philip Game, Commissioner of Police. A decision was made to 
cancel the East End march …’  All the other mainstream papers reported that on his 
arrival Mosley was told by Game that the march was cancelled and there was no 
suggestion that Mosley was a party to the decision.62  The Mail appears to have 
inflated Mosley’s significance.  Throughout the report, anti-fascists are referred to as 
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‘Communists’, reinforcing the message that the BUF aimed to protect mainstream 
society from the perceived communist menace.  Similarly, in October 1937, following 
disorder in Bermondsey during the BUF’s fifth anniversary march the Daily Mail 
report referred to ‘Reds’ and ‘Communists.’63  On both occasions there was no 
mention of local opposition to the march and no editorial comment. 
Although Rothermere had publicly distanced himself from the BUF in July 
1934, he continued to meet Mosley socially, and as late as June 1939 he hosted a 
dinner party at which Mosley was encouraged to speak about how a national leader is 
found.64  Nor did he cut all his political links to Mosley.65  Rothermere used Ward 
Price as a conduit between Mosley and himself, and in July 1939 Ward Price attended 
a Mosley dinner party for BUF sympathisers and other pro-Nazi figures.66   
Rothermere had also introduced his protégée and confidante, Collin Brooks, to 
Mosley.  Brooks kept in touch with Mosley and BUF officials, and his journal shows 
that in March 1938 he met Mosley for lunch to discuss the future of British fascism, 
during the course of which Mosley complained that nobody would report his 
meetings.67  This was untrue, but his meetings were not reported as often as he 
thought they should be, possibly because the same issues were addressed at different 
locations and the speeches would have appeared repetitive to readers.   
Pugh’s assessment of the position of the Beaverbrook press is also largely 
consistent with the evidence.  The reports relating to Olympia and the subsequent 
debate were complete, factual and neutral in tone.68  The lack of any editorial 
comment was in keeping with the previously expressed advice that those wearing 
coloured shirts, of any hue, were not a serious concern.  However, he neglects to 
mention that Low, in the Evening Standard, continued to produce anti-fascist 
cartoons, the most telling of which, The Other Test Match, showed a cricket pitch on 
which a heavily outnumbered team dressed in whites was being brutally assaulted by 
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Blackshirts while Mosley looked on, giving the fascist salute.  A John Bull figure in 
the stands exclaims: ‘I don't know what you think you're playing at, young man, but it 
certainly isn't cricket!’69   
Following the Battle of Cable Street, the Express praised the police and 
reiterated its commitment to democracy.70  A week later it reported a largely peaceful 
march by communists and the attack on Jewish shops and passers-by by a ‘gang of 
hooligans’ shouting pro-Mosley slogans.71  The editorial column criticised ‘Redshirt-
Blackshirt tomfoolery’ for diverting police resources every Sunday afternoon.72  The 
Express reacted in similar fashion to the riots in Bermondsey a year later, claiming 
that communist opposition to Mosley’s fascists generated publicity for the fascists and 
incurred heavy police costs.73 
Unfortunately, the Mirror does not figure in the analysis of either Pugh or 
Lawrence.  The reports of the Olympia meeting are sketchy and vaguely pro-
Blackshirt. There is little mention of violence.  Unlike most other mainstream papers 
the Mirror, when reporting the Home Secretary’s response to events, concentrated on 
alleged communist violence.  One strap-line referred to a ‘THREATENING RED 
MOB’ when the words actually used were ‘organised Red mob.’74  The paper 
continued to report Mosley’s speeches and there was no editorial comment on either 
Olympia or the ending of Rothermere’s support for the BUF.75  Reports of meetings 
included photographs of a smiling Mosley, huge crowds, and female fascist 
marchers.76  The tenor of the paper’s response to Mosley and the Blackshirts swung 
between factual reporting and presenting a slightly exotic and possibly dangerous 
entertainment.  In March 1935, as part of a series entitled ‘If I was Dictator’, the 
Mirror published an article by Mosley setting out the issues he regarded as needing 
prompt action.  It advised readers to: ‘Decide if you like him, because you can’t be 
sure you won’t have to.’77  By 1936 the Mirror was less inclined to drape all Mosley’s 
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opponents in the red flag, reports of disorder in the East End and in Bermondsey were 
phrased in terms of ‘fascist’ and ‘anti-fascist’, there were no references to ‘Reds’ or 
‘Communists.’78  The only editorial comment followed Mosley’s injury in Liverpool; 
readers were advised to avoid violence, which could create martyrs, and 
recommended to: ‘Kill by silence and absence.’79 
Both Pugh and Lawrence pay scant attention to the Herald, grouping it with 
the liberal press.  Pugh argues that Olympia merely confirmed the left-wing press in 
their hostility to the BUF, while Lawrence concludes that although the Herald was 
surprisingly even-handed in its initial reports it, like other left-wing papers, took 
advantage of the controversy to mount an anti-fascist propaganda campaign.  
Certainly, post Olympia, reports of BUF meetings and court cases in the Herald were 
more frequent, and concentrated on the hostility of the crowds, the Blackshirts’ need 
for police protection, and violence allegedly committed by fascists.80  However, 
editorial comment, again in line with Labour party policy, advised readers to keep 
away from fascist meetings and marches, as aggressive opposition generated more 
publicity and sympathy for fascism.81  Following the Battle of Cable Street the 
Herald’s leader writer argued that while the fascists had no chance of success they 
provoked disorder and it was the duty of the Government to ‘rid the country of this 
menace to the King’s peace.’82  After the violence in Bermondsey and Mosley’s 
injury in Liverpool the editorial column stressed again that using physical violence to 
fight fascism advertised fascism and allowed Mosley to appeal to public sympathy.83 
Pugh provides only a brief assessment of the liberal press’ response to 
Olympia, though he does note the strong anti-Blackshirt bias in the News Chronicle 
report of the meeting.  In contrast, Lawrence sees little difference in their coverage 
and that provided by the left-wing papers.  Surprisingly, he describes the News 
Chronicle as adopting a low-key approach.  While there is some similarity between 
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the line taken by the Manchester Guardian following Olympia and that of the Herald, 
there were distinct differences in the tone of reports and in editorial attitudes of the 
other Liberal papers.  
The Manchester Guardian did cover the disturbances at Olympia, but its 
initial reports were reluctant to apportion blame.84  The following day, however, the 
leader column criticised Mosley’s methods.85  A week later, concern was expressed 
regarding the BUF’s semi-military character and there was also support for the 
Government’s decision to consult the leaders of the major political parties regarding 
fascist disorder.86  The paper applauded Rothermere’s reasons for breaking with 
Mosley, but pointed to inconsistencies in his argument and criticised his judgment in 
attempting to turn the BUF into a Tory  ‘ginger group.’87  Reports of BUF meetings 
continued to focus on disorder and violence, although some did include details of 
Mosley’s speeches or policies.88  In the days prior to the Battle of Cable Street the 
paper’s London correspondent noted an increasing sense of tension as preparations to 
oppose the march were made.89  There was no editorial enthusiasm for resistance, and 
reports of the disturbances were low-key.90  The leader column praised the police 
action and stressed that ignoring Mosley’s meetings and marches was more effective 
than disrupting them.91  However, the report of the disturbances in Bermondsey, a 
year later, conceded that forcing a change of route represented a moral victory for 
Mosley’s more militant opponents.92 
The News Chronicle remained steadfast in its opposition to fascism, and was 
by far the most anti-fascist of the mainstream publications.  The paper’s leader-writers 
took every opportunity to remind readers that the British did not require or desire 
continental methods of government.93  Coverage was not totally one-sided; there were 
report of attacks on fascists.94  However, its reporting of the Olympia meeting was 
notably different from other papers surveyed, it was clearly anti-fascist, and there was 
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no mention of ‘Communists.’  Instead, the Special Correspondent praised the 
interrupters, who ‘showed both courage and resource.’  Mosley’s big meeting ‘had 
been killed dead by the carefully organised demonstration of English men and women 
who hate Fascism and all its works.’95  The following day’s editorial was forthright in 
its condemnation of the brutality, and rejected Mosley’s assertion that the Blackshirt 
Defence Force was needed to secure free speech in Britain: ‘The claim of an 
irresponsible private body to maintain by force what it holds to be order is a parody of 
the forms of law.’96  Following Olympia, the News Chronicle’s attitude to the BUF 
hardened and by the end of the month the delegation of TUC and Labour party 
representatives to Sir Ian Gilmour was said by their industrial correspondent to have 
carried the ‘fight against Fascist terrorism’ to the Home Office.97   
References to acts of fascist terrorism increased in the aftermath of the Battle 
of Cable Street.98  So concerned was the News Chronicle that it published calls by 
James Maxton, and by A. A. H Findlay, chairman of the TUC, for a popular front 
against fascism.99  The leader column was also used to urge a popular front.  Fascism 
was not perceived as a present threat to democracy but was thought to have the 
potential to develop into one if left unchecked.100  By October 1937 the News 
Chronicle was more sanguine and argued that the best way to defeat Mosley was to 
ignore him as violent opposition garnered publicity and, if they were injured, public 
sympathy for the fascists.101 
Pugh’s analysis of the quality press concluded that Olympia had a positive 
result for the BUF as afterwards their meetings were more frequently reported.  He 
also claims that the Daily Telegraph’s reporting of the event was sympathetic to the 
Blackshirts; this is strongly disputed by Lawrence who maintains that the Daily 
Telegraph’s stance was unequivocally anti-BUF.102  The evidence supports 
Lawrence’s interpretation.  The report published by the Daily Telegraph was a 
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neutral, factual account of the meeting, interruptions and ejections.  It is not surprising 
that, being a Tory paper, it also reported the disturbances prior to the meeting and 
attributed them to communists, nor is it an indication of sympathy for the Blackshirts.  
That the report of the meeting was immediately followed by eyewitness testimony of 
Blackshirt violence suggests that the paper was not predisposed to the fascist cause.103   
For the Telegraph, fascism was as much to be deplored as communism and in an 
editorial the paper insisted that ‘British political tradition must combine without 
thought of party to fight the spirit of the new violence from whichever side it 
comes.’104  Only days later another editorial stressed that there was no doubt that the 
use of reasonable force had been gravely exceeded at Olympia and encouraged the 
Government to suppress any attempt to usurp Government functions, such as the 
preservation of order.105  The Telegraph continued to provide its readers with factual 
reports of disturbances, including the Battle of Cable Street in 1936 and the 
barricading of streets in Bermondsey in 1937.106 
Pugh and Lawrence agree that the Times continued to adopt a lofty, almost 
supercilious, tone in its editorial comment on Olympia, though Pugh does not pay 
enough regard to the editorial’s content which stressed that there was no place for 
fascism in Britain.107  Additionally, Pugh’s argument that in defending the principle 
of free speech the paper had softened its attitude to the Blackshirts is not 
convincing.108  Like the Telegraph, the Times regarded both fascism and communism 
as undesirable.  Following the Battle of Cable Street, the Times described the 
activities of both fascists and communists as ‘a tedious and rather pitiable 
burlesque.’109  The increased level of public violence was stated to be a public 
nuisance that required Government intervention, ‘without violating the traditional 
canons of British Liberty.’110  As far as the Times was concerned the only place for 
the Blackshirt was in Madame Tussaud’s.111 
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The Observer said little about Olympia, probably due to the time constraints 
inherent in publishing a Sunday paper.  Its editorial the following week censured 
Mosley, and while there was disapproval of ‘organised attempts’ to disrupt meetings, 
there was also a firm rejection of ‘the Nazi technique’ and ‘the Nazi temper.’112  A 
week later, the Observer reported a speech by Herbert Morrison in which he 
dismissed Mosley and the BUF on the grounds that the British public would not be 
fooled by ‘spotlight, film star swank.’113  There was no editorial comment on 
Rothermere’s decision to part-company with Mosley.  The paper remained opposed to 
fascism, although its claim that the people of the East End were not hostile to BUF 
meetings suggests a limited perception of the East End’s population.114  As the 1930s 
progressed the Observer expressed concern that Mosley’s antisemitic tactics would 
lead to serious consequences in the East End.115   
That the Olympia debacle had not benefited the BUF is further illustrated by 
the reaction of the BBC. Previously Mosley had taken part in a radio debate on 
fascism, and immediately after Olympia he had been given the opportunity to defend 
the actions of the BUF.116  There were also plans for him to take part in a series of 
broadcasts on constitutional issues, however, following debates on the violence at 
Olympia in Parliament and in the press, these were shelved and Mosley would not 
take part in a BBC radio broadcast again until 1968.117  Francis Hawkins did attempt 
to get Mosley included in a series of debates in 1939, but the BBC declined on the 
grounds that the debates were restricted to MPs from the main political parties.118   
Later that year Mosley protested at what he called ‘silly lies’ broadcast internationally 
by the BBC that included suggestions that the BUF was less successful than the 
Communist party and that they were holding fewer meetings than previously.119   
In contrast to the souring of relations with the BBC, there was little change in 
the way that cinema newsreels reported BUF activity.  Although the BUF had claimed 
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that Jewish pressure had resulted in film of their meetings being cut from cinema 
programmes, reports continued in a neutral and detached style, and, as can be seen 
from footage shot in 1936 during the Battle of Cable Street, did not imply any 
criticism of Mosley and the BUF.120  
Although the mainstream press continued to print factual reports of BUF 
meetings, editorial comments were generally critical of the BUF and its methods.  
Mosley and the BUF frequently complained that the mainstream press was against 
them and there were repeated allegations that the press was under Jewish influence.121 
Despite the BUF’s assertions of conspiracy, Britain’s mainstream press did not 
present a united front against fascism; each paper had a slightly different stance, and 
there were different gradations of anti-fascism. Broadly speaking, the quality press 
was opposed to Mosley and the BUF and was the most clearly anti-fascist.  For some 
papers, particularly the Daily Telegraph, and the Times, participating in a popular 
front against fascism, as advocated by the News Chronicle at the height of its anti-
fascist campaign, would have given British fascism a prominence it did not deserve 
and might also have had implications for Britain’s foreign affairs.  If papers known to 
be closely allied to the Government’s political aims had actively pursued an anti-
fascist agenda it would have made Britain’s already fraught diplomatic relations with 
Italy and Germany even more difficult. Certainly, those advocating a popular front did 
not suggest the inclusion of the Conservatives.122  The Tory papers regarded the BUF 
with disdain, seeing it as a nuisance rather than a threat, and had no objection to 
fascism as a continental phenomenon.  The government of other countries was seen as 
no concern of Britain’s, unless they posed a threat to international stability.123  The 
response of the Tory press to events such as Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia, the 
persecution of Jews and other minority groups in Germany, the annexation of Austria, 
and the invasion of Czechoslovakia show that, although some Tory papers expressed 
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regret, they were all opposed to any confrontation with the fascist regimes. Despite 
this tolerance of fascism beyond the Channel, its imposition in Britain was implacably 
opposed.  The liberal papers perceived the fascist movement as more of a threat and 
were correspondingly more vocal in their opposition, with the News Chronicle being 
the most outspoken in this regard.  Their anti-fascism was more ideologically based 
and extended to continental varieties.  The Herald shared this opposition to fascism in 
all its forms, but, for tactical reasons was less vocal in its opposition to the British 
variety.  
The popular press, with its tendency to embrace new trends, gimmicks and 
‘stunts’ was more receptive to the novelty of fascism.  Nevertheless, the Express 
regarded British fascism as a potential, though unlikely, threat to the Empire and, 
while against it in principle, generally ignored it.  The Mirror, while not promoting 
fascism, rejected a united front against it.124  Yet, by 1937 its opposition was clear and 
the paper can be counted amongst those anti-fascist papers that regarded violent 
opposition as counter-productive.  Only the Rothermere press actively promoted 
fascism for a short period, an error of judgement based on Rothermere’s misreading 
of the situation and his misunderstanding of fascism’s revolutionary nature.  It was 
not long before economic and political realities encouraged Rothermere to direct his 
papers to take a more neutral stance, although this did not extend to any criticism of, 
or opposition to, the BUF.  The political violence and increasing antisemitism of the 
BUF appeared to mimic the European fascist movements and, as the 1930s drew to a 
close, this, coupled with the growing political tension in Europe, ensured that the 
British mainstream press, including the Mail, put aside any earlier misgivings 
regarding the efficacy of the parliamentary system and reinforced the message that 
there was no place in the mainstream social or political spectrum for British fascism.  
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A SUSTAINABLE SUBCULTURE OR RADICAL COUNTERCULTURE? 
 
Given the comprehensive rejection of the majority of the mainstream media it is not 
surprising that the BUF developed its own infrastructure and that its members relied 
on the movement for more than political sustenance.  Recent developments in the 
study of British fascism have referred to fascist subcultures, but have not defined the 
term or justified its use.  Michael Spurr finds common ground between the study of 
post-war youth subcultures and the growth of British fascism between the wars, 
particularly in the case of the BUF.125  Significant areas of similarity are said to be the 
development of mass society, social modernisation, social dislocation in the aftermath 
of war, an increased emphasis on generational perceptions of society, and a reliance 
on symbolic measures to reconcile contradictions and to generate cohesion within the 
group.126   There is much in the cultural artefacts and activity of British fascists to 
support this analysis.  Albert K. Cohen describes subcultures emerging as a group 
response to perceived problems in the surrounding or dominant culture to which they 
are unable or unwilling to adjust.127  The response is gradual, ‘a process of mutual 
exploration and joint elaboration of a new solution.’128  The shared values of the 
subculture validate the beliefs of the individual group members and promote 
solidarity.  The more the subculture invites the hostility of others, the more its 
members turn to one another for cooperation.  In response to actual, perceived or 
anticipated hostility from those outside the subculture, its members may develop 
hostile and contemptuous attitudes towards those who reject their values.129  Marvin 
E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, in their analysis of violent behaviour, also discuss 
the way that differing values set subcultures apart from the dominant or parent 
culture, this prevents full integration, leading to a sense of isolation that reinforces the 
solidarity of the subculture.130  Subcultures provide the means for individuals to share 
feelings of exclusion and create a sense of inclusion that builds up a corresponding 
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sense of identity.131  The significant divergence between the cultural perceptions of 
the British fascist press and the mainstream press, particularly the popular press, 
encouraged fascist groups to become insular and rely on the members of their own 
organisation for shared cultural experiences.  In the BF and the IFL this was largely 
restricted to political meetings, paper selling, the wearing of political uniforms, the 
occasional dinner dance, and organised activities for children.132  Additionally the 
Fascist Bulletin did advertise fascist cigarettes and fascist ties, and there was a report 
on a camp for women fascists in August 1925.133  In both movements the 
development of a subculture did not develop beyond the embryonic stage. 
In the BUF the sense of solidarity and unity was bound up in the cult of the 
leader.  Mosley was the central figure around whom the BUF revolved; they were 
Mosley’s men.134  Despite the claimed rejection of materialism, Gottlieb shows that 
the marketing of BUF merchandise and the commercialisation of the Mosley image 
was a central part of the BUF’s propaganda drive.135  Much of the BUF merchandise 
was directly related to Mosley, including reproductions of a sketch of the leader, a 
bronze plaque of the leader, a recording of Mosley speaking, and Chesterton’s 
biography of Mosley, Portrait of a Leader.136  Other merchandise included the BUF’s 
own brand cigarettes, BUF diaries, Christmas cards and calendars, badges, cuff links, 
scarf pins, clips and brooches with flash in the pan emblem, playing cards with gold 
panels and black fasces or black panels with gold fasces, fascist notepaper, recordings 
of the BUF Male Voice Choir, sheet music for ‘Mosley’ and ‘Britain Awake’, and a 
photographic record of the BUF with the optimistic title The British Union’s March 
To Power! 137 
According to John Clarke et al, subcultures are distinctive enough to be 
identifiably different from the dominant culture, and are focussed around certain 
activities, specific values, uses of material artefacts and occupation of territorial 
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spaces.138  In the case of the BUF the shared fascist experience was developed in a 
variety of ways.  The BUF made effective use of ritual and symbols, which defined 
and expressed group identity, and showed distinctions and differences within the 
group.  Mabel Berezin describes political ritual as generating meaning through 
repetition for both participants and observers; repetition also generates familiarity, 
which reinforces identity and solidarity through the sharing of the ritual experience.139  
Public spectacle in the form of marches and large public meetings such as those at 
Olympia or Belle Vue were intended to demonstrate fascist strength to those outside 
the movement and to generate a sense of belonging that would extend beyond the 
duration of the actual event.140 
Philip Coupland has written convincingly on the symbolic resonance of the 
black shirt.141  That members found meaning in the uniform can be seen from the 
closing paragraph of ‘Rude Awakening,’ a short story that described a nightmare 
about an England dominated by Jews; an awful vision that was swept away by the 
presence of a column of black-uniformed men marching along the street.142  Mosley 
described the black shirt as a ‘symbol of faith’ and ‘the outward expression of 
manhood banded together in the iron resolve to save great nations from degeneration 
and decay.’143  The cult status of Mosley was a unifying force, and descriptions of 
meetings at which Mosley spoke emphasise their theatrical and ritualistic format.  
Berezin considers the arrival of the leader an archetypal form of public ritual.144  It 
was one Mosley exploited fully.  Command of the streets and domination of certain 
areas, particularly in the East End of London, were territorial imperatives for the 
BUF.  Mosley told Colin Brooks: ‘It is the mastery of the streets which matters …’145  
It was expected that members would demonstrate commitment to the BUF and active 
members served at least three nights a week selling the BUF papers, stewarding 
meetings, or training.  Marches, street corner meetings and paper sales by uniformed 
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members demonstrated their distinctive presence.  The effect of a heavy BUF 
presence on the streets is recorded in Action by a new member who had admired their 
discipline and fresh athletic Englishness, and felt impelled to join the movement.146  
As we have seen, the rhetoric of the BUF provided a validation of aggressive 
masculinity that was not in tune with mainstream perceptions of masculinity. 
However, the theory of subculture is based on the concept of resistance to the 
dominant culture; membership of the subculture permits resistance to some aspects of 
the dominant culture while providing a strategy for remaining within it.  Attempts at 
resolving the contradictions inherent in this process are undertaken at a symbolic level 
and are therefore destined to fail.147  In cases where the values of a possible subculture 
do not merely differ from those of the dominant culture but are antithetical to them, it 
is more appropriate to consider the group as a counterculture. 148  Clarke et al, whose 
analysis is class based, argue that subcultures are predominately working class, while 
countercultures spring from the middle class and are thus strategically better placed to 
undermine or attack the disputed values of the dominant culture.  The disaffiliation of 
a counterculture is said to be primarily based on ideological and cultural differences 
with the dominant culture.  The counterculture attacks the institutions of the dominant 
culture and attempts to set-up elements of an alternative society.149  Subcultures are 
often tolerated by the dominant culture, as they share some values and those that are 
different are not necessarily in opposition.  Provided they do not cause disruptive 
conflict or disturb normal social relations there is no necessity for the dominant 
culture to take action against them.150  Aggressive countercultures are likely to 
provoke a reaction. 
During the mid to late 1930s, the BUF presented itself as a counterculture.  It 
had adopted an antagonistic stance, proposing to enforce revolutionary change to the 
dominant culture, albeit by legal means if possible.151    The intention of the BUF was 
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to replace the mainstream, dominant culture with a completely fascist culture as 
shown in the plans for the corporate state.  The existence of a BUF counterculture is 
supported by the development of a sophisticated infrastructure that employed full-
time officials, and by the paramilitary organisation and outlook adopted by the BUF, 
epitomised by the segregated lifestyle and military discipline of the Defence Force. 
Up to 400 men lived and trained at Black House Headquarters, which had its own 
canteen and recreational facilities.152 
Gottlieb has noted the movement’s attempt to create the cultural structure that 
would be necessary for the BUF’s vision of the corporate state.  This included 
arranging its own weddings and christenings.153  The social life of members also 
revolved around the BUF.  There were numerous sports teams competing in a variety 
of sports but they had little or no contact with teams outside the BUF.  There were 
also BUF bands, orchestras and choirs.154  Members could spend their leisure time 
within the Blackshirt environment.  The BUF ran summer camps, although these were 
segregated after the first year.155   If a holiday camp did not appeal there were ‘Grand 
Blackshirt Lakeland Tours’ available at moderate terms, or bed and breakfast in 
Brighton, South Devon, or Southsea.156  Special terms were offered to BUF members 
at the Princes Marina Café in SW9.157  Blackshirt readers were encouraged to buy a 
motor vehicle ‘from fascist Roy Capell’, to join the Blackshirt automobile club, and to 
purchase ‘insurance from Blackshirts.’158  Members even ran a BUF version of the 
Christmas fair, the ‘Blackshirt Bazaar’ selling perfume, cakes, jams, arts, crafts, toys, 
and flowers.159  The BUF headquarters and branches also organised lectures, dinner 
dances, plays, and concerts.160  Evening classes were also provided; physical training 
for men and self-defence for women.  Mosley had plans to run a commercial radio 
station and to buy local mainstream newspapers.161  This level of organisation, 
coupled with its revolutionary aims, suggest the BUF was more than a subculture.  
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This is reinforced by the BUF’s willingness to confront state institutions, for instance 
its unsuccessful championing of farmers in the 1934 ‘Tithe Wars.’162  At one farm 
they dug trenches four feet deep, organised a twenty-four hour patrol, barricaded a 
cart track, and set-up their headquarters in a chicken house flying the Blackshirt flag, 
all without the consent of the farmer concerned in the dispute.  When challenged, their 
response was ‘Fascists do not ask for permission.’163  Eighteen fascists were later 
arrested and charged with causing public mischief.164 
The image of the BUF was one of aggressive masculinity and confrontation.  
The taint of violence surrounding BUF marches and meetings caused concern within 
the dominant culture.  Fascist and anti-fascist clashes in the East End of London 
intensified, culminating in the Battle of Cable Street, where anti-fascists successfully 
halted a BUF march.  Repeated violent incidents led to mainstream support for 
Government action to restrain politically-inspired aggression from fascist and 
communist groups, both of which were perceived as alien influenced and, while not a 
political menace, as disturbing the peace.165  The Government responded with the 
Public Order Act (1936), which came into force in January 1937 and prohibited the 
wearing of uniforms associated with political organisations or objectives; quasi-
military groups organised, trained or equipped to usurp the role of the police and 
armed forces, and the use or display of physical force to promote political 
objectives.166 
The introduction of the act, coupled with financial problems, led to a 
downscaling of operations and the beginnings of a more secretive, underground 
structure.  Significantly, this was intensified when internments began and continued in 
the camps, showing the members commitment to the BUF’s counterculture.  In the 
Isle of Man camp, Tommy Moran organised the internal camp administration on 
fascist lines complete with what Graham Macklin described as a ‘rudimentary fascist 
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police force.’167  The underground organisation was maintained after the war, both 
when Mosley was in exile and after his return to Britain.168  During the period 
discussed, the attitudes, aims and actions of the BUF indicate that its active members 
were operating as part of a counterculture. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Initially the majority of the mainstream press largely ignored the BUF, however 
during 1934 the increase in membership, Rothermere’s support and the heated public 
debate over the violence at Olympia led to heightened interest in the movement, 
spurring deliberate attempts by the mainstream media to situate the BUF outside of 
the mainstream.  The continued association of the movement with violence in the 
reports of BUF activity was an effective mechanism for reinforcing the perception 
that fascism was not in accord with British values. While it would be overstating the 
case to describe this as a ‘united’ or ‘popular’ front against fascism, it could be seen 
as a de facto front for British democracy that contained distinct strands of anti-fascism 
within it.   
The majority of mainstream newspapers urged their readers to ignore the BUF 
and this reinforced an existing tendency, consistent with fascism’s concept of the 
corporate state, with its drive to extend the role of the state to cover all aspects of 
society, to create a functioning counterculture.  As we have seen, this included the 
fascistisation of religious ceremonies and cultural events, the provision of financial 
services, the organising of an extensive range of leisure and educational activities, and 
the retailing of a range of symbolic items glorifying Mosley as the great leader.  
Particularly for those men who lived in the Black House, it was possible to have very 
little contact with mainstream society, except for the time spent representing the 
movement on the streets or at public meetings. 
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CONCLUSION: In from the Cold? 
There has been a tendency, when considering the politics of the inter-war period, to 
view the British fascists as marginal entities and, in the case of the IFL particularly, as 
cranks situated firmly on the lunatic fringe.1  Even the relatively more successful BUF 
is regarded as being confined to the political margins.2  Additionally, there is a 
persistent perception of Mosley as a taboo figure, beyond the pale of mainstream 
society.3  In part, this perception of Mosley and the BUF is fostered by the failure of 
the British fascist movements to shake off the ‘foreign’ taint of continental fascism.  
Recent developments in the historiography have done much to demonstrate the strong 
British roots that were as important to their development as the European influences.4  
Yet the words of one anti-fascist hold true and British fascists are still regarded as 
having ‘offended against the common values of decency.’5  This thesis has made a 
detailed study of the mainstream and fascist press in order to assess the extent to 
which these perceptions are true; is British fascism judged to be beyond the pale or 
should it be brought in from the cold? 
 Additionally this study responds to Lunn’s challenge to take a more 
imaginative approach to the scrutiny of British fascism and adopts a broader focus 
than is usually found in the historiography.  By examining British fascism within the 
context of the mainstream it offers a more sophisticated and nuanced approach that 
provides a clearer understanding of its dynamic location within a society whose 
attitudes and values were developing in response to a period of rapid social change 
and turbulent international politics. 
The extent to which British fascism can be seen as part of the mainstream, or 
as an extension of it, differs depending on the issue and period considered, as the 
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mainstream itself was, and is, not static.  It is probable that even more variation would 
be found in a study of the provincial press.  The studies of Devon and Newcastle by 
Todd Gray and Nigel Todd, respectively, show a range of local response to the BUF 
from support, through indifference to outright hostility.6  The attitude of local 
newspapers is a potentially interesting area for future research that would add more to 
our understanding of the ways in which fascism and the mainstream interrelate. 
Clearly there were some issues that demonstrated a considerable gap between 
what was acceptable in the mainstream and the views advocated by British fascists.  
Attitudes towards antisemitism were the most notable in this category.  While there 
was, undoubtedly, antisemitism at all levels of British society, its overt expression 
was unacceptable and it did not manifest more strongly than the first level of the 
model described in chapter one. Specifically, there were some instances of 
stereotypical characterisation of Jews but, in the newspapers examined, such instances 
were rare.  
 Although the degree of antisemitic content in the fascist press varied, the 
British fascists were represented at all three levels of the model, and Kushner’s 
definition of ‘exclusionist’ antisemitism is appropriate here as each of the three 
movements wanted to exclude the Jews from society in some way.   Of the three 
groups studied, the IFL exhibited the most radical expressions of antisemitism.  Under 
the influence of Leese, its antisemitic policy developed rapidly and within eighteen 
months had moved from the outer to the inner circle of the mode.  From 1930 
antisemitism informed all areas of the IFL’s propaganda output and by 1935 the IFL 
was able to contemplate the most efficient form of genocide without any qualms.7   
Conversely, the antisemitism of the BF and the BUF varied, depending on the extent 
to which it was sanctioned by the organisations’ leadership at any particular time.  For 
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both these organisations, antisemitism was restricted to the two outer circles of the 
model and did not encompass biological-racial antisemitism.  While the antisemitism 
of the BF and BUF drew on existing antipathy to Jews, and could, therefore, be seen 
as an extension of mainstream views, its overt expression and the adoption of 
exclusionist policies clearly placed it outside the mainstream. 
Although, with regard to British Jews, there was no significant antisemitic 
content in the national newspapers studied here, articles in the popular press relating 
to ‘foreign’ Jews often portrayed them as undesirable and a threat to the nation, 
particularly to the unemployed.  The attitudes of British fascists towards refugees 
were expressed in tones comparable to the Tory popular press, whose use of 
exclusionist rhetoric in relation to ‘non-British’ Jews suggests British fascists were 
not estranged from significant strands of mainstream opinion. However, despite the 
similarities, the underlying motivation differed.  British fascists were motivated by 
ideological imperatives and their opposition to refugees was expressed in antisemitic 
terms.  Heavily influenced by their proprietors, the Express and the Mail were 
motivated by fear and self-interest, but their opposition did not employ antisemitic 
vocabulary, instead these papers used more general terms that applied equally to all 
refugees regardless of religion or ethnic origin.  For this reason, the application of 
Kushner’s terms exclusionary or conservative antisemitism to the refusal of the 
popular press to countenance the arrival of refugees in Britain is problematic.  
Admittedly, the vast majority of the refugees were Jewish, and, on one occasion, 
concern was expressed that accepting large numbers of Jews in Britain might lead to 
an increase in antisemitism, but, generally, it was not the Jewishness of the refugees 
that the Express and Mail perceived as a threat.  Instead they focussed on the 
economic impact, particularly in relation to the unemployed, and their reaction to the 
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refugee issue was consistent with their isolationist attitude and their vehement 
opposition to the provision of financial or military aid to European governments such 
as Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and even extended to defence agreements 
with France.8  
At least one expression of editorial opinion in the Express appears to support 
Kushner’s theory of liberal antisemitism, in that it can be interpreted as advocating 
that refugees should make every effort to assimilate to avoid provoking antisemitism, 
yet there is a lack of supporting evidence in the rest of the mainstream press, which 
raises the question of how much pressure to assimilate was applied to Jews living in 
Britain by the mainstream, and how much was the result of Jewish community leaders 
taking pre-emptive action out of fear of provoking an increase in antisemitism.  More 
research is needed to answer this question.   
British fascists were inherently anti-communist, as were much of the 
mainstream.  References in the fascist press to the Spanish Civil War employed 
terminology that was often analogous to that of the Mail and, less often, to the 
Express, but the majority of the mainstream press offered a less heightened tone in 
their coverage, regardless of their stance on the war.  The fascist press were more 
aggressive in their denunciations of communism than the mainstream newspapers and 
regularly employed terms that de-humanised or demonised communists.  In relation to 
British politics, the Labour party and trade unions were ridiculed and accused of 
betraying the working class by the fascist press, which often conflated communism, 
socialism and the Labour party in an attempt to tap into mainstream opposition to 
communism.  During election campaigns, the Tory elements of the mainstream also 
adopted the tactic of blurring the boundaries between the Labour party, socialism and 
communism.  Yet, even at the height of election fever there was no suggestion that 
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voting Labour was other than a legitimate, if dangerously unwise, choice.  The 
evidence from the national press, therefore, supports Worley’s argument that the 
Labour party had been accepted as part of mainstream politics. In contrast, the British 
fascists’ rejection of the left, which was linked to their anti-democratic vision for a 
nation that allowed no parliamentary opposition, situated the British fascists in the 
political margins. 
There was a considerable area of overlap between the mainstream and fascist 
press in relation to foreign policy.  Disillusionment with the League of Nations was 
frequently expressed by the Tory popular press and, less often, by the Telegraph. 
While the Express and the Mail came close to expressing the distrust of the League 
promulgated in the fascist press, this was never articulated in antisemitic terms.   
There were also similarities between these papers and the fascist press in relation to 
isolation, the Empire and tariff reform.  As we have seen, the evidence presented here 
does not endorse Lewis’ assessment of BUF foreign policy.  The similarity of the 
Government’s policy of appeasement to that of the BUF and the success of the peace 
campaign brought the BUF closer to the mainstream.  Yet its commitment to the 
prospect of a fascist Europe prevented the BUF from altering its foreign policy in 
response to international developments.  Every German expansion had to be 
welcomed and justified, despite growing public unease.  Eventually the BUF found 
itself once more on the political margins as even the most recalcitrant organs of the 
mainstream press recognised the failure of appeasement and the inevitability of war. 
This thesis builds on the groundbreaking work of Durham, Gottlieb, Linehan, 
Spurr and Stone, among others, in identifying the cultural concerns of British fascists, 
and locates them in the wider context of inter-war society.9  In their diagnosis of 
society’s ills British fascists drew on the concept of cultural pessimism, which was a 
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significant strand in mainstream European thinking at the time.  Yet, their prescribed 
remedies did not attract sizeable popular support.  While the cultural pre-occupations 
of the British fascists found a more muted expression in the mainstream press, these 
represented only aspects of a much wider perception of British society.  The Tory 
quality press, while fighting a rearguard action to preserve the status quo, did not 
share the cultural pessimism of the British fascists and, significantly, the popular press 
exhibited positive signs of cultural optimism and an encouraging attitude to social 
change and innovation.  The fascists’ relentless and discordant avowals that 
decadence and decline were everywhere in evidence, together with its insistence on 
the centrality of the state in all areas of life were not compatible with mainstream 
commitment to a private life and the role of voluntary civil organisations.  
The evidence discussed here shows that the response of the mainstream press 
to British fascism was more varied than previous analyses by both Pugh and 
Lawrence suggests.10    Apart from the support of the Rothermere press between 
January and July 1934, the BUF received little positive coverage in the mainstream 
press.   Rothermere’s support generated more press interest in the BUF, but this 
largely translated into opposition.  While there was no universal concerted campaign 
against the BUF, press reports of their activities tended to focus on public order 
issues, in particular violence at BUF meetings and court cases. The reports in the 
mainstream press, especially in the liberal and left-wing papers, identified the BUF as 
political extremists and, therefore, located them outside of the mainstream.  As 
Kushner argues in relation to post-war fascist groups, the inter-war fascists are 
perceived as ‘other’ and kept at a distance, yet there are elements of fascination and 
admiration mixed with the repulsion and disgust that can lend a certain ambiguity to 
mainstream rejections of fascism, though, perhaps, not to the extent that Kushner 
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implies.11  The sense of isolation from the mainstream was intensified by the 
insistence of the national press that BUF provocation should be ignored by readers. 
This encouraged the BUF to see itself as separate from the dominant, liberal culture; 
this separation was further encouraged by the movement’s infrastructure and the 
range of BUF political, social and business activities that enabled members to 
submerge themselves in a BUF lifestyle.  While Spurr argues that the BUF operated 
as a subculture, the evidence presented here demonstrates that the BUF had created a 
functioning counterculture.12 
This thesis has established that there were significant areas of discursive 
overlap between the fascist and mainstream press.  There is a strand within the 
historiography that argues that British fascist policies were developments of earlier 
mainstream ideas.13 The evidence discussed here confirms that much of fascist 
thinking had mainstream roots and could be considered an extension of mainstream 
attitudes.  Yet, what this thesis also reveals is that even in areas that appear to show a 
convergence of views, such as attitudes to refugees or appeasement, the ideological 
imperative of the British fascists was not shared by the mainstream.  It is clear that 
there are substantial links between mainstream attitudes and those of the fascist press, 
yet at crucial points the linkage breaks down and attitudes diverge or find different 
forms of expression.  The ideology and policy of the British fascists clearly comprise 
elements of mainstream thinking and they can, therefore, be described as being ‘of the 
mainstream’, but they were constrained by the rigidity of their ideology and by their 
refusal to tolerate dissent, which limited their appeal to the wider public.  The 
perception of these movements presented by the majority of the mainstream press 
clearly situates them at the margins.  In their response to what they saw as a press 
conspiracy, the BUF increasingly defined itself in opposition to the mainstream, but 
 319
its ambition was always to be the mainstream.  Not just part of it but the whole, 
leaving no room for alternate or opposing expressions.   
Finally, it is the anti-democratic nature of their ideology, coupled with the 
virulent exclusionist antisemitism that came to taint every aspect of their policies that 
condemns the fascists of inter-war Britain to remain in the cold.  Even so, they should 
not be frozen out of our understanding of the mainstream entirely.  This thesis has 
demonstrated that there are elements of the extreme contained within the mainstream, 
and democratic societies need to acknowledge this and be vigilant against the 
encroachment of the forces of illiberalism. 
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